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Hall’s action required additional circumstances to produce harm and Hall therefore does not serve as controlling precedent for a vagueness challenge based on the proffered circumstances in Boyer’s case. The statute provides ample notice to Boyer that the conduct of which she is accused is prohibited. See Land [ v. State, 262 Ga. 898, 426 S.E.2d 370 (1993)]. Roughly handling an infant clearly may endanger the bodily safety of the infant. That risk is clear, substantial, and unjustifiable, and disregarding such a risk would be a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” Sears and Fletcher dissent. CC. VENUE State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (November 21, 2005). Venue for defendant’s identity fraud prosecution was proper in victim’s home county, although none of defendant’s acts occurred there; legislature’s declaration that a person or business’s “identifying information” is “found within the county where the consumer or business victim of the identity fraud resides or is found” means that “the ‘act’ which constitutes the crime of ‘identity fraud’ does occur in the county of the victim’s residence. … There is a valid connection between the act of accessing records and the use of information contained therein. Regardless of where the records were accessed, the use of the information obtained therefrom is consummated in the county where the victim lives. There is not any constitutional impediment to the authority of the General Assembly to define a crime in such a manner as to provide that a defendant’s conduct which takes place in one jurisdiction culminates in an unauthorized act or, as in this case, an unauthorized use occurring in another.” Trial court’s ruling, that the venue provision of the identity fraud statute was unconstitutional, is reversed. Three justices dissent. Replaces Supreme Court’s prior ruling dated October 3, 2005. V. CONTEMPT In re: Sprayberry, 334 Ga.App. 571, 779 S.E.2d 732 (November 16, 2015). Finding of contempt against attorney whose cell phone vibrated in court reversed; trial court failed to provide counsel “any meaningful opportunity to be heard. The trial court was conducting a motions hearing, not a trial, such that a short time could have been spent allowing her to offer an explanation to the court before it reached judgment as to her contempt. The transcript also shows that the trial court repeatedly interrupted Sprayberry as she attempted to explain herself, with the result that the question whether she had notice of the rule barring cell phones, which had been promulgated by the court only that morning, remained unexplored. ‘Because this was a summary criminal contempt hearing, it was incumbent upon the court to afford [Sprayberry] an opportunity to be heard’ on this issue. Coleman v. State, 269 Ga.App. 827, 605 S.E.2d 424 (2004) (citation omitted). The trial court failed to provide Sprayberry with such an opportunity, with the result that the judgment of contempt against her must be reversed.” Here, when counsel attempted to explain her actions, the court cut her off, saying, “ ‘“[a]ll you got to do is pay your fine’ and refused any further discussion, twice saying, ‘The best thing to do is not talk about it.’” Birdsong v. Barnett, 334 Ga.App. 120, 778 S.E.2d 372 (October 8, 2015). Physical precedent only. Finding of criminal contempt based on violation of stalking protective order affirmed. Hearing notice here didn’t violate due process. 1. Defendant had adequate notice of hearing. “‘[W]here the alleged contumacious conduct is disobedience to a mandate of the court, ... the law requires that a rule nisi issue and be served upon the accused.... The notice given by the rule nisi is to afford the accused a reasonable time in which to prepare his defense to the charge that he had violated the court’s order.’ Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga.App. 587, 589(1), 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974) (citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted). In the instant case, the motion for contempt of the stalking protective order and the rule nisi setting the show cause hearing for September 3, 2014, were served by mail on Birdsong on August 19, 2014. Birdsong retained counsel, who filed a response to the motion and represented him at the hearing. Under these circumstances, we find that Birdsong was given adequate notice of, and opportunity to defend himself at, the hearing on the motion for contempt of the protective order.” 2. No due process violation where rule nisi setting contempt hearing didn’t include specific date of incident, but evidence showed that defendant was aware of the date and incident in question. “While it would have been the better practice to include the specific date in the motion [for contempt], we find no due process violation in this case.” Birdsong showed “that she had also filed a warrant application hearing request based on the same incident, which plainly stated the [incident] date”; Barnett’s counsel acknowledged that his client had received notice of the warrant application. “Finally, Birdsong has made no showing that he was actually surprised or deprived of a defense due to the lack of a specific date in the motion for contempt. Accordingly, ‘[i]t does not appear that the failure to allege a more specific date for the offense materially affected his ability to present a defense. We [thus] find no error in the court’s failure to dismiss the [motion].’ Gentry v. State, 235 Ga.App. 328, 329–330(3), 508 S.E.2d 671 (1998) (citation omitted).” Moton v. State, 332 Ga.App. 300, 772 S.E.2d 393 (May 5, 2015). Criminal contempt conviction affirmed; due process