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fact, did speak with police, and the jurors were able to hear his statement. Because these incidents occurred as part of a narrative of events and were not ‘directed to a particular statement or defense offered by [Shaburov],’ they were not prejudicial. DeLong v. State, 310 Ga.App. 518, 526(4) (714 S.E.2d 98) (2011). See also Hardy, 301 Ga.App. at 116(2).” Counsel thus wasn’t ineffective for failing to object on these grounds. Accord, Dority v. State , 335 Ga.App. 83, 780 S.E.2d 129 (November 20, 2015) (evidence that defendant “made arrangements to come forward, cancelled the arrangements, eventually came forward, and then waived his right to remain silent and spoke to [officer]” not improper, citing Shaburov ). Fleming v. State, 324 Ga.App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (October 2, 2013). Convictions for battery and criminal damage to property affirmed; no improper comment on defendant’s silence where defendant made internal affairs complaint against arresting officer, but then failed to show up for interview on the complaint. “Fleming freely spoke to the internal affairs investigator, as well as the arresting officer, and there is no evidence that he ever expressly invoked his right to remain silent. Moreover, Fleming testified that he declined to show up at the appointment because he did not think it would be worthwhile, not because he wanted to remain silent. Under these circumstances, the testimony about Fleming's failure to appear for the interview did not amount to an impermissible comment on his right to remain silent. See, e.g., Curry v. State, 291 Ga. 446, 451(3), 729 S.E.2d 370 (2012) ( since the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent during a police interview, testimony regarding his failure to respond to particular questions during interview was admissible ); Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800, 802(2), 708 S.E.2d 329 (2011) (where defendant spoke with police without ever invoking his right to remain silent, questions from the prosecuting attorney about why he had not come forward sooner ‘did not constitute impermissible commentary on [his] right to remain silent’) (citations omitted).” Accord, Carter v. State , 324 Ga.App. 118, 749 S.E.2d 404 (October 4, 2013) (no improper comment on defendant’s silence in asking her why her testimony contradicted her statements to officer); Eason v. State , 331 Ga.App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (March 10, 2015) (same as Curry ); Turner v. State , 331 Ga.App. 78, 769 S.E.2d 785 (March 11, 2015) (State could impeach defendant’s trial testimony with his prior inconsistent statement to officer). Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 745 S.E.2d 637 (July 1, 2013). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no error in admitting evidence of defendant’s brother’s refusal to give police a statement regarding defendant’s charges. 1. Defendant “lacked standing to invoke either [brother] Jamal's right against self-incrimination or Jamal's due process right not to have his silence used to incriminate him after being advised of his Miranda rights, see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). [fn] … Generally speaking, and particularly outside the First Amendment context, a criminal defendant ‘will not be heard to complain of the violation of another person's constitutional rights.’ Sims v. State, 243 Ga. 83, 85, 252 S.E.2d 501 (1979). See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). And Georgia courts have specifically held that a criminal defendant has no right to raise alleged violations of another individual's right against self-incrimination or rights under Miranda. See Wilson v. State, 286 Ga. 141, 142, 686 S.E.2d 104 (2009) (holding that ‘a criminal defendant lacks standing to assert [another person's] privilege against self-incrimination’ because ‘[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is that of the person under examination as a witness and is intended for his protection only’ (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Garlington v. State, 268 Ga.App. 264, 267, 601 S.E.2d 793 (2004) (holding that a defendant lacks standing to seek the exclusion of evidence on the ground that it was taken in violation of someone else's Miranda rights).” 2. Evidence of brother’s silence wasn’t excluded by Georgia’s evidentiary rule generally barring evidence of pre-arrest silence, found in Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 629–630, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991). Mallory barred “comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward” as “far more prejudicial than probative.... [S]uch a comment will not be allowed even where the defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his own defense.” Mallory, 261 Ga. at 630 (emphasis added). Declines to extend Mallory “to prohibit comments on the silence or failure to come forward of witnesses other than the criminal defendant who is on trial.” Declines to comment on whether Mallory remains good law under the new Evidence Code, considering its roots in old OCGA § 24-3-36, now repealed. Dunn v. State, 291 Ga. 551, 732 S.E.2d 524 (September 10, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “Appellant fails in his assertion that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to statements made by Detective Ricketts indicating his desire to get a statement from appellant after he calmed down.[fn] The detective's statements that he wanted to get a statement from appellant at the jail when he calmed down is not the equivalent of a comment on appellant's refusal to speak with police or that appellant invoked his right to remain silent. See Maldonado v. State, 313 Ga.App. 511, 513 (722 S.E.2d 123) (2012) (officer's statements that he wanted to talk to defendant is not the equivalent of a statement that defendant had declined to speak with officer or had invoked his right to remain silent).” Martin v. State, 290 Ga. 901, 725 S.E.2d 313 (April 24, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error