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Pattern jury charge on affirmative defenses was not plain error. Mathis v. State, 299 Ga.App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (July 31, 2009). Conviction for armed robbery reversed; defendant was entitled to jury charge on coercion or duress as his sole defense, even though he didn’t request it in writing. “Since [co- defendant] Waller testified that he committed such acts because Mathis pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him or his family, he was entitled to a jury charge on coercion, and the trial court erred in failing to so instruct the jury, even in the absence of a request by Mathis.” Lightning v. State, 297 Ga.App. 54, 676 S.E.2d 780 (March 26, 2009). Trial court properly charged jury that defendants’ claim of self-defense was an admission of committing the acts alleged. “‘[W]ith a legal affirmative defense, the accused admits the elements of the crime, but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate by showing no criminal intent; all elements of the parts of the crime are admitted with the exception of the intent. All defenses which have been held to be statutory affirmative defenses meet these criteria, i.e., justification, self-defense or defense of others, rendering assistance to law enforcement officers, defense of habitation, defense of property other than habitation, entrapment, and coercion. Each of these affirmative defenses requires that the defendant admit the crime before he can raise such defense.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State, 240 Ga.App. 774, 776(1) (525 S.E.2d 154) (1999). Thus, to assert a defense of justification, like self defense, a defendant must admit the act, or he is not entitled to a charge on that defense. Ojemuyiwa v. The State, 285 Ga.App. 617, 620(1) (647 S.E.2d 598) (2007). Because the Lightnings requested a charge on self defense, and that was the theory of their case, the trial court did not err by giving the charge to which they now object.” Burchett v. State, 283 Ga.App. 271, 641 S.E.2d 262 (January 12, 2007). Convicted of underage possession of alcohol, defendant contends that State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the exception provided by OCGA § 3-3-23(c) (person under 21 may possess alcoholic beverage in home when provided by parent or guardian) didn’t apply. Held, State had no burden to disprove exception where defendant came forward with no evidence that the exception did apply. “ Where certain conduct is generally prohibited, but where a statutory exception permits the conduct under specified circumstances, the exception amounts to an affirmative defense. May v. State, 179 Ga.App. 736, 737(2) (348 S.E.2d 61) (1986). See OCGA §§ 16-3-20 through 16-3-28 (statutory affirmative defenses); Jack Goger, Daniel's Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 21-17 (2007 ed.) (affirmative statutory defenses). The initial burden of producing evidence to support an affirmative defense rests upon the defendant charged with the offense. May v. State, 179 Ga.App. at 737(2). Only after a defendant raises the issue at trial is it then incumbent upon the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Because possession of an alcoholic beverage by a person under 21 years of age is generally prohibited, OCGA § 3-3-23(a)(2), the exception to that general prohibition created by OCGA § 3-3-23(c), which allows the conduct under specified circumstances, is an affirmative defense. Because Burchett never produced evidence that his parent or guardian gave him the beer and that his possession of it was in the home and presence of his parent or guardian, the State did not have to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See May v. State, 179 Ga.App. at 737(2). Burchett’s sufficiency argument fails.” E. ALIBI See also PROCEDURE – ALIBI, NOTICE OF, below Rembert v. State, 324 Ga.App. 146, 749 S.E.2d 744 (October 7, 2013). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant’s alibi defense, first disclosed on day of trial. OCGA § 17-16-5(a) requires at least ten days’ notice of an alibi defense and authorizes trial court to exclude such evidence “upon a showing of prejudice or bad faith.” “Rembert presumably knew of his alibi at the time of his arrest in March 2011. Yet by his own admission, he failed to mention that alibi to the arresting officer or the investigating officer. Nor did he assert his alibi at the evidentiary hearing held on the issue of his probation revocation, and he admitted that he did not inform his attorney of his alibi until the morning of trial. [Cit.] Moreover, during the approximately six months that elapsed between Rembert's arrest and trial, neither of his alibi witnesses (who were his mother and his brother) came forward to inform either the prosecution or Rembert's lawyer that Rembert was with them at the time of the robbery. [Cit.] These facts support a finding that Rembert acted in bad faith when he failed to provide the State with timely notice of his alibi.” “With respect to the element of prejudice, a court may infer that the State is prejudiced when the prosecution ‘does not have the full ten days to investigate alibi evidence.’ (Citations omitted.) Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 732(3) (699 S.E.2d 531) (2010). This is because where ‘[t]he State is denied the ten days authorized by law in which to investigate and refute the alleged alibi, ... the development of ... evidence [to refute the alibi] is clearly hampered, if not rendered impossible.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Freeman v. State, 245 Ga.App. 384, 385(2) (537 S.E.2d 776) (2000). Thus, the fact that the State did not learn of Rembert's alleged alibi until the morning of jury selection supports the trial court's implicit finding that the prosecution was prejudiced by Rembert's failure to comply with the State's discovery request.” Trial court,