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accident, as defendant didn’t admit committing the act in question). Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 607 S.E.2d 147 (October 29, 2004). Convictions for reckless driving and failure to use due care affirmed. “The defense of accident applies where ‘it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.’ [Cit.] The defense is not applicable here because Winston was charged with reckless driving and failure to exercise due care, not with striking pedestrians. Thus, ‘although [she] had been in an accident, the charges against [her] related not to the accident but to [her] condition while driving.’ [Cit.] Moreover, the defense of accident is an affirmative defense available only where the defendant admits committing the act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it. [ Cit.] Because Winston did not admit to driving recklessly or without due care, she had no right to a charge of accident with regard to those crimes.” Accord, Davis v. State , 301 Ga.App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (November 13, 2009); Sevostiyanova v. State , 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012) (in prosecution for violation of duty upon striking unattended vehicles, defendant not entitled to charge on accident where she denied striking vehicles); Lauderback v. State , 320 Ga.App. 649, 740 S.E.2d 377 (March 21, 2013). Byrd v. State, 277 Ga. 554, 592 S.E.2d 421 (February 2, 2004). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court did not err in refusing to charge jury on both self-defense and accident. Cites one rare case where this was found to be error, Koritta v. State , 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994). Trial court here properly charged on accident, but not justification, in accordance with the defense presented at trial. Compare Hill (September 24, 2009), above. Cornell v. State, 277 Ga. 228, 587 S.E.2d 652 (October 20, 2003). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “Cornell’s intentional firing of the gun at the victim, even if only intended to scare the victim and ‘back him off,’ does not invoke the defense of accident. [fn] See Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 478, 480 S.E.2d 32 (1997) (defendant’s testimony that he fired to defend himself and scare the victim did not invoke the defense of accident); Scott v. State, 261 Ga. 611, 612, 409 S.E.2d 511 (1991) (no trial court error in failing to charge on accident when undisputed that defendant intentionally pulled the gun’s trigger).” Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 412, 587 S.E.2d 868 (September 25, 2003). Defendant, charged with DUI and failure to maintain lane, asked for jury charge on accident, “because there was some contested evidence at trial that his brakes might have malfunctioned.” Trial court properly refused to give the charge: “the law of accident is inapplicable here because Stefanell was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain lane, not failing to stop before hitting the backhoe … ‘[T]he charges against [him] related not to the accident but to his condition while driving.’” Also, defendant was not entitled to a charge on the affirmative defense of accident because he did not admit the underlying offenses. “An affirmative defense is a defense that admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to justify, excuse or mitigate it.” Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 574 S.E.2d 372 (November 7, 2002). Trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on misfortune or accident under OCGA § 16-2-2 in this vehicular homicide prosecution, since “there is evidence that the defendant could not have avoided the collision due to circumstances beyond his control. See Morris v. State, 210 Ga.App. 617, 618(2), 436 S.E.2d 785 (1993) (evidence that foggy weather conditions made it impossible or almost impossible for defendant to see the stop sign he ran at the time he struck the victim’s vehicle); Allen v. State , 177 Ga.App. 600, 602(2)(a), 340 S.E.2d 246 (1986) (evidence that defendant struck the victims with his car after turning sharply to avoid a collision with another vehicle which unexpectedly moved into lane at same time as did defendant); Roberts v. State, 173 Ga.App. 701, 704(1), 327 S.E.2d 819 (1985) (contrary to state’s evidence that defendant caused collision by not slowing down at an intersection, defendant testified that she stopped or drastically slowed down and was then hit by speeding vehicle); Carswell v. State, 171 Ga.App. 455, 460(5), 320 S.E.2d 249 (1984) (evidence that defendant’s car left highway and struck victims after he swerved to avoid hitting vehicle entering highway); see also Miller v. State, 236 Ga.App. 825, 828(2), 513 S.E.2d 27 (1999) (evidence that defendant could not have avoided hitting bicyclist because the night was so dark, the bicycle did not have a big enough reflector, and the bicyclist was wearing nonreflective clothing). ‘It is error to fail to charge on this defense, whether it is the sole defense, the controlling issue, or one of the main theories of defense if the issue is raised by the evidence.’ Carswell , 171 Ga.App. at 461, 320 S.E.2d 249.” Overruled on this point, State v. Ogilvie , 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (November 5, 2012). Sellers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 621, 538 S.E.2d 511 (August 21, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no error in trial court’s charge to the jury that “the defense of accident and the defense of justification for self-defense are inconsistent defenses.” The Supreme Court noted in Turner v. State , 262 Ga. 359, 360(2)(b), 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992) “that there will occasionally be a case where ‘a party who is armed with a weapon contends that while he was defending