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G. BURDEN OF PROOF Seminal cases: State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Smith v. United States, 11-8976, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 714, 184 L.Ed.2d 570, 2013 WL 85299 (January 9, 2013). Affirming D.C. Circuit Court, and defendant’s convictions for drug conspiracy and related offenses. Trial court properly charged jury that defendant had burden of proving withdrawal from conspiracy, and due process doesn’t prohibit government from placing burden of proof of affirmative defenses on defendant. Defendant here argues that he withdrew from the conspiracy earlier than the applicable statute of limitation, and that the government must prove his active participation in the conspiracy after that date. Trial court properly ruled to the contrary. “Establishing individual withdrawal was a burden that rested firmly on the defendant regardless of when the purported withdrawal took place. Allocating to a defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due Process Clause. While the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt ‘every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged,’ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), ‘[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required,’ Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). The State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant only ‘when an affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime.’ Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting). Where instead it ‘excuse[s] conduct that would otherwise be punishable,’ but ‘does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself,’ the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006). Withdrawal does not negate an element of the conspiracy crimes charged here. … Far from contradicting an element of the offense, withdrawal presupposes that the defendant committed the offense. … Withdrawal terminates the defendant's liability for postwithdrawal acts of his co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy.” Similarly, the statute of limitations may provide a complete defense, but “[a] complete defense … is not necessarily one that establishes the defendant's innocence. … A statute-of-limitations defense does not call the criminality of the defendant's conduct into question, but rather reflects a policy judgment by the legislature that the lapse of time may render criminal acts ill suited for prosecution. See, e.g., Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). Thus, although union of withdrawal with a statute-of-limitations defense can free the defendant of criminal liability, it does not place upon the prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw. As with other affirmative defenses, the burden is on him.” “‘[T]he common-law rule was that affirmative defenses ... were matters for the defendant to prove.’ Martin, supra, at 235; see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 201 (1769).” Noble v. State, 282 Ga.App. 311, 638 S.E.2d 444 (November 7, 2006). “‘When a defendant raises an affirmative defense [here, accident] and offers evidence in support thereof, the [s]tate has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 128(7)(l) (630 S.E.2d 621) (2006) (whole court; Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009)). Whether the state has satisfied this burden is a jury question. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga.App. 846, 851(5) (595 S.E.2d 654) (2004).” Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (June 22, 2006). Affirming Fifth Circuit; in federal prosecution for receiving firearm while under indictment and related offenses, district court properly allocated burden of proof on defense of duress to defendant. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the defense of duress does not negate the mens rea element of the offenses. “The crimes for which petitioner was convicted require that she have acted ‘knowingly,’ [cit.], or ‘willfully,’ [cit.]. As we have explained, ‘unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term “knowingly” merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.’ Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) (footnote omitted). And the term ‘willfully’ [cit.] requires a defendant to have ‘acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’ Ibid . … [E]ven if we assume that petitioner's will was overborne by the threats made against her and her daughters, she still knew that she was making false statements and knew that she was breaking the law by buying a firearm. The duress defense, like the defense of necessity that we considered in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), may excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but the existence of duress normally does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself. [fn]” “The jury instructions in this case were consistent with this requirement [that the government prove that the defendant acted “knowingly” or “willfully”] and, as such, did not run afoul of the Due Process Clause when they placed the burden on petitioner to establish the existence of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.” 2. Also contrary to defendant’s argument, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499