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VGCSA prosecution, trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to charge on mistake of fact based on defendant’s claim that he didn’t know what the pills he possessed were. Arrested for loitering and obstruction of officers, a search incident to arrest revealed three Ambien tablets in defendant’s pockets. “The entire basis of appellant’s defense at trial was that he knew he possessed the sleeping aids, but that he believed the pills were some form of over-the- counter medication and not Zolpidem Tartrate.” Trial court declined charge on mistake of fact, and Court of Appeals agreed, “construing OCGA §§ 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 not to require the defendant to know that the pills he possessed were a controlled substance.” Supreme Court disagrees: “[T]he criminal intent required by OCGA § 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 is intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug. … Therefore, possessing Zolpidem Tartrate, which one knows or understands to be Zolpidem Tartrate is a violation of OCGA § 16-13-30(a) because Zolpidem Tartrate, which one believes or understands to be an over-the counter medication (such as Doxylamine Succinate, sold as an over-the-counter sleep aid under the brand name Unisom) is not a crime because the requisite mens rea is not present. It is this latter scenario which appellant asserts to be the case. … Appellant’s knowledge of the chemical identity of the substance in his possession is purely a question of fact. As such, it should have been a question for the jury, and the jury should have been instructed to consider the defense of mistake of fact.” Court of Appeals took the facts differently, believing that the defense was that “appellant knew that the three pills in his possession were Zolpidem Tartrate, but that he asserted a defense based on not knowing that Zolpidem Tartrate is a controlled substance under Georgia law. Were that the case,” Supreme Court says, “the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the matter would have been correct.” Query: does this open the door for a drug couriers to remain willfully ignorant of what substances they possess? See Maddox v. State , 272 Ga.App. 440, 612 S.E.2d 484 (February 10, 2005) (arson case; approving charge on willful ignorance as supplying the element of knowledge of critical facts), and cases cited therein; Taylor v. State , 293 Ga.App. 551, 667 S.E.2d 405 (September 16, 2008) (forgery case; ‘ mistake of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only if it is not superinduced by the fault or negligence of the [defendant]’). Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459, 712 S.E.2d 828 (July 5, 2011). Reversing 303 Ga.App. 589 (693 S.E.2d 826) (2010), burglary and criminal trespass convictions reversed; trial court erred by failing to sua sponte charge jury on defendant’s sole defense – mistake of fact. “At trial Price asserted that he entered the home through an unlocked door because he thought he saw ‘for sale by owner’ and ‘open house’ signs posted in front of the home and was assisting his mother in looking for a house. Two other men, who were with Price, testified that they too saw ‘for sale’ and ‘open house’ signs.” Court of Appeals wrongly held that this did not raise defense of mistake of fact, concluding that by denying intent to commit theft, he failed to admit the act. “The Court of Appeals' conclusion that a mistake of fact charge was not authorized in light of Price's denial of having any intent to commit a theft while inside of the house is incorrect. Because Price's defense was based on the idea that he was authorized to enter the house as an interested buyer, and because this authorization alone would have eliminated one of the essential elements of burglary that the State was required to prove, Price's intent after he entered the house was irrelevant to his mistake of fact defense to burglary. … Indeed, Price was not required to admit to having any intent to steal anything in the house in order to assert his mistake of fact defense, as the element of the crime being negated by his mistake of fact defense had nothing to do with whether or not Price had an intent to steal once he was inside, but only whether he was authorized to “enter[ ] ... the dwelling house” in the first place. OCGA § 16–7–1(a).” Compare Floyd (January 17, 2013), and Evans (September 23, 2014), both above. Boatright v. State, 289 Ga. 597, 713 S.E.2d 829 (June 27, 2011). Malice murder, burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge on mistake of fact as to the burglary charges, based on defendant’s alleged mistake as to who lived in the house. “That appellant may have thought Craig Aiken still lived in the home does not constitute the type of mistake of fact that would serve as a defense to his unauthorized entry into the home where the evidence is uncontroverted that appellant was not invited into the home by Aiken or anyone else.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 21, 695 S.E.2d 359 (May 11, 2010). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly refused to charge on mistake of fact where defendant claimed “that the victim ‘was known by [Jones’s] family to carry a knife,’” as that fact alone wouldn’t have justified defendant’s attack. Disabato v. State, 303 Ga.App. 68, 692 S.E.2d 701 (March 23, 2010). “Mistake of fact is not a defense to the crimes of aggravated child molestation and child molestation. See Schultz v. State, 267 Ga.App. 240, 242(2), 599 S.E.2d 247 (2004).” Accord, Creighton v. State , 327 Ga.App. 825, 761 S.E.2d 373 (July 1, 2014). Butler v. State, 298 Ga.App. 129, 679 S.E.2d 361 (May 28, 2009). At defendant’s trial for furnishing alcohol to minors, trial court properly denied request for charge on mistake of fact. Defendant’s defense, that he didn’t know restaurant customer was underage, was adequately covered by court’s charge on knowledge as an essential element of the