☢ test - Í

[himself] against such other's imminent use of unlawful force’ (emphasis supplied). See also OCGA § 16–3–24.2 (‘A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16–3–21 ... shall be immune from criminal prosecution.’) (emphasis supplied). Thus, a mere threat of force is all that is required when one reasonably believes that he must defend himself against another's imminent use of unlawful force. In this regard, a person is justified in going beyond merely threatening to use force and actually ‘using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm ... if he ... reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself.’ OCGA § 16–3–21(a). … [T]he record reveals that Waldon was totally irrational, that Green did not know what Waldon was going to do, and that Green held onto the knife for ‘protection’ and to ‘scare’ Waldon. Waldon knew that Green had the knife, and Waldon nevertheless violently attacked him. By holding onto the knife for his own protection and to scare Waldon, Green was, at the very least, showing a threat of force to Waldon in direct response to an imminent violent attack from Waldon.” State v. Cohen, 309 Ga.App. 868, 711 S.E.2d 418 (June 13, 2011). Trial court properly dismissed accusation charging school teacher with simple battery against three elementary school students; trial court could find that teacher was acting in good faith attempt to discipline or maintain order. Despite school’s “no-touch” policy, “the principal agreed that there are some situations in which a teacher may touch a student as part of maintaining order, although there might be disagreement as to the amount of touching that is needed.” Using “any evidence” standard of review, State v. Yapo, 296 Ga.App. 158, 160 (2) (674 S.E.2d 44) (2009), evidence allowed trial court to find that defendant acted in good faith based on his own testimony that he grabbed a boy to separate a fight, or pushed down on a student’s shoulder “to encourage him to be seated,” or “placed a hand on the shoulder of a student to get their attention.” Accord, Pickens (March 3, 2015), above. Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (November 22, 2010). Interim review of defendants’ capital murder prosecution; trial court correctly ruled that OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides immunity from prosecution only if the person killed was entering the defendant’s dwelling unlawfully; not, as contended by defendant, if the rightful occupant “reasonably believes” that the entry was unlawful. The code section reads in pertinent part: “A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, such person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: … (2) That force is used against another person who is not a member of the family or household and who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.” (Emphasis added.) “The introductory clause, when read in isolation, might be construed to apply a reasonable belief standard with respect to the unlawful entry or attack element. We reject that interpretation, however, because we conclude that it is not supported by a reading of the statute as a whole, would thwart the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute, and would alter both the well-established common law principle and the long-standing precedent of this State's appellant courts that generally the use of force in defense of habitation is justified only where there is an unlawful entry.” Instead, “the term ‘reasonably believes’ and, thus, the reasonable belief standard, [fn] in the introductory clause of the statute applies only to an actor's perception of the amount of force necessary to prevent or terminate another's unlawful entry or attack; consequently, the entry or attack itself must have been in fact unlawful, regardless of what a defendant might have believed, in order for the statute to apply.” As the deputy’s entry here pursuant to warrant was lawful, immunity couldn’t apply regardless of defendant’s belief. State v. Green, 288 Ga. 1, 701 S.E.2d 151 (October 4, 2010). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court’s order finding that defendant’s killing of victim was justified reversed and remanded; trial court used incorrect legal standard in making its determination. “In reaching its conclusion that Green was immune from prosecution, the trial court made no finding that Green was justified under OCGA § 16-3-21(a) in using force which was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm because he reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself. Instead, the trial court ruled that Green was immune from prosecution because he did not commit any of the acts that statutorily preclude a finding of justification. See OCGA § 16-3-21(b). While the commission of any of the three acts listed in § 16-3-21(b) does preclude a finding of justification, the converse of that statement -- that the lack of the commission of any of the three acts demands a finding of justification -- is not legally sound. Subsection (a) of OCGA § 16-3-21 requires that the person claiming justification in a murder prosecution establish that he held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force against the decedent was necessary to prevent the defendant's death or great bodily injury. Mullins v. State, [287 Ga. 302 (1) (695 S.E.2d 621) (2010)]. The trial court did not take into account subsection (a) of § 16-3-21 when it concluded that Green was immune from prosecution.” Later appearance of same case after remand, see Green (October 3, 2011), above.