☢ test - Í

court, and made available for cross-examination. ‘[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [her] prior testimonial statements.’ Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59(IV). Since Lott was afforded the opportunity to confront Jackson, even though he chose not to actually cross-examine her, the trial court’s error in admitting Jackson’s statement was cured, and the error is not grounds for reversal. Brock v. State, 270 Ga.App. 250, 253(4) (605 S.E.2d 907) (2004) (‘[s]o long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant’s rights are protected’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, Lott ‘cannot decide not to call the [declarant] as a witness at trial, then complain on appeal that his right to confrontation was violated.’ Howell v. State, 278 Ga.App. 634, 637-638(2) (629 S.E.2d 398) (2006) (physical precedent only).” Howell overruled on this point, Hatley v. State , 290 Ga. 480, 722 S.E.2d 67 (February 6, 2012). Moore v. State, 280 Ga.App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (August 2, 2006). “Moore complains that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission of testimony by one of the investigators that he had run a computer check on the license plate of the Ford Taurus that Moore had driven onto the premises and determined that the car had been reported stolen. Introduction of evidence of the stolen-car report did not implicate the concerns of the Confrontation Clause, because it would appear that the primary purpose of the report was to advise law enforcement authorities of a crime in progress rather than to initiate a prosecution; therefore, the report was not testimonial in nature. See generally Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288 (627 S.E.2d 17) (2006). And even though evidence such as this is hearsay, it has been found to be admissible. See Russell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 650(4) (512 S.E.2d 913) (1999).” Kimbrell v. State, 280 Ga.App. 867, 635 S.E.2d 237 (August 1, 2006). Trial court admitted into evidence 911 recording of concerned citizen calling to report defendant, driving his Harley wearing only black boxer shorts. Defendant was subsequently arrested for DUI. Held, 911 call was not “testimonial,” under Crawford. “911 calls … are not testimonial since, rather than being made for the purpose of proving a past event, they are not premeditated and are made to prevent or stop an ongoing crime. [ Pitts (January 24, 2005), below at 187(2).]” Dicta in Davis v. Washington (June 19, 2006), below, suggests that 911 calls may be testimonial in some cases. Little v. State, 280 Ga.App. 60, 633 S.E.2d 403 (June 21, 2006). Confrontation Clause does not bar use of statements for purposes other than proving their truth – such as, here, explaining the officer’s conduct based on information there were drugs in defendant’s vehicle. “As the United States Supreme Court noted, the Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 59, n. 9. In this case, the officer’s testimony referenced the informant’s tip only to the extent necessary to provide context or background information explaining his presence in the parking lot and his conduct in approaching Little’s car.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (June 19, 2006). Also Hammon v. Indiana, 05- 5705 . Companion cases consider the scope of Crawford v. Washington ’s ruling that the Confrontation Clause excludes “testimonial statements.” Davis concerns a 911 call; Hammon concerns a sworn victim statement given to investigating officer immediately following domestic incident. Held, the portion of the 911 call in question here (but not necessarily all 911 calls, see below) was nontestimonial; the sworn victim statement was testimonial. “ Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. [Footnote 1: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. … And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.]” 1. 911 Calls: Call in this case distinguished from Crawford : victim “was speaking about events as they were actually happening , rather than ‘describ[ing] past events,’ [Cit.]” (italics in original); victim “was facing an ongoing emergency … [victim’s] call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat”; third, “the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford ) what had happened in the past”; “[a]nd finally, the difference in the level of formality between the two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers; [victim] McCottry’s