☢ test - Í

“Pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-5, a mistake of fact is “a misapprehension of fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission.” Here, Harden's defense was not a mistake of fact, but was to deny committing the crime alleged. ‘[Harden] cannot deny committing an act, while at the same time argue he committed the act by mistake.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Willingham v. State, 235 Ga.App. 475, 477(2), 509 S.E.2d 744 (1998). Moreover, if Harden participated in the drug sale, the fact that he did so because he was owed money by Rowe would not justify his act .” Allen v. State, 237 Ga.App. 744, 516 S.E.2d 788 (April 23, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for obstruction of an officer, defendant contended the officer’s attempted arrest was not lawful, and requested a jury charge on mistake of fact on the theory that his resisting arrest, if wrongful, was a mistake of fact. Held, no error in refusing to charge jury on mistake of fact; “a mistake as to the legality of an arrest would constitute a mistake of law, and “‘[f]ailure to give a charge on mistake of fact is not error where the evidence shows that a party has made a mistake of law. [Cit.]’ Turner v. State, 210 Ga.App. 303, 304(1), 436 S.E.2d 229 (1993).” Accord, Harris v. State , 324 Ga.App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (October 30, 2013) (defendant’s belief that he could seize vacant homes, claim ownership and rent them out was a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact). Y. MISTAKEN IDENTITY Bass v. State, 271 Ga.App. 228, 609 S.E.2d 386 (January 6, 2005). Court did not err in refusing to admit photo of man “who allegedly resembles” defendant based on detective’s testimony on cross-examination that he had heard that the man “‘may have been involved’ in the robbery.” “‘Generally, [the] accused may introduce evidence tending to show that another person committed the crime with which he is charged, if a proper foundation is laid, unless the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by actual risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bradford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 568, 569 (420 S.E.2d 4) (1992). ‘This evidence ... must be such proof as directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti, and tends clearly to point out someone besides [the] accused as the guilty person. Evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Croom v. State, 217 Ga.App. 596, 599(3) (458 S.E.2d 679) (1995).’” Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 239, 539 S.E.2d 914 (October 3, 2000). The defendant was charged with and convicted of financial transaction card fraud stemming from the use of an illegally acquired credit card from her boss’s purse. The victim was notified that someone was trying to use her card. The victim went down to the location where the attempted use of the card was made and ask the manager to describe the perpetrators. She then showed the manager a picture of the defendant, and the manager identified the defendant as one of the women who tried to use the card. At trial, the defendant tried to offer photographs of her nieces into to evidence to show their resemblances to her and to question the identification made by the store manager. The trial court refused to admit these photographs. Held, the trial court erred in excluding the photographs. Trial court’s error in refusing to admit photographs of defendant’s nieces to show their resemblances to her was harmful, where the sole defense was that another person committed crimes and the store manager’s unreliable identification of the defendant as the individual who attempted to use the victim’s credit card at the store may have been challenged had the jury been shown the photographs of the defendant’s nieces. Distinguished by Allen v. State , 268 Ga.App. 519, 602 S.E.2d 250 (July 15, 2004) (not error to rule out photographs and in-court appearances by two men resembling defendant, who also had committed robberies in the area, where no evidence connecting them to the robberies in question except one photo identification by one victim who retracted that identification when she saw that man and defendant in live line-up together). Z. MUTUAL COMBAT Berrian v. State, 297 Ga. 740, 778 S.E.2d 165 (October 5, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in declining to give defendant’s requested charge on mutual combat. “‘The essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, a readiness, and an intention on the part of both parties to fight. Reluctance, or fighting to repel an unprovoked attack, is self-defense, and is authorized by the law, and should not be confused with mutual combat.’ Mathis v. State, 196 Ga. 288, 291(1) (26 S.E.2d 606) (1943); see also Weatherby v. State, 213 Ga. 188, 193(4) (97 S.E.2d 698) (1957) (where the defendant’s testimony would have been sufficient to prove he killed the victim in self-defense and show a case of justifiable homicide, a voluntary manslaughter charge based on mutual combat ‘is neither required nor authorized’).” Defendant here described his attempts to flee victim’s assault, not his desire to fight him. Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (April 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant