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acquiesce to the waiver on the part of their attorneys.” Accord, Dunn (February 24, 2011), below. Dunn v. State, 308 Ga.App. 103, 706 S.E.2d 596 (February 24, 2011). Convictions for statutory rape and related offenses reversed; trial court erred by dismissing juror outside defendant’s presence and without first consulting counsel, replacing him with an alternate. Court announced in open court that juror had been dismissed because “he was asleep most of yesterday,” and also that other jurors “[were] complaining of his body odor today, that it was distracting them from listening to and concentrating on the evidence.” 1. Ruling violates requirement that there be a sound basis for replacement of a juror , as it is unclear what source of judge’s knowledge was, i.e., did he personally observe juror sleeping; if so, court’s duty is to awaken a sleeping juror. If action was based on hearsay, judge should have inquired with opportunity for counsel to participate in inquiry. Herring v. State, 224 Ga.App. 809, 811(1) (481 S.E.2d 842) (1997); State v. Arnold, 280 Ga. 487, 489 (629 S.E.2d 807) (2006). 2. To extent information came from other jurors, it violated defendant’s right to be present. “‘A colloquy between the trial judge and the jury is a part of the proceedings to which the defendant and counsel are entitled to be present.’ (Citation omitted.) Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807(6) (505 S.E.2d 731) (1998). Thus, ‘the appellate courts of this state have emphasized the importance of trial courts not engaging in any type of ex parte communications with jurors.’ (Citations omitted.) Payne v. State, [290 Ga.App. 589, 592(4) (660 S.E.2d 405) (2008)].” 3. Consent by counsel after-the-fact didn’t amount to waiver. “‘A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 648(2) (512 S.E.2d 913) (1999). In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show that Dunn or his counsel had any knowledge of the judge's decision to dismiss the juror or the reasons behind that decision until the time of the judge's abrupt announcement – after the juror had already been released from service. Further, the trial transcript does not show that, after the judge made his announcement, Dunn's counsel discussed the dismissal with Dunn or asked him if he supported or opposed the dismissal, that Dunn expressly authorized his counsel to waive any objection to the dismissal, or that Dunn personally waived any objection to the dismissal.” Also, “there is nothing in the trial transcript that shows that anyone in the courtroom at the time of the judge's announcement explained to Dunn his rights regarding the dismissal of the juror, nor is there anything in the record to show that counsel consulted with Dunn about how the defense should respond to the dismissal. Moreover, unlike a situation where a judge dismisses a juror for cause and, after consulting with the parties, proceeds with only eleven jurors See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 483-484(3)(a) (299 S.E.2d 531) (1983); Johnson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 77, 78-79(1) (447 S.E.2d 74) (1994). (an obvious change in the jury's composition), the substitution of an original juror with an alternate is a more subtle change, and the significance of such a change in the jury's composition may not be obvious to a criminal defendant.” Accord, Ward (February 28, 2011), above. Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (November 22, 2010). Interim review of defendants’ capital murder prosecution; trial court erred in conducting hearing on Fair’s, and State’s, motion to disqualify co-defendant Jolly’s attorneys “in order to prevent the disclosure of confidential and privileged aspects of Fair's case” in Fair’s absence. The motions were “based on an alleged conflict of interest arising from the fact that staff attorneys employed at different branches of the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender are now representing Fair and Jolly.” “This hearing “affected Fair's fundamental rights to independent counsel and to a fair trial. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161(II) (108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140) (1988) (stating that trial courts have an independent duty to investigate potential conflicts when alerted by objection from one of the parties to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair and does not contravene the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Thus, it was a critical part of Fair's trial proceedings at which he had the right to be present. See Rice v. State, 226 Ga.App. 770, 772(1) (487 S.E.2d 517) (1997) (holding that a hearing held in a defendant's co-indictee's separate trial that addressed a possible conflict of interest arising from the defendant's attorney's representation of his co-indictee was a ‘“critical stage of the proceedings' such that [the defendant's] right to be present was absolute’”). Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to ensure Fair's presence or obtain a valid waiver. See Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 456, 457(2) (519 S.E.2d 907) (1999) (setting forth the conditions that are required for a valid waiver of a defendant's right to be present). Because the trial court failed to do either, we vacate the trial court's orders on any potential conflict of interest and remand this case to the trial court in order to conduct a new hearing on that issue to be held with Fair present, or to obtain a valid waiver from Fair. See id.” McGruder v. State, 307 Ga.App. 379, 705 S.E.2d 175 (October 15, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motions to withdraw pleas and motion to modify sentence, filed eight years after plea entry; sentence was not void because court amended it outside defendant’s presence, to reflect that the fifteen years to serve consisted of ten years on the armed robbery charge and five years on the firearms charge. Based on Robertson v. State, 280 Ga. 885, 886 (635 S.E.2d 138) (2006) (entry of mandatory sentence on remand properly done outside defendant’s presence). “We hold that the court's resentencing here was purely ministerial and therefore could be performed in McGruder's absence. See id. Moreover, there could be no harm because the amended sentence is the same as McGruder's original sentence.”