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the Supreme Court of the United States specifically stated ‘that the protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others. [Cits.]’ … Powell does not confer upon Morrison the constitutional right to distribute obscene material.” O. JURY TRIAL See also SENTENCING – AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – GENERALLY, below Reed v. State, 318 Ga.App. 412, 734 S.E.2d 113 (November 8, 2012). Conviction for attempted armed robbery affirmed; no error in proceeding with eleven jurors with defendant’s consent, where one juror was excused mid-trial. “Counsel for an accused can validly waive the accused's right to a jury of twelve ‘if (1) the waiver is made, without objection, in the accused's presence or (2) the accused otherwise acquiesces in the waiver.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 192 Ga.App. 47, 48(3), 383 S.E.2d 615 (1989). See Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 483–484(3)(a), 299 S.E.2d 531 (1983); Weeks v. State, 187 Ga.App. 307, 310(2), 370 S.E.2d 344 (1988). The record reflects that Reed was present when his trial counsel requested that the case be allowed to proceed with only eleven jurors, did not object to his counsel's request, and, in fact, expressly consented to the request when questioned about the issue by the trial court. [fn] Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in concluding that Reed had waived his right to a jury of twelve and in allowing the case to proceed with eleven jurors. See id.” Zigan v. State, 281 Ga. 415, 638 S.E.2d 322 (November 30, 2006). Trial court properly ruled that it could not conduct a bench trial instead of a jury trial over the State’s objection, notwithstanding defendant’s waiver of jury trial. “Although [defendants’] waiver of the right to trial by jury appears adequate, the refusal of the prosecution to consent left the trial court with no choice but to deny the demand.” Adopts principles from Glass v. State, 250 Ga. 736(1), 300 S.E.2d 812 (1983), quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930), that waiver requires consent of government counsel. “Although Glass is not directly on point since it involves waiver of a unanimous verdict rather than waiver of jury trial entirely, the principles it imported into Georgia jurisprudence from the decision in Patton apply with equal force to the issue of a defendant’s demand for a bench trial instead of a jury trial. In fact, the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Patton which was quoted in Glass expressly addressed both waiver of a unanimous verdict and waiver of jury trial altogether.” Sears dissents. Accord, Smith v. State , 295 Ga. 120, 757 S.E.2d 865 (April 22, 2014). See also State v. Henderson , 283 Ga.App. 111, 640 S.E.2d 686 (December 19, 2006) (suggesting in dicta that a bench trial without express waiver of jury trial by State would be “void”). State can’t appeal trial court’s wrongful denial of jury trial, see Howard (May 19, 2003), below, and cases cited thereunder. Distinguished, Smith v. State , 291 Ga.App. 725, 662 S.E.2d 817 (May 30, 2008) (where defendant waived right to jury trial, she can’t raise State’s objection to bench trial on appeal). Smith v. State, 270 Ga.App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (November 16, 2004). On his charges of following too closely and failure to maintain lane, “while the record shows that Smith went to a bench trial before the TVB [traffic violations bureau] having been advised of his right to a jury trial and that he made no demand for a jury trial, nothing of record affirmatively shows that he did so upon a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right. Importantly, although Smith proceeded pro se in the TVB, there is no showing in the record as to whether the TVB asked him if he wished to waive his right to a jury trial. Neither is there any showing that Smith was informed of the various aspects of the right to a jury trial and of the general consequences of relinquishing that right in favor of a bench trial before the TVB, whether by affidavit or open-court colloquy showing that he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a jury trial. See Gardner v. State, 261 Ga.App. 425, 426(2) (582 S.E.2d 566) (2003) (While this Court has found such a written waiver to be adequate, waiver in open court is preferred.).” Remanded to determine whether right to jury trial was validly waived. Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688, 581 S.E.2d 1 (May 19, 2003). Under OCGA § 5-7-1(a), State could not appeal trial court’s refusal to hold jury trial where defendant waived right to jury trial. But see J. Carley’s concurrence, asserting right to jury trial belongs not just to defendant under Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI. Accord, State v. Evans , 282 Ga. 63, 646 S.E.2d 77 (June 4, 2007) (still true despite holding in Zigan, November 30, 2006, above) . Geng v. State, 276 Ga. 428, 578 S.E.2d 115 (March 10, 2003). City Court of Atlanta denied defendant’s request for jury trial on his speeding charge, holding that he had no such right within the traffic violations bureau under OCGA § 40-13- 60. Held, defendant faced possible misdemeanor punishment, hence he was entitled to a jury trial. “It is of no consequence that OCGA § 40-13-60 characterizes the offense as a ‘traffic violation’ rather than a ‘misdemeanor,’ when in fact the potential exists for prosecution as a misdemeanor under the statute.” The sentence in OCGA § 40-13-60 which seems to limit traffic violators to bench trials is declared unconstitutional; the rest of the traffic violations bureau statute is upheld. Two justices (Hines and Benham) dissent. Accord, Caputo v. State , 276 Ga.App. 477, 623 S.E.2d 687 (November 18, 2005).