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officer and Maynard himself about his refusal to discuss or deny the allegations against him. The transcript shows that the prosecution called a fellow police officer, who was a close friend of Maynard, to testify about a conversation he had with Maynard after the victim made the allegations that led to the charges against Maynard.” “Maynard contends this questioning violated the rule against commenting upon a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward. See Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 629-630(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991) (‘a comment upon a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward is far more prejudicial than probative.’) In Jarrett v. State, 265 Ga. 28, 29(1) (453 S.E.2d 461) (1995), the Georgia Supreme Court stated that the basis for the rule was that ‘the high degree of potential prejudice of any comment upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward far outweighs its minimal probative value.’ Therefore, ‘ Mallory prohibits “any testimony touching upon the silence of an accused, because the prejudicial impact of such testimony is far greater than its minimal probative value.” (Punctuation omitted .) Wallace v. State, 272 Ga. 501, 503(2) (530 S.E.2d 721) (2000). Mallory established a hard and fast rule, although federal constitutional precedents did not require such a strict approach. ’ Gordon v. State, 250 Ga.App. 80, 82 (550 S.E.2d 131) (2001).” Court of Appeals agrees that the questioning here violated Mallory , and because of State’s repeated references to the subject in its case, “we cannot find that the error in allowing the prosecution to repeatedly cross-examine Maynard about his silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, must reverse Maynard’s conviction.” Parks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 679, 637 S.E.2d 46 (September 7, 2006). Officer’s testimony that defendant made no statements at time of arrest was not grounds for mistrial. “‘The comment of the witness was not directed to any particular statement or defense offered by the [defendant]. Furthermore, the comment on remaining silent was made during a narrative on the part of the authorities of a course of events. The remark apparently was not intended to, nor did it have the effect of, being probative on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. To reverse a conviction, the evidence of the defendant’s election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of the defendant’s defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. No such situation exists here.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Burton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 822, 823(4) (383 S.E.2d 187) (1989).” Accord, Whitaker v. State , 283 Ga. 521, 661 S.E.2d 557 (May 19, 2008); Reese v. State , 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (June 27, 2011); Jefferson v. State , 312 Ga.App. 842, 720 S.E.2d 184 (November 3, 2011); Matabarahona (November 20, 2015), above. Ekanger v. State, 279 Ga.App. 421, 631 S.E.2d 459 (May 16, 2006). “At [his shoplifting] trial, Ekanger testified in his own defense, claiming that he was not trying to steal the shirt [stuffed into his pants], but that he was only trying to hide the shirt from a friend for whom he was buying it. During cross-examination, the State asked the following questions: ‘And after [the officer] stopped you, you didn’t tell him, oh, I was going to pay for this? You didn’t tell him this [shirt] is for a friend.’” Held, prosecutor’s questions constituted improper comment on his pre-arrest silence, but harmless error in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga.App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (February 24, 2006). Officer’s brief comment on defendant’s refusal to give a statement did not mandate mistrial. “[T]here was only one reference to Haggins’s election not to make a statement, the prosecutor did not solicit the reference, and she neither mentioned Haggins’s silence nor sought to draw any prejudicial inferences from it. Thus, ‘there was no focus on [Haggins’s] silence sufficient to constitute prejudicial error.’ Clark v. State, 191 Ga.App. 386(2) (381 S.E.2d 763) (1989) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only), citing Evans v. State, 167 Ga.App. 396, 398-99(2) (306 S.E.2d 691) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536 (314 S.E.2d 910) (1984); compare Gordon v. State, 250 Ga.App. 80, 83 (550 S.E.2d 131) (2001) (reversing conviction where prosecutor repeatedly stressed defendant’s failure to explain events leading to his arrest and court told jury that prosecutor had a right to question defendant about his failure to make a statement).” Cited with approval in Ekanger (May 16, 2006), above. Accord, Kania v. State , 280 Ga.App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (July 10, 2006). Hines v. State, 277 Ga.App. 404, 626 S.E.2d 601 (January 27, 2006). Police officer’s testimony on defendant’s failure to respond to certain questions during his interrogation, though he had consented to be questioned, violated defendant’s right to remain silent, and counsel’s failure to object thereto constituted deficient performance; no reversal, however, because there is “no reasonable probability that the comments had any effect on the jury’s verdict,” as it was brief, elicited on cross, and state made no further reference or attempt to take advantage. “‘It is fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination of a defendant as to post-arrest silence where the defendant has been informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), or to permit comment thereon, since the giving of the Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant that his silence will not be used against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Clark v. State, 237 Ga. 901, 230 S.E.2d 277 (1976). See also Bennett v. State, 254 Ga. 162(4), 326 S.E.2d 438 (1985).’ Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393, 393-394(1), 435 S.E.2d 202 (1993). Furthermore, in Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 327-328(3), 297