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syndrome. the evidence in question was not admissible to support Pena's justification defense. ‘Because justification is based on the fears of a reasonable person, the subjective fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant in the evaluation of this defense.’ O'Connell v. State, 294 Ga. 379, 382(3), 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense. See id. (finding evidence of childhood abuse committed against the defendant by someone other than the victim inadmissible to support a justification defense); Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99(3), 515 S.E.2d 836 (1999) (same as to expert testimony that the defendant suffered from a post traumatic stress disorder from childhood abuse committed by someone other than the victim).” Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 771 S.E.2d 362 (March 27, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any claim of error, including plain error, in court’s giving of pattern charge on self-defense (“a person is not justified in using force if that person ... is attempting to commit, is committing, or is fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony” ), inasmuch as counsel requested the charge and did not withdraw the request despite inclusion of language on flight that defendant didn’t want. “Under these circumstances, Appellant clearly invited the error that he now alleges based on Heard [ v. State , 261 Ga. 262, 403 S.E.2d 438 (1991)] and affirmatively waived appellate review of that error.” In any event, the charge was a correct statement of law, overruling Heard . Benham, Hunstein and Melton concur specially, would not overrule Heard . Accord, White v. State , 297 Ga. 218, 773 S.E.2d 219 (June 1, 2015). Tremblay v. State, 329 Ga.App. 139, 764 S.E.2d 163 (September 24, 2014). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; jury could find that defendant wasn’t acting in self-defense when he attacked victim. “Georgia law is clear that ‘a person is not justified in using force in self-defense if he is the initial aggressor.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Muckle v. State, 307 Ga.App. 634, 637(1)(a), 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).” Boutier v. State, 328 Ga.App. 869, 763 S.E.2d 255 (August 26, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on justification. “Boutier declined to testify at trial or present any defense witnesses to support a justification defense, and his cross-examination of the State's witnesses did not reveal any evidence that would support a defense of justification. Instead, all of the evidence presented at trial pointed to Boutier as the initial aggressor who violently attacked the victim because he believed the victim was making too much noise. And, contrary to Boutier's assertion in his brief, the detention officer's testimony that Boutier had a ‘mild abrasion or a cut’ over one of his eyes, without more, clearly was insufficient to support a justification charge.” Hudson v. State, 325 Ga.App. 657, 754 S.E.2d 626 (February 5, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court declined to charge on self defense. “‘A prima facie case of justification requires a showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant was honestly trying to defend himself. The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing, and we will not reverse that determination absent an abuse of discretion.’ Williams v. State, 298 Ga.App. 151, 153, 679 S.E.2d 377 (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). ‘If the amount of force used by a person is excessive, ... it does not qualify as self-defense.’ Howe v. State, 322 Ga.App. 294, 297, 744 S.E.2d 818 (2013). It is true that there was some evidence that Mrs. Hudson attacked first. But Hudson hit her in the face with a trophy, covering her in blood and splattering blood over the room. She required sutures; he did not even appear to have been in a fight. So Hudson has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that he had not made a prima facie case of self-defense. See Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 227–228(2), 744 S.E.2d 695 (2013) (trial court did not err in determining that evidence did not warrant giving of self-defense charge where evidence showed that unarmed victim moved toward defendant only after defendant threatened him with revolver and that victim attempted to point defendant's gun away from others).” Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 744 S.E.2d 695 (June 17, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on self-defense. “In this case, Brunson did not testify, his custodial statement was not admitted into evidence, and the only evidence of his version of events was his statement that he ‘didn't shoot anybody,’ which is inconsistent with a justification defense. … The fact that [victim] Milton was a large man is insufficient to support a finding that Brunson had a reasonable belief that he had to shoot Milton to avoid death or great bodily injury to himself.” State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 728 S.E.2d 582 (June 18, 2012). Reversing 311 Ga.App. 46, 714 S.E.2d 717 (2011), Court of Appeals improperly reversed defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter and related offenses. Trial court