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two, however, must be, and are, analytically distinct. Thus, although this Court cannot apply the 2006 Amendment to § 16-6-4 retroactively, we can rely on that amendment as a factor representative of the evolving standard regarding the appropriate punishment for oral sex between teenagers.” Distinguished, Whitehead (January 15, 2009), above (ten-year minimum sentence for sexual assault on student not cruel and unusual; statute had not been amended); Bragg v. State , 296 Ga.App. 422, 674 S.E.2d 650 (March 4, 2009) (same as Widner ; 18-year old convicted of rape and child molestation of 14-year old wasn’t covered by statutory amendment applied in Humphrey ); Mangrum v. State , 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009) ( Humphrey v. Wilson has no application where victim was injured and killed). Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 651 S.E.2d 32 (September 24, 2007). Trial court properly ruled upholding “the constitutionality of OCGA § 24-4-60, which requires any person convicted of a felony and incarcerated in a State correctional facility to provide a sample for DNA analysis to determine the identification characteristics specific to the person.” Imprisoned on a felony drug charge, Quarterman’s DNA sample was used to link him to an outstanding rape case. “The court finds the statute is not penal and that means used to enforce the statute have not been shown to be malicious or grossly disproportionate to the refusal to comply with the statutory mandate.” Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 631 S.E.2d 675 (June 26, 2006). Mandatory sentence of ten years to serve without parole for aggravated child molestation does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. “‘Legislative enactments constitute the clearest and most objective evidence of how contemporary society views a particular punishment. As a result, the issue of punishment is generally one for the legislative branch, and legislative discretion is deferred to unless the sentence imposed shocks the conscience.’ Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62(5) (573 S.E.2d 362) (2002).” Accord, Bennett (June 18, 2008), above; Driggers v. State , 295 Ga.App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (January 27, 2009) . Distinguished, Humphrey (October 26, 2007), above. Butler v. State, 277 Ga.App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (December 6, 2005). 1. Life imprisonment for repeat drug offenders does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, though the offense on trial was “selling $20 in cocaine.” 2. “ Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753-754(2)(a) (470 S.E.2d 874) (1996) has held that the imposition of no possibility of parole under OCGA § 17-10-7 for recidivists does not violate the Eighth Amendment. ” Affirmed on different issue, Butler v. State , 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006). Keyton v. State, 257 Ga.App. 380, 571 S.E.2d 423 (September 13, 2002). Defendant was sentenced to serve 12 months in jail for driving on an expired tag. Defendant appeals, saying court erroneously considered circumstances of his arrest - he was prowling with the apparent (late at night, dark clothes, ski mask, box cutter, on probation for armed robbery) purpose of committing a burglary or robbery. Held, although prowling charge was dismissed due to a technical error in the accusation, the evidence of the circumstances of defendant’s arrest was properly before the court and could be considered in sentencing . Sentence was within statutory parameters and thus did not violate Eighth Amendment. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (September 22, 2000). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense from arguing to the jury “the significant sentencing disparity between armed robbery and robbery by intimidation. The jury acts as a finder of fact. The legislature determines the range of sentences for a crime. The trial court properly refused to allow Johnson to argue to the jury that, in effect, the legislature was wrong in creating its sentencing structure.” Defendant here soaked store clerk with gasoline, then menaced him with a lit cigarette. Defendant argues here that “that a sentence imposed on one convicted of armed robbery not using a weapon capable of causing serious bodily harm is unconstitutionally disproportionate because it subjects the perpetrator to a minimum ten-year sentence for a crime in which the victim was not actually subject to serious physical injury,” an argument that would not seem to be supported by the evidence, and in any event rejected by the Court. “Even assuming that no weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury was involved in this case, ‘[t]he legislature’s choice of sentence is insulated from judicial review unless it is wholly irrational or so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.’ Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 597(1), 408 S.E.2d 701 (1991). We note that the fear imposed on a victim who reasonably believes he or she is being threatened by a weapon capable of causing serious bodily harm, but which is not so capable, is no less real than the fear of a victim faced with an actual deadly weapon.” Shuman v. State , 244 Ga.App. 335, 535 S.E.2d 526 (June 7, 2000). On convictions for armed robbery and related offenses, recidivist sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under OCGA § 17-10-7(b) wasn’t cruel and unusual. Based on Ortiz v. State , 266 Ga. 752, 754(2)(a), 470 S.E.2d 874 (1996).