☢ test - Í

AA.

NECESSITY See subheading JUSTIFICATION, above

BB. PARENTAL DISCIPLINE Tabb v. State, 313 Ga.App. 852, 723 S.E.2d 295 (February 1, 2012). Child cruelty conviction affirmed; charge on justifiable parental discipline was correct: “If you find from the evidence that the defendant did inflict corporal punishment upon the child in this case, and you further find that it was reasonable and did not cause the child to suffer cruel or excessive physical pain, then the defendant would be justified, and it would be your duty to acquit the defendant.” CC. POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER Brower v. State, 334 Ga.App. 262, 779 S.E.2d 32 (October 27, 2015). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered expert testimony on PTSD. Defendant “argued that she was justified in committing the crimes because she suffered from PTSD which negated her intent to commit the charged crimes, essentially asserting a diminished mental capacity defense.” “‘Evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental disability may be presented in support of a defense of insanity or delusional compulsion (see OCGA §§ 16–3–2 and 16–3–3); a claim of incompetency to stand trial (see OCGA § 17–7–130); or, since such pleas were authorized, a plea of guilty but mentally ill or guilty but mentally retarded (see OCGA § 17–7–131)—none of which Appellant raised in this case. For more than 150 years, however, [our Courts have] consistently upheld the exclusion of evidence of a defendant’s diminished mental condition when offered to support other defenses or to negate the intent element of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608, 715 S.E.2d 48 (2011) (‘“[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.”’) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603, 555 S.E.2d 716 (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that ‘he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,’ because ‘the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity defense or that he was mentally ill at the time of the conduct in question’)[.] Thompson v. State, 295 Ga. 96, 98–99(2), 757 S.E.2d 846 (2014).” “‘[I]t has not yet been determined whether post traumatic stress disorder ... [is an] admissible scientific principle[ ] in Georgia.’ Prickett v. State, 220 Ga.App. 244, 247(3), 469 S.E.2d 371 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Belt, 269 Ga. 763, 764, n. 1, 505 S.E.2d 1 (1998). See Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga.App. 544, 549 n. 2, 533 S.E.2d 109 (2000).” DD. PREEMPTION Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston, S15A1442, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085243 (March 21, 2016). Conviction for ordinance violation reversed; 1. city “ordinance that prohibits certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing on their premises any form of electronic or mechanical game machine or coin-operated device that may be used for entertainment or amusement purposes” was preempted by “the State’s detailed statutory scheme regulating coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) and COAM businesses in Georgia, see OCGA §§ 16–12–35 and 50–27–70 to 50–27–104 (COAM Laws), … under the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a).” Contrary to city’s argument, fact that the ordinance regulated alcohol retailers didn’t change the fact that it also regulated COAMs. While the State statutes don’t expressly preempt local legislation, preemption is nevertheless implied because “the intent of the General Assembly to preempt local regulation on the same subject as the general law is inferred from the comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme.” 2. “Nor does it matter, in the analysis under the first part of the Uniformity Clause, that the local ordinance does not duplicate any specific provision of the COAM Laws. As explained above, where the state statutory scheme is as comprehensive as the COAM Laws, we presume that the General Assembly meant to occupy the entire field of regulation on the subject, and thus that the gaps the legislature left were intended to be unregulated matters rather than spaces for local governments to fill by local regulation. Thus, contrary to the City’s claim, § 3–57 is not an ordinance that only incidentally affects COAMs and COAM businesses. The direct effect of § 3–57 is to ban COAMs from businesses in the City of Clarkston where the State of Georgia allows them. For these reasons, we conclude that the COAM Laws preempt City Code § 3–57 by implication.” Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (February 24, 2014). Trial court properly denied LLC’s various constitutional challenges to prosecution under county nuisance ordinance. Defendant here operated a landfill in Stephens County, and was charged with violations of both county ordinance and State EPD regulations for solid waste disposal violations. Local ordinance wasn’t pre-empted by state statute or regulations. “OCGA § 12–8–30.9 states that no provision of the Act: ‘shall be construed to be a limitation: (1) On the power of a municipality, county, authority, or special district to adopt and enforce additional regulations, not in conflict with this part, imposing further conditions,