☢ test - Í

contemnor's own misconduct is not a defense to criminal contempt. See Turner Advertising Co. v. Garcia, 252 Ga. 101, 103(2) (311 S.E.2d 466) (1984); Kace Investments, L.P. v. Hull, 278 Ga.App. 477, 484-485(2) (629 S.E.2d 26) (2006).” Record here supported trial court’s finding that defendant had ability to pay; notwithstanding his contention that he had other financial obligations, “there was nothing in the Sanctions Order that gave Affatato authority to prioritize third-party creditors over the payment to Considine ordered by the trial court.” 2. Defendant paid second amount due immediately before hearing, by borrowing from his parents; finding of contempt affirmed, based on trial court’s finding that defendant could have borrowed the money sooner. 3. Third finding of contempt reversed; order for payment was unclear whether the sum was to be paid by defendant or by receiver appointed for the parties’ business . “‘Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order should inform him in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must therefore be express rather than implied. Furthermore, the very nature of the proceeding in either civil or criminal contempt for an alleged disobedience of a court order requires that the language in the commands be clear and certain.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 444(3) (651 S.E.2d 72) (2007). See Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331, 333(1) (676 S.E.2d 212) (2009); Cabiness v. Lambros, 303 Ga.App. 253, 255(1) (692 S.E.2d 817) (2010).” Compare Harris (July 16, 2009), below. In re: Harris, 299 Ga.App. 216, 682 S.E.2d 196 (July 16, 2009). Juvenile court could hold parent in civil contempt for failing to provide information to DFCS per court’s verbal order. “‘The distinction between [criminal and civil contempt] is that criminal contempt imposes unconditional punishment for prior acts of contumacy, whereas civil contempt imposes conditional punishment as a means of coercing future compliance with a prior court order.’(Citation omitted.) Alexander v. Dekalb County, 264 Ga. 362, 364 (444 S.E.2d 743) (1994).” Contempt here was civil as mother could purge herself by providing the required information. Barnes and Johnson dissent, would reverse finding of contempt because verbal order was ambiguous (“I'm going to require you to contact them today or tomorrow…”). Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 419, 680 S.E.2d 508 (June 17, 2009). Physical precedent only. 1. Trial court could find defendant in direct contempt based on appearing in court under the influence of alcohol, although defendant’s drinking occurred outside the presence of the court. “Hayes attempts to characterize his actions as indirect contempt by asserting that the behavior targeted by the judge was his drinking the night before the plea hearing. But the trial court based its finding of contempt not on Hayes' action in drinking alcohol, but rather upon Hayes' possible appearance in court ‘with alcohol on [his] breath or under the influence of alcohol.’ That factor led the trial court to vacate Hayes' earlier plea, thus disrupting the court's ability to properly conduct the plea hearing in Hayes' case. And although the judge did not personally detect or observe evidence of alcohol on Hayes' person during the plea hearing, the action of Hayes' appearing with alcohol in his system occurred, if at all, in the judge's presence in open court. We find, therefore, that any contempt would be direct, not indirect, and thus subject to summary adjudication.” 2. Evidence here was insufficient to support finding beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed criminal contempt. “The record here contains only the judge's statement that some unidentified probation officer reported smelling alcohol on Hayes' person and that Hayes had failed an AlcoSensor test and the prosecutor's statement that the Intoxilyzer printout showed that Hayes registered .035. Although we have held that such evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's exercise of its inherent power to vacate Hayes' guilty plea and sentence, we find that it was insufficient to establish contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Morris v. State, 295 Ga.App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (January 15, 2009). Juvenile court’s finding of contempt against attorney reversed; although court gave attorney opportunity to be heard, it announced that counsel’s reference to her own representation of her client as ‘ineffective’ was “per se” contempt. “[T]he juvenile court's adjudication of contempt in the instant case cannot stand where the judge's ruling makes clear that the judge did not weigh the evidence but applied an erroneous per se rule. Such a per se rule has no place in an adjudication of contempt.” In re: Beckstrom, 295 Ga.App. 179, 671 S.E.2d 215 (November 13, 2008). Physical precedent only. Attorney could be held in direct contempt for failing to appear for trial after notice given by letter and telephone from trial judge. “Significantly, attorneys are officers of the court, see In re: Willis, 259 Ga.App. 5, 6(1) (576 S.E.2d 22) (2002), and courts have broader contempt powers in cases of ‘[m]isbehavior of any of the officers of the courts in their official transactions’ pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2). ‘If OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2) is construed to apply only to the disobedience by an officer of the court to a written order, this provision of our Code is rendered meaningless; it would be entirely duplicitous of the provisions of OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(3) and therefore redundant. OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2) is intended to impose upon officers of the courts engaged in their official transactions a higher duty to the court than is demanded of the broader group of individuals listed in OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(3) who are arguably subject to the contempt powers only for failure to comply with those commands of the court spread upon the record in written form. Surely the interrelationship between the court and its officers is of such a complex and on-going nature as to render impractical any