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scope of copyright,” and there is no preemption.’ Collezione Europa U.S.A. v. Hillsdale House, 243 F.Supp.2d 444, 449 (M.D.N.C. 2003). The statute in question, OCGA § 16-8-60(b), criminalizes the sale, or the possession for purposes of sale, of recordings which do not carry a label identifying the ‘transferor’ of the sounds, regardless of their copyright status. The statute does not criminalize unauthorized copyrighted works. The federal copyright law, on the other hand, protects the exclusive right of the copyright owner to reproduce, perform, distribute or display the copyrighted work. See 17 USCA § 106. Thus, the Georgia statute contains an extra element – i.e., labeling – which qualitatively distinguishes it from federal copyright law and saves it from preemption. See Anderson v. Nidorf, [26 F.3d 100 (9th Cir., 1994)] (California statute prohibiting sale of recordings without disclosing manufacturer and author was not preempted by federal copyright law).” EE. PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS Piper v. State, 320 Ga.App. 120, 739 S.E.2d 407 (March 5, 2013). In prosecution for drug-related offenses, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on alleged prosecutorial vindictiveness. In return for guilty pleas to theft charges in one case, State nolle prossed drug-related charges in second case. Defendant later filed successful habeas petition based on missing plea paperwork on theft charges. State then renewed drug charges, causing defendant to file plea in bar. Prosecutor responded to plea in bar by saying, “that this was not a case of retribution; but rather that, because the habeas petition was granted, ‘[w]e are simply moving back to the point we were prior to the plea.’” Distinguishing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656) (1969), raising presumption of vindictiveness where greater sentence imposed following successful appeal after first trial. “But, “[t]he Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that previously imposed after a guilty plea. Application of that presumption is limited to circumstances in which there is a “reasonable likelihood” that an unexplained increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority. Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the defendant has the burden of proving actual vindictiveness without aid of a presumption.’ Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865) (1989). Further, “a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 [(102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74)] (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 [(98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604)] (1978).” Alabama v. Smith, supra at 800, n. 3. … Piper has come forward with no actual evidence of vindictiveness to refute [the State’s explanation], arguing only that any sentence will be an increase and therefore vindictiveness is presumed. This is not sufficient under the authority set out above.” Parker v. City of Glennville, 288 Ga. 34, 701 S.E.2d 182 (October 18, 2010). Superior Court properly denied injunction against enforcement of city ordinance, which prohibits weeds and grass over ten inches within the city, despite defendant’s claim of selective enforcement. No proof of discriminatory selective enforcement. “‘The party seeking to prove unconstitutionally discriminatory enforcement of the law ... has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish the existence of intentional or purposeful discrimination which is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications.’ State v. Causey, 246 Ga. 735, 737 (273 S.E.2d 6) (1980). Importantly, ‘[s]ome selective enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation. [Cit.]’ Department of Nat. Resources. v. Union Timber Corp., 258 Ga. 873, 876 (375 S.E.2d 856) (1989). See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446) (1962). Although Parker presented some evidence suggesting § 30-8 may not be currently enforced against heavily wooded areas within the city limits, there was substantial evidence of its enforcement against property similar to the lots owned by Parker. Moreover, the trial court found no evidence of intentional discrimination against Parker, let alone discrimination based on some unjustifiable standard.” Lopez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 178, 598 S.E.2d 898 (April 23, 2004). “‘An indictment obtained without the dismissal of a prior indictment is a superseding indictment. A grand jury is not prevented from returning another indictment against an accused, even though an indictment is pending, where there has been no jeopardy upon the first indictment, and the existence of a prior indictment generally is not grounds for quashing the second indictment, although the state may be required to elect upon which indictment it will proceed. However, a reindictment increasing the severity of the charges following the exercise of certain procedural rights may create an appearance of vindictiveness, and where it does so, the burden is shifted to the government to prove that the decision to reindict with more severe charges did not result from any vindictive motive.’ Larochelle v. State, 219 Ga.App. 792, 794 (466 S.E.2d 672) (1996) (citations and punctuation omitted).” State carried that burden here by showing that one charge was erroneously reduced to a misdemeanor on the original indictment; a new district attorney took office during the pendency of the case and upon review decided the case should be reindicted; a new attorney assigned to the case felt additional charges were warranted; and attorney swore decision to make new charges was made before talking to lawyers about defendant’s federal lawsuit against police officers.