☢ test - Í

such as those contained in OCGA § 42-1-12 are regulatory, and not punitive, in nature. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93(II) (123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164) (2003) (Alaska's sexual offender registration statute served a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and did not impose ‘retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause’ of the United States Constitution). … In light of this determination that such registry requirements are ‘not punitive, it follows that the [registry requirement under Georgia] law is not a “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment,’” quoting Doe v. Miller, 405 F3d 700, 723(V) n.6 (8 th Cir., 2005). Accord, Wiggins v. State , 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (November 8, 2010) (sex offender registration not cruel and unusual punishment). Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804 (March 1, 2010). Consecutive sentences are not per se cruel and unusual. “‘Eighth amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.’ [Cits.] ... Several ... states have reached similar conclusions.... ‘[I]f a proportionality review were to consider the cumulative effect of all the sentences imposed, the result would be the possibility that a defendant could generate an Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim simply because that defendant had engaged in repeated criminal activity.’ [Cits.] ... In accordance with this analysis, we conclude that for purposes of the Eighth Amendment ..., proportionality review should focus on individual sentences rather than on the cumulative impact of multiple sentences imposed consecutively. Where none of the individual sentences imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of those sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.’ State v. Hairston, 888 N.E.2d 1073, 1077-1078 (Ohio 2008).” Kollie v. State, 301 Ga.App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (November 19, 2009). Sentence of seven consecutive life sentences plus 265 years for series of armed robberies, kidnappings and related offenses was not cruel and unusual. Horne v. State, 298 Ga.App. 601, 680 S.E.2d 616 (June 29, 2009). Life sentence for kidnapping with injury is not cruel and unusual, even “considering that the victim's injuries were slight. We have held that a sentence of life imprisonment for kidnapping with injury is authorized by the statute. Fulcher v. State, 259 Ga.App. 648, 649-650(2) (578 S.E.2d 264) (2003). Our Supreme Court has held that OCGA § 16-5-40(b)(4) does not violate the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment even though it mandates a life sentence if the victim suffers any bodily injury, regardless of its severity. Albert v. State, 180 Ga.App. 779, 786-787(9), (10) (350 S.E.2d 490) (1986).” In re: B.Q.L.E., 297 Ga.App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742 (March 13, 2009). Juvenile court commitment was not a “sentence” constituting cruel and unusual punishment. “This contention miscasts the commitment under the Juvenile Proceedings Chapter as a sentence of punishment and ignores the very purpose of the statutory scheme. … B.Q.L.E.'s commitment ‘is not a conviction of a crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction nor operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.’ OCGA § 15-11-72.” Hillman v. State, 296 Ga.App. 310, 674 S.E.2d 370 (February 26, 2009). OCGA § § 17-10-6.1(c)(1) and 16-8-41(b), creating mandatory minimum sentences for serious violent felonies, are not cruel and unusual punishment. Acknowledging its previous holding that the mandatory sentencing provisions of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, our Supreme Court in Campbell v. State , 268 Ga. 44 (485 S.E.2d 185) (1997), found constitutional the legislature's actions of establishing maximum and minimum punishments and eliminating judicial discretion for the sentencing of certain violent offenders. Id. at 46(2).” Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (November 25, 2008). Mandatory life sentence for second lifetime offense of failing to register as a convicted sex offender is unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment, as it is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. “The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment ( Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758) (1962)), and its ‘protection against cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic “precept of justice that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” [Cit.].’ Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 525) (2008). The Eighth Amendment ‘prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.’ Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637) (1983); Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 S.E.2d 144) (1987) (the concept of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ embraces arbitrary and disproportionate sentences). The Eighth Amendment ‘contains a “narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to noncapital cases” [Cit.]’ ( Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 18, 20 (123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108) (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)), and forbids ‘only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836) (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).” Offense here is found to violate that proportionality principle. Proportionality review requires initial comparison of “the gravity of