☢ test - Í

especially the heat of controversy, that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his proper role and hindering rather than facilitating the search for truth.’ In re: Dellinger , 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir., 1972).” “[W]e hold that an attorney may be held in contempt for statements made during courtroom proceedings only after the court has found (1) that the attorney’s statements and attendant conduct either actually interfered with or posed an imminent threat of interfering with the administration of justice and (2) that the attorney knew or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy. Because contempt is a crime, the evidence must, of course, support these findings beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re: Burton , 271 Ga. 491 (3) (521 S.E.2d 568) (1999). To assist in its analysis, it may be helpful for the court to consider the following non- exhaustive list of factors: (1) the extent to which the attorney was put on notice prior to the contempt citation that a continuation of the offending statements would constitute contempt; (2) the likely impact of the offending statements on the deliberations of the fact-finder, which calculus incorporates both the nature and timing of the offending conduct and whether the fact-finder is a judge or jury; (3) whether the offending statements occurred as an isolated incident or constituted a pattern of behavior; (4) the significance of the particular issue in question to the case as a whole and the relative gravity of the case; and (5) the extent, if any, to which the trial court provoked the offending statements with its own improper statements. See Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt - Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 743, (IV) (D-I) (Oct. 1990).” Vacating and remanding 284 Ga.App. 877, 645 S.E.2d 349 (March 30, 2007). Accord, In re: Hughes , 299 Ga.App. 66, 681 S.E.2d 745(July 14, 2009) (finding of contempt reversed; court alleged that attorney made “sarcastic, unprofessional looks” but gave no opportunity to be heard; no indication of prior warning or likely impact on the court’s deliberations as fact- finder). In re: Harris, 289 Ga.App. 334, 657 S.E.2d 259 (January 25, 2008). Trial court found Harris guilty of direct criminal contempt, finding that she had made comments to the children of her friend, intended “to undermine the Court’s Order [regarding the father’s visitation] and to encourage the minors and the parties to act in contempt and contravention of the Court’s Order.” Held, trial court erred in holding Harris in contempt. 1. Direct contempt : “In this case, the court’s order does not show when or where Harris and the children’s grandmother allegedly made the contumacious statements to the child and, therefore, does not establish that they occurred in the court’s presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. Id. In fact, the court’s order shows that the court first learned of the statements during an in camera discussion with the child, so the court was admittedly unaware of any contumacious conduct by Harris prior to that discussion. Accordingly, the court erred in finding that Harris’ alleged comments constituted direct criminal contempt.” 2. “[T]he record does not support a conclusion that Harris was in constructive criminal contempt, because she was not bound by the separation agreement, did not have actual notice of the separation agreement, and had no notice of or opportunity to be heard on the allegations of contempt.” Based in part on Salter v. Greene, 226 Ga.App. 384, 385(1) (486 S.E.2d 650) (1997) (“the [defendant] was not bound by the special conditions of her ex- husband’s probation, which prohibited him from having contact with her, and, therefore, could not be found in contempt for voluntarily taking a trip with him”). In re: P.W., 289 Ga.App. 323, 657 S.E.2d 270 (January 25, 2008). OCGA § 15-11-5 gives juvenile court power to hold juvenile in contempt. Juvenile courts hold the same power granted to superior courts by “OCGA § 15-6-8(5) … to punish contempt ‘by fines not exceeding $500 and by imprisonment not exceeding 20 days.’” Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 653 S.E.2d 713 (November 21, 2007). Attorneys for capital murder defendant Sanders filed challenges to the constitutionality of capital defense funding in Georgia. As part of their challenge, they subpoenaed records of the Georgia Capital Defender. The Capital Defender sought to quash the subpoena out of concern that release of the information would disclose trial strategy of the defendants in those cases. The Capital Defender employed one attorney and contracted with the other. Having been placed in an adversarial position against the Capital Defender, “Sanders’ attorneys informed the trial court that they would not proceed with any motions in Sanders’ case until conflict free counsel were appointed and the counsel advised Sanders of whether the conflict with his current attorneys could be waived. Even after the trial court expressly ordered Sanders’ attorneys to proceed with the motions hearing, they still refused to do so. Accordingly, the trial court held [attorneys] Britt and Ramseur in direct criminal contempt and ordered each of them to serve twenty-four hours in jail and pay a $500.00 fine.” Held, trial court properly held counsel in contempt, noting that the conflict of interest in question was irrelevant to almost all of the 100-plus pending motions. “‘ The disobedience of an unsuperseded order within the jurisdiction of a court is a contempt of court, even though the order is erroneous. ’ Anderson v. Dowd, 268 Ga. 146 (485 S.E.2d 764) (1997); Pearson v. George, 211 Ga. 18(3) (83 S.E.2d 593) (1954) (‘[I]f the court has jurisdiction to make [an] order, it must be obeyed however wrong it may be’).” Note, order here was determined not to be erroneous. “‘ If a person to whom a court directs an order believes that