☢ test - Í

Ga. 886, 889(4), 204 S.E.2d 597 (1974) (under its police power, the State has the right to determine which harmful substances are illegal to possess). The requested instruction could have misled the jury into believing that it could acquit Carlson if it found that Carlson's conduct was justified because he thought that he derived some benefit from using the marijuana, notwithstanding the apparent illegality of possessing it. See Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 402(3), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999); Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 557, 558(3)(b), 385 S.E.2d 404 (1989) (when the charge being sought is not required by the evidence, it is properly refused).” Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99, 515 S.E.2d 836 (May 17, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly ruled out evidence of defendant’s alleged post-traumatic stress disorder as not relevant to any claim of “justifiable homicide” or voluntary manslaughter. “The trial court refused to allow an expert to testify that, in his opinion, Bryant suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from childhood sexual abuse. Bryant enumerates this evidentiary ruling as error, contending that the excluded testimony was relevant to whether his shooting of Ryan was a justifiable homicide. As defense counsel conceded in the trial court, however, the expert's opinion testimony was ‘not really going as to a justification defense in this case.’ Indeed, the testimony could not be admissible for that purpose, since Bryant did not contend that he had a history of being sexually abused by Ryan himself. If Bryant was asserting self-defense, he could show other specific acts of violence committed against him and others by Ryan. See Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407(3) (c), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991). He could not, however, support that defense by the proffer of any evidence based upon the commission of extraneous acts of abuse upon him by anyone other than Ryan. ‘It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the [S]tate to rebut, refute or test as to credibility, evidence of abuse by third parties.’ Clenney v. State, 256 Ga. 123, 124-125(3), 344 S.E.2d 216 (1986).” Williams v. State, 237 Ga.App. 814, 515 S.E.2d 875 (April 8, 1999). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s justification defense : “ Pursuant to [Uniform Superior Court] Rule 31.6, a defendant who is asserting a claim of justification must, ten days prior to trial, give the State notice of his intent to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim. Compliance with the rule is mandatory. Johnson v. State, 270 Ga. 234, 235(3), 507 S.E.2d 737 (1998). Williams failed to give the requisite notice. [fn] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence.” W. MERE PRESENCE Clark v. State, 319 Ga.App. 880, 738 S.E.2d 704 (February 22, 2013). Evidence supported Clark’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine and related offenses, along with two co-defendants. Contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence of his relationship with the co-defendants, his driving, and his handling of the medicine bottle containing the drugs showed more than “mere presence at the scene.” Edwards v. State, 306 Ga.App. 713, 703 S.E.2d 130 (November 4, 2010). Convictions for possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine affirmed; evidence showed more than mere presence: “In addition to showing that Edwards lived at the residence in question, the state adduced further evidence that methamphetamine was found in the master bedroom atop the same dresser as a driver's license bearing Edwards's name and the Englewood residential address; that stored in a lockbox underneath the bed in that room were recipes for producing methamphetamine or a similar substance, along with digital scales associated with the drug trade; and that Edwards's residential premises was being used as a clandestine methamphetamine lab.” X. MISTAKE OF FACT Franklin v. State, 335 Ga.App. 557, 782 S.E.2d 461 (February 2, 2016). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to sua sponte charge the jury on mistake of fact. “[O]ur Supreme Court has previously held that, in cases in which a jury finds a defendant guilty of forcible rape after proper instruction, ‘[t]he element of force negates any possible mistake as to consent,’ Lamar v. State, 243 Ga. 401, 403(6), 254 S.E.2d 353 (1979); accord Baise v. State, 232 Ga.App. 556, 558(1), 502 S.E.2d 492 (1998); Johnson v. State, 204 Ga.App. 369, 369(1), 419 S.E.2d 96 (1992), such that the court does not err by failing to charge on mistake of fact. See Lamar, 243 Ga. at 403(6), 254 S.E.2d 353 (holding that appellant’s contention that trial court erred in failing to charge on mistake of fact was without merit when jury was properly charged as to forcible rape and found appellant guilty of same); see also Johnson, 204 Ga.App. at 369(1), 419 S.E.2d 96. … Here, mistake of fact was not Franklin’s sole defense to these charges, as he claims on appeal. Instead, the record reflects that Franklin, who did not testify in his own defense, attempted to show that intercourse with the victim was consensual, not that he mistakenly believed that it was consensual.”