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counterpart, FRE 1101, which references “miscellaneous proceedings such as ” those listed; the Georgia provision includes no such language. Smith v. State, 325 Ga.App. 405, 750 S.E.2d 758 (November 15, 2013). Physical precedent only on this point. DUI-per se conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to require State to produce intox source code pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4), absent evidence that the State is in possession of the code. Defendant contends that State is in “constructive possession” of the code because “‘[t]he State of Georgia has always had the power to negotiate a contract with CMI that would give it access to the source code ... [or] to switch to a different machine for which the source code is available.’ Neither of these arguments address the case here, which is that the State, so far, has not. It is undisputed that the State lacks actual access to the source code.[fn] Nevertheless, Smith continues to argue that CMI is essentially a state actor because it is the exclusive provider of the Intoxilyzer 5000 used for breath testing in Georgia. As support he cites federal law applicable to civil claims under 42 USC § 1983. See, e.g., Willis v. Univ. Heath Svcs., 993 F.2d 837 (11 th Cir., 1993). That argument is misplaced here because the issue is the admissibility of a breath test under OCGA § 40–6–392. That Code section outlines in detail the criteria for admissibility and disclosure of scientific testing in DUI cases. Smith cites no Georgia precedent requiring disclosure of the source code in this case, and in light of this clear legislative directive on the issue, we decline to depart from the legislative scheme in this case.” Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (November 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed. 1. Defendant wasn’t denied compulsory process where he was unable to obtain witness/intox source code evidence from Kentucky. Trial court issued certificate of materiality under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, but Kentucky court denied defendant’s application. “Here, the trial court considered the motion, and issued the certificate, which was then presented to the Kentucky court. It was then for the Kentucky court to decide whether the witnesses and evidence were material and necessary and should have been compelled. [FN: We note that Phillips's arguments that the Kentucky court failed to hold a hearing on necessity and materiality in violation of the Uniform Act and lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective order are properly addressed to the Kentucky courts, and they do not provide a basis to require the trial court to postpone Phillips's DUI trial. ] Thus, the Georgia trial court had no authority to compel the witness. Absent a finding that the Kentucky court lacked jurisdiction (there is no such allegation here), the Kentucky order was entitled to full faith and credit pursuant to Article 4, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. [fn] Although Phillips argues that the trial court should have waited until his appeal had been resolved, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kentucky appellate court issued a supersedeas of the order, and therefore, the Kentucky trial court's order was enforceable. [fn].” Accord, Davenport v. State , 328 Ga.App. 850, 763 S.E.2d 130 (August 19, 2014). 2. Defendant failed to show Brady violation – no showing that the State possessed and suppressed evidence favorable to the defense, or a reasonable probability of a different outcome had it been disclosed. 3. No confrontation clause violation. Based on Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 309(2) (637 S.E.2d 706) (2006) (intox inspection certificates weren’t “testimonial” because they weren’t “made in an investigatory or adversarial setting” nor “generated in anticipation of the prosecution of a particular defendant”). “This rationale applies to the ‘testimony’ of the Intoxilyzer 5000 in this case, as well as the employee witnesses and documentation Phillips sought from CMI.” 4. No abuse of discretion in denial of motion for continuance while source code appeal proceeded in Kentucky. “Here, the trial court granted a certificate pursuant to OCGA § 24–10–94 (2012) to permit the defense an opportunity to obtain the information and witnesses sought from CMI, specially set the case with enough time for the defense to do so, and after the Kentucky court issued an order denying Phillips's request for the information, which order was entitled to full faith and credit, required Phillips to proceed to trial. [FN25. We note that at the time of trial, the case had been pending for more than six years, and defense counsel had filed approximately twenty leaves of absence. ] ” Accord, Smith v. State , 325 Ga.App. 405, 750 S.E.2d 758 (November 15, 2013); Sanders v. State , 327 Ga.App. 608, 760 S.E.2d 636 (June 18, 2014); Davenport v. State , 328 Ga.App. 850, 763 S.E.2d 130 (August 19, 2014). Cronkite v. State, 293 Ga. 476, 745 S.E.2d 591 (July 1, 2013). Affirming 317 Ga.App. 57, 730 S.E.2d 694 (2012); trial court properly denied motion for certificate of need for testimony under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, as defendant failed to show that the evidence was “material” to his prosecution. Court of Appeals correctly affirmed trial court, but incorrectly stated that the defendant was required to show “ evidence of an error in the source code that was material to this case.” “Rather, the ‘consequential facts’ of this case deal with whether the Intoxilyzer 5000 may have generated erroneous results from Cronkite’s breath test.” Here, Cronkite attempted to do that by showing that defendant had a dental implant and retainer that could trap mouth alcohol, resulting in an erroneous reading. “However, Cronkite presented no evidence that mouth alcohol was present during his breath test such that an error message should have been generated that was not generated. Indeed, the mere possibility that alcohol can remain present in the mouth due to the existence of a surgical implant and retainer does not amount to