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breath test results based upon breathing patterns,’ and that the information would be used ‘as applied to [his] particular health and physical issues,’ he did not allege that he actually had a physical or health issue that might affect the results of the breath test, much less present any evidence about it. … Thus, as Holowiak did not carry his burden of showing that the subpoena was material and necessary to the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holowiak's motion.” Disapproved as applying wrong test for out-of-state witness, see Davenport (June 20, 2011), above. State v. Smiley, 301 Ga.App. 778, 689 S.E.2d 94 (December 22, 2009). Trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress breath test results affirmed based on failure to provide “full information” pursuant to defendant’s discovery motion. Defendant requested, among other things, Intoxilyzer source codes; trial court found State’s claim that it didn’t possess them “not persuasive.” Court of Appeals affirms, noting the lack of a transcript of the suppression hearing. “[W]ithout a transcript of the motion hearing, we must presume that the trial court found evidence of bad faith on the part of the state in not producing the requested information. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the results of the breath test.” Johnson, concurring specially: “It is important to note that the ruling in this case does not affect our decisions in Hills [May 15, 2008, below] and Mathis [ v. State , 298 Ga.App. 817, 681 S.E.2d 179 (June 18, 2009)] . ” Distinguished, Parker (March 13, 2014), above. Hills v. State, 291 Ga.App. 873, 663 S.E.2d 265 (May 15, 2008). Trial court properly ruled that defendant wasn’t entitled to discovery of source codes of Intoxilyzer 5000. “The state is only required to produce ‘written scientific reports in the possession of the prosecution.’ OCGA § 17-16-23(b). See OCGA §§ 17-16-1(1), 17-16-23(b); see also Xulu v. State, 256 Ga.App. 272, 273(2) (568 S.E.2d 74) (2002). Here, the trial court concluded that ‘the State does not possess or control the “source code” and the “source code” is not available to the State.’ Based on the evidence in the record, we must agree. Hills offered no evidence that the Intoxilyzer software was created for the state or that the state owned the code. Nor did he provide evidence that the state was otherwise in possession or control of the computer code. Because Hills failed to meet his prima facie burden of showing the state had possession, custody or control of the source code, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, see Cottrell v. State, 287 Ga.App. 89, 91(1) (651 S.E.2d 444) (2007), by denying his discovery motion.” Accord, Holowiak v. State , 295 Ga.App. 474, 672 S.E.2d 454 (January 8, 2009); Mathis v. State , 298 Ga.App. 817, 681 S.E.2d 179 (June 18, 2009). F. DRIVING/PHYSICAL CONTROL Pough v. State, 325 Ga.App. 547, 754 S.E.2d 129 (January 15, 2014). Evidence supported DUI conviction. Defendant was found alone with car, parked but running, on side of interstate. “Pough stated that he was on his way home from shooting pool at a sports bar and he stopped his Jeep because he had to urinate.” Jury could thus find that defendant had driven the vehicle despite defense evidence that someone else drove him to the location, then left. Smith v. State, 325 Ga.App. 405, 750 S.E.2d 758 (November 15, 2013). DUI-per se conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant was, in fact, the driver of the vehicle. Officers responded to 911 call of a one- vehicle accident, but no one purported to see defendant driving. “[T]he first responding officer testified that ‘[p]aramedics came out. They checked out the driver,’ and the officer smelled an odor of alcohol on ‘the driver,’ whom he identified as Smith at trial. The record does not disclose whether this description was hearsay from the paramedics or from Smith himself, nor did Smith object on that ground, so Smith has not demonstrated that this characterization of him as the driver was inadmissible. Furthermore, [Sgt.] Teague testified that Smith volunteered to him that he was not at fault for the traffic accident because someone else had hit or sideswiped him. Cf. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga.App. 751, 753(1), 722 S.E.2d 446 (2012); Jones v. State, 219 Ga.App. 780, 781(2), 466 S.E.2d 667 (1996); Frye v. State, 189 Ga.App. 181, 181–182, 375 S.E.2d 101 (1988). Smith also discussed with the officer the fact that even if he was not at fault he could be considered an impaired driver.” Green v. State, 323 Ga.App. 832, 748 S.E.2d 479 (September 11, 2013). Evidence supported conviction for per se DUI (but reversed on other grounds). “Here, the evidence established that Green was found in the driver's seat of his vehicle that had its flashers on and was stopped in the lane of travel. Green was the sole occupant of the vehicle, he failed field sobriety tests, and had a blood-alcohol concentration that was double the legal limit of 0.08 grams. ‘Although the officer did not see the car moving, he observed circumstances from which [the trial court sitting as the trier of fact] could infer that [Green] was in actual physical control of the car when it was moved to the location where the officer found it, and that [Green] was intoxicated while moving it there.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Stephens [ v. State, 271 Ga.App. 634, 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005)].” Lawson v. State, 313 Ga.App. 751, 722 S.E.2d 446 (January 27, 2012). Evidence supported DUI conviction, although