☢ test - Í

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (June 25, 2008). Trial court improperly admitted unconfronted testimonial statements made by an unavailable victim three weeks prior to her death for which defendant was charged with murder. Held: The theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not an exception to the Sixth Amendment confrontation requirement when the state cannot show that the defendant acted with the intent to prevent the victim from testifying . Defendant was charged with the murder of his ex-girlfriend. The trial judge admitted unconfronted testimonial statements made by the victim three weeks prior to her death to a police officer. The statements were admitted pursuant to a California statute that allows the admission of out of court statements describing the infliction of physical injury on a victim when the prior statements are deemed trustworthy- even if the victim is unavailable at trial. The California Court of Appeals and the California State Supreme Court held that such a rule does not violate the rule of Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) because Crawford recognizes a forfeiture exception. The California courts held that the defendant had forfeited his sixth amendment confrontation right because he had killed the victim and therefore made her an unavailable witness. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the forfeiture exception to the confrontation clause applies “ only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. The rule required the witness to have been kept back or detained by means of procurement of the defendant .” The court acknowledges that there is a forfeiture by wrong doing exception to the confrontation requirement; however, historically this exception only applied when the defendant acted with the intent to make the victim unavailable for trial. In Reynolds v. United States , 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879), the court allowed unconfronted testimony only “ where the defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.” A forfeiture doctrine that is as broad as the California courts’ interpretation would be “repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury: that those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty (after less than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury has pronounced guilt) should be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from their judge-determined wrong.” The basic purpose of the forfeiture doctrine is grounded in the “ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.” Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Such a forfeiture rule provides disincentive for “defendants to intimidate, bribe and kill witnesses against them […]. “ However, the forfeiture exception must have a boundary by requiring that the state show the defendant’s intent to prevent the witness from testifying at trial. “[A] legislature may not punish a defendant for his evil acts by stripping him of the right to have his guilt in a criminal proceeding determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the constitution deems reliable and admissible.” Justices Thomas and Alito concur but note that in their opinion the prior statements in this case did not implicate the confrontation clause because under the standard of Davis v. Washington and Hammons v. Indiana , 547 U.S. 813, the statements were not testimonial. However, since both parties in the instant case do not contest that the statements were testimonial, the court’s opinion is correct. Justices Souter and Ginsburg concur by emphasizing that “the sixth amendment was meant to require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process before thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation right forfeited; otherwise the right would in practical terms boil down to a measure of reliable hearsay, a view rejected in Crawford .” 541 U.S. 36. Justices Breyer, Stevens and Kennedy dissent by pointing out that the instant case fits well within the historical use of the forfeiture doctrine. Further, “… there is no difficulty demonstrating the defendant’s intent… because the defendant here knew that murdering his ex-girlfriend would keep her from testifying; and that knowledge is sufficient to show the intent that law ordinarily requires.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (June 19, 2006). Also Hammon v. Indiana, 05- 5705 . Companion cases consider the scope of Crawford v. Washington ’s ruling that the Confrontation Clause excludes “testimonial statements.” Davis concerns a 911 call; Hammon concerns a sworn victim statement given to investigating officer immediately following domestic incident. Held, the portion of the 911 call in question here (but not necessarily all 911 calls, see below) was nontestimonial; the sworn victim statement was testimonial. “ Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. [Footnote 1: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. … And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.]” 1. 911 Calls: Call in this case distinguished from Crawford : victim “was speaking about events as they were actually happening , rather than ‘describ[ing] past events,’ [Cit.]” (italics in original); victim “was facing an ongoing emergency … [victim’s] call was