☢ test - Í

the attorney notice of specific charges, but the hearing, including the attorney’s opportunity to be heard, must be conducted by another judge.’ (Emphasis added; Citation and punctuation omitted.)” Quoting In re: Adams , 215 Ga.App. 372, 375(1), 450 S.E.2d 851 (1994). “[T]he transcript of the colloquy between the trial judge and the attorneys at the contempt hearing, at the very least, raises an inference that the trial judge had become involved in the c ntroversy as he necessarily applied his impressions from the prior bond hearings in reaching his finding of contempt. While Schoolcraft admitted the key issue – that his response to the judge’s question was incorrect – he explained that his answer was based upon his misunderstanding of the question. The trial judge, however, did not think that his question could have been misinterpreted. As this Court has previously noted, ‘It is difficult to maintain the objectivity required of a fair and impartial judge, when you are deciding whether it is your version or the defendant’s that is correct.’ Adams, 215 Ga.App. at 377(1), 450 S.E.2d 851.” Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 13, 608 S.E.2d 645 (February 7, 2005). Charge that attorney violated court’s gag order by calling radio show and talking about trial in progress was an allegation of indirect contempt; attorney thus was entitled to notice, chance to discuss with counsel and prepare for hearing. In re: Daley, 270 Ga.App. 583, 608 S.E.2d 253 (November 22, 2004). Summoned to court as a potential juror in a death penalty trial, defendant and other jurors were instructed by the court “not to discuss the case with anyone, including each other, outside the actual voir dire questioning in the courtroom.” Back in the jury room, defendant said in a loud voice in the presence of the other jurors and a bailiff, “No one cares that I knew the victim, I was best friends with [him], and that this man deserves to die.” The panel was dismissed as a result. Several weeks later, defendant was summoned to a rule nisi hearing. Defendant contended that the judge should have recused herself. Held, judge properly did not recuse herself. “Although the contempt in this case arose from violation of a court instruction, the contemptuous conduct was not in the presence of the court; and the bailiff, not the judge, was the witness against Daley.” Coleman v. State, 269 Ga.App. 827, 605 S.E.2d 424 (October 1, 2004). Trial court found defendant in contempt for not turning his cell phone off and allowing it to ring in the courtroom. While trial court could properly conduct a summary contempt proceeding without prior notice in this circumstance, court must “afford[ ] the contemnor an opportunity to speak in his or her behalf.” Trial court erred in “summarily announcing punishment” without “affording Coleman an opportunity to be heard.” Judgment reversed. In re: Davis, 265 Ga.App. 290, 593 S.E.2d 740 (January 26, 2004). Attorney could not be held in direct criminal contempt for failing to appear for his client’s trial when court, rather than placing him “on call,” told him the case would be reached “at some point” and then attempted to call the case for trial one week later. Although the court told the defendant personally when to appear, “it is undisputed that the court did not give Davis any notice of the [ultimate] trial date.” Distinguishing Omole (December 5, 2002), below. In re: Orenstein, 265 Ga.App. 230, 593 S.E.2d 690 (January 16, 2004). Attorney prepared and presented purported consent order to which the other party did not consent, allowing his client to withdraw funds from court’s registry. Attorney was held in civil contempt for failing to repay funds when ordered to do so. “Orenstein argues that the trial court’s order [holding him in contempt] is erroneous because it does not refer to any willful or intentional conduct that can be characterized as contemptuous. We disagree. ‘Constitutional courts of Georgia have inherent and legislative authority to punish for contempt, any person in disobedience of its judgments, orders, and processes. Proper administration of justice by our courts demand they have the power to enforce obedience, by contempt proceedings if necessary.’ [Cit.] ‘It is only necessary that the order [finding contempt] specify sufficient facts to show that the respondent was in contempt of court.’ [Cit.] No magic words are required.” Show cause order giving attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard satisfied the requirements of due process; no separate “civil action” was required. In re: Holt, 262 Ga.App. 730, 586 S.E.2d 414 (August 13, 2003). Trial court properly held defense counsel in contempt for failing to comply with USCR 17.1(B) regarding conflict notices. “Even if Holt did not have seven days notice of the conflict, we find that written notice of conflict given at 4:07 p.m. on the Friday before the Monday calendar call and at 5:00 p.m. on Monday afternoon for Tuesday morning is not ‘prompt’ as required for the Uniform Rules and is insufficient.” Counsel further failed to report despite the express telephone instruction of the Court, instead attending a different court, when the Court had 100 jurors waiting just to try this case. (Case does not discuss whether contempt hearing was summary or counsel was afforded due process.) Accord, In re: Herring , 268 Ga.App. 390, 601 S.E.2d 839 (July 7, 2004).