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the credibility of Pearson’s claim that the homicide was justified, not an impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent.” Accord, Jennings v. State , 282 Ga. 679, 653 S.E.2d 17 (November 5, 2007); Dingler v. State , 293 Ga.App. 27, 666 S.E.2d 441 (July 24, 2008). 2. “During the State’s closing argument, the prosecuting attorney questioned whether someone who acted in self-defense would run away, and she continued with the following: ‘If you’ve got a good story, if you’ve got a good reason for doing something, what do you want to do? You want the police to know your side of the story. You want the police to know you were defending yourself. You are going to be right there.... You are not going to wait until you come into a courtroom and start talking about self-defense. You are going [to] talk about it on the day that it happens.’ … The State may offer evidence of the defendant’s flight from the scene, and argue that it is circumstantial evidence of his guilt. Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 517-518(3)(b), 397 S.E.2d 683 (1990). However, a prosecutor may not comment on an accused’s pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward voluntarily, even if he chooses to testify at trial. Landers v. State, 270 Ga. 189, 190(2), 508 S.E.2d 637 (1998). Thus, even though Pearson testified in his own defense, the assistant district attorney should not have included in her argument a reference to his pre-trial failure to raise the defense of justification. See Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 629(5), 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991).” Distinguished, Willis (April 26, 2011), above. Roebuck v. State, 261 Ga.App. 679, 583 S.E.2d 523 (June 16, 2003). Trial court properly allowed testimony of victim’s mother, who confronted defendant with allegations of molestation. Witness testified that defendant “did not admit or deny the allegations to her.” While Mallory v. State , 261 Ga. 625, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991) prohibits “comment upon a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward ,” this only applies to “a defendant’s silence in the face of questions by an agent of the State or his failure to come forward when he knew that he was the target of a criminal investigation” (emphasis in original). Otherwise, OCGA § 24-3-36 allows such silence to be admitted as it “may amount to an admission.” Accord, Gibson v. State , 291 Ga.App. 183, 661 S.E.2d 850 (April 16, 2008) (corporate security representative properly allowed to testify that defendant “didn’t come forward” when rep asked a group of employees if anyone owned a truck like the one used in the assault). This line of cases overruled, Reynolds (February 23, 2009), above. Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 532 S.E.2d 395 (July 5, 2000). Felony murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to testimony “that appellant had invoked his right to remain silent. The fact that a defendant exercised the right to remain silent may not be used against the defendant at trial. See Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325(3), 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). However, if the testimony concerning remaining silent is made ‘during a narrative on the part of the authorities of a course of events” and “apparently was not intended to, nor did it have the effect of, being probative on the guilt or innocence of the defendant’ it is not prejudicial. Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520(2), 272 S.E.2d 487 (1980). In fact, ‘[t]o reverse a conviction, the evidence of the defendant's election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of the defendant's defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury.’ Id. at 523, 272 S.E.2d 487. At trial, both officers testified to the following course of events: appellant executed a waiver form, made a statement, asked for an attorney which stopped the questioning, and then made additional incriminatory statements. The officers' reference to appellant's invocation of the right to remain silent was not objectionable since it was made during a narrative on the course of events surrounding the giving of appellant's statement. The testimony was not given to be probative of appellant's guilt or innocence. Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to object was not deficient assistance of counsel.” Smith v. State , 243 Ga.App. 331, 533 S.E.2d 431 (March 31, 2000). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed; no improper comment on defendant’s silence. “After playing a surveillance camera videotape of the robbery, the prosecutor asked one of the investigators, ‘In regards to any tape, voice analysis, or comparisons played to the witnesses, were you able to take a taped statement from Mr. Adrian Smith?’ The officer replied, ‘No, I was not.’ Defense counsel requested a mistrial, arguing that the jury was left with the impression that Smith asserted his right to remain silent after the arrest. The judge denied the motion, stating that he ‘was not left with that impression at all.’ We agree. The officer's comment only referred to whether or not he had taken a taped statement from Smith and did not directly comment on Smith's refusal to give a statement.” Allen v. State , 272 Ga. 513, 530 S.E.2d 186 (May 8, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no reversible error in investigator’s brief reference to invocation of right to silence. “[I]t appears from the record that the statement was inadvertent in that the investigator was merely explaining the events leading up to admissible evidence regarding appellant's unsolicited question whether police had found the rifle used in the shooting. Moreover, the prosecutor did not follow up on that portion of the investigator's statement referencing appellant's pretrial silence and made no attempt to capitalize on this issue during trial. See [ Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277, 283(4)(b), 295 S.E.2d 518 (1982)]; United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d 626, 630 (5 th Cir., 1979). Considering these factors together with the strength of the