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VI. DEFENSES See also related subsections under JURIES AND JURORS – CHARGE, below A. ABANDONMENT Falay v. State, 320 Ga.App. 781, 740 S.E.2d 738 (March 26, 2013). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on abandonment when it asked, during deliberations, “When you know a crime is going to be committed, does walking away and not reporting it make you a party to the crime? Does not reporting it when you witness it make you a party to the crime?" Defendant requested that the court respond by charging on abandonment, a charge he hadn’t previously requested. “‘The court may properly refuse to instruct the jury on matters not relevant to the issues on trial. Indeed, the court should enlighten rather than confuse the jury in responding to questions. Thus, refusing to answer jury questions requesting irrelevant information is entirely proper. Instead, the court may respond to a jury's question by repeating charges which are legally sufficient and not misleading.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holloman v. State , 257 Ga. App. 490, 492 (571 S.E.2d 486) (2002). Abandonment, a ‘voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose,’ OCGA § 16-4-5 (a), is available only where the defendant first ‘admit[s] engaging in the [underlying] crime.’ Younger v. State , 288 Ga. 195, 197 (1) (702 S.E.2d 183) (2010). Falay made no such admission.” Simmons v. State, 289 Ga. 773, 716 S.E.2d 165 (October 3, 2011). Murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly declined to find ineffective assistance based on failure to seek a jury charge on abandonment. “[A] jury charge on abandonment is available only where the defendant first ‘admit[s] engaging in the [underlying] crime.’ Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 197 (702 S.E.2d 183) (2010). Appellant made no such admission, and so his trial counsel committed no error on this score. And even if he had admitted participating in the murder, it would be a stretch to say he was entitled to an abandonment charge, because Appellant was the driver of the getaway car. See Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga.App. 486, 489 (672 S.E.2d 459) (2009) (holding that an abandonment charge was not warranted partly because the defendant drove the getaway car).” Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (November 8, 2010). Felony murder and firearm conviction affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to charge on abandonment defense because 1. Younger did not admit engaging in the crime of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery so as to warrant a charge on the affirmative defense of abandonment. See Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 806(5) (505 S.E.2d 731) (1998); and 2. there was no evidence of a voluntary renunciation of purpose . “OCGA § 16-4-5 specifically states that to be considered abandonment, the defendant's conduct must be ‘under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.’ OCGA § 16-4-5(a). And, a ‘renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from ... [a] belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose.’ OCGA § 16-4-5(b)(1).” “ The State's evidence was that Younger left the house when confronted, which is not a voluntary renunciation, but a response to circumstances that increased the probability of apprehension and made accomplishing the criminal purpose more difficult. [Cits.]” Allen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 82, 648 S.E.2d 677 (June 22, 2007). Abandonment defense under OCGA § 16-4-5 “requires a voluntary and complete renunciation of criminal purpose. Defendant here could be convicted of attempted rape; “the evidence shows that upon discovering the victim was menstruating, Allen apparently found the accomplishment of the crime to be more difficult. He did not, however, abandon his criminal enterprise, choosing instead to force the victim to perform fellatio on him. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Allen made a complete renunciation of his criminal purpose. See Cunningham v. State, 240 Ga.App. 92, 99(4)(c) (522 S.E.2d 684) (1999).” Level v. State, 273 Ga.App. 601, 615 S.E.2d 640 (June 9, 2005). Fact that perpetrators fled from scene of planned robbery when they saw police patrolling the area did not demand a finding that they abandoned their robbery plans. “Pursuant to OCGA § 16-4-5(a), it is an affirmative defense when one abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents its commission under circumstances ‘manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.’ Such a renunciation is not voluntary and complete when, as here, it results from ‘[a] belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose.’ OCGA § 16-4-5(b)(1). Here, [the men Level procured to commit the robbery] made no effort to abandon the robbery until the fortuitous arrival of the police. See Jones v. State, 246 Ga.App. 494, 495(1)(b), 540 S.E.2d 693 (2000); Hayes v. State, 193 Ga.App. 33, 37(7), 387 S.E.2d 139 (1989). Also, none of these three actual perpetrators of the attempted robbery asserted the affirmative defense of abandonment. A directed verdict on this count was not demanded and there was no error in its denial.” Accord, Heard v. State , 299 Ga.App. 44, 681 S.E.2d 701 (July 13, 2009) (no abandonment of bank robbery where defendant “made no effort to