☢ test - Í

back inside the car when [co-defendant] Lewis bumped him, causing him to fire the gun and shoot Lynn. However, Brockman admitted that he went to the service station with the intent to rob Lynn, that he pointed a loaded gun at Lynn, and that he twice demanded money from Lynn. He also testified that after he told Lynn, ‘No, you got it,’ Lewis began yelling to go, that his ‘first thought was that a policeman had pulled in behind [them],’ that ‘at that point ... [he] stomped on the gas,’ that Lewis was hitting his shoulder as he pulled his hand back into the car, and ‘that's when the gun went off.’ Therefore, based on his own testimony, the ‘criminal scheme’ was ongoing when Brockman shot the victim. See generally Collier, supra, 244 Ga. at 560(3) (‘A homicide is within the res gestae of the underlying felony for the purpose of the felony-murder rule if it is committed while fleeing the scene of the crime.’). Moreover, Brockman acted with criminal negligence when he pointed the loaded gun at Lynn, rendering the defense of accident inapplicable. See Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 832(4) (700 S.E.2d 544) (2010) (For purposes of OCGA § 16–2–2, being criminally negligent means acting ‘in a manner showing an utter disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby,’ and no charge on accident was required where the defendant got into bed with the victim with his finger on the trigger of a loaded gun, even though he testified that the victim's pushing the gun away caused it to accidentally fire).” Kidd v. State, 292 Ga. 259, 736 S.E.2d 377 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly refused jury charge on accident. “In this case, there was no evidence that Appellant shot the victim by accident. The evidence showed that the victim was shot in his back at close range at an angle that could not be self-inflicted, as well as shot in the leg from a distance of more than two feet. Two witnesses testified that appellant had something in his hand immediately prior to the fight, with one of the witnesses stating that the object was a gun. Appellant's basic assertion to authorities that a gun went off during the struggle with the victim was insufficient to warrant a charge on accident. See Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828(4), 700 S.E.2d 544 (2010) (claim by a defendant that the shooting was an accident is, without more, insufficient to authorize a charge on accident).” State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (November 5, 2012). Reversing 313 Ga.App. 305, 721 S.E.2d 549 (November 9, 2011), and reinstating convictions for vehicular homicide, second degree, and failure to yield to pedestrian. Trial court properly declined to charge jury on defense of accident. 1. Contrary to Court of Appeals, “‘strict liability’ traffic offenses are not offenses with no criminal intent element. They do not require the specific intent or wrongful purpose that is an element of other crimes, but they do require the defendant to have voluntarily committed the act that the statute prohibits, which typically involves driving at a particular time and place (e.g., through a red light, see OCGA § 40–6–20(a)) or in a particular way (e.g., too fast, see OCGA § 40–6–181).” 2. Defense of accident may apply in strict liability offenses “only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the prohibited act. Contrary to Ogilvie's assertion, this does not eliminate the accident defense in traffic offense cases. The defense must be based, however, on evidence that the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an unforseeable physical ailment or external force. Cf. Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 532, 536–537 (552 S.E.2d 499) (2007) (holding that a justification instruction was required on a failure to maintain lane charge based on evidence that the defendant accelerated and hit a utility pole to avoid an armed attack); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga.App. 614, 615 (347 S.E.2d 354) (1986) (holding that a charge on accident was required in a prosecution for obstructing a police officer based on the defendant's testimony that she obstructed the officer when she fell due to illness).” Thus, on the failure to yield to a pedestrian charge here, for example, “[a] charge on accident is appropriate for this crime only when there is evidence that the defendant did not voluntarily drive into the crosswalk.” 3. Defendant’s claim that child suddenly ran in front of her did not state a defense of accident. “If Ogilvie had been indicted for a crime that required her to have intentionally or maliciously hit the child, like murder, see OCGA § 16–5–1, this evidence would have supported an accident instruction, because it would tend to show that she did not act with the requisite “criminal ... intention.” OCGA § 16–2–2. As explained above, however, that was not the type of intent required to commit a strict liability traffic offense.” Rather, the defense raises an issue of proximate cause with regard to the vehicular homicide charge. “In the language of § 40–6–393(c), the evidence raised the issue of whether Ogilvie's alleged violation of § 40–6–91 was ‘the cause of [the child's] death.’ The trial court committed no error in this regard, however, giving the jury a full charge on proximate cause, in addition to charging the relevant language of those two statutes.” “Cause” here means “proximate cause,” citing State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010). Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 700 S.E.2d 544 (October 4, 2010). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to jury charge on accident. “Claims by a defendant that he ‘“didn't mean to do it” and “it was an accident”’ are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident. McDade v. State, 270 Ga. 654, 646 (513 S.E.2d 733) (1999). Mills contends that if the jury believed his trial testimony, it could have found in his favor on an affirmative defense of accident. However, ‘“[d]eath caused by criminal negligence is not an accident.’”