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the actions of the defendant in performing simple exercises such as the ‘leg lift’ and ‘walk and turn’ without referring to any ‘points’ system or using the words ‘pass’ or ‘fail,’ cross-examination on NHTSA procedures is irrelevant, regardless of whether the officer is trained in them or not.” Same holds true for failure to follow instructions on HGN, but not for results of HGN – see James v. State, 260 Ga.App. 536, 580 S.E.2d 334 (March 26, 2003). K. IMPLIED CONSENT AND CHEMICAL TESTS 1. BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT Potter v. State, 301 Ga.App. 411, 687 S.E.2d 653 (December 3, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide and related offenses affirmed. Trial court properly admitted expert testimony estimating defendant’s blood alcohol concentration based on his serum alcohol concentration. In this case of first impression in Georgia, Court of Appeals finds that method for converting from serum alcohol concentration to blood alcohol concentration has “reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty,” despite defense expert’s testimony to the contrary. 2. BLOOD TESTS, BLOOD DRAWER Verlangieri v. State, 273 Ga.App. 585, 615 S.E.2d 633 (June 9, 2005). 1. “‘Our Supreme Court has held that the State may prove compliance with the ‘approved methods’ requirements of OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A) solely through the oral testimony of the individual who conducted the test. Price v. State [269 Ga. 222, 225, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998)] (gas chromatography test admissible through oral testimony of analyst who administered it). In Radcliffe v. State, [234 Ga.App. 576, 578-579, 507 S.E.2d 759 (1998)] we held results of a blood test admissible where the DFS forensic toxicologist testified simply that the tests were performed according to methods approved by the DFS. Likewise, the existence of permits and certificates required by the statute and DFS rules may be proven orally through competent circumstantial evidence. Gidey v. State [228 Ga.App. 250, 252, 491 S.E.2d 406 (1997)]. In Banks v. State, [235 Ga.App. 701, 509 S.E.2d 63 (1998)] we held that testimony by the officer that he was certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 5000 when he tested the defendant and that the machine appeared to be working properly, while ‘perhaps “marginal,”’ was enough by itself to satisfy the State’s burden of proof. Id. at 702(1), 509 S.E.2d 63. In Koulianos v. State, [192 Ga.App. 90, 383 S.E.2d 642 (1989)] the officer’s testimony that he was a licensed intoximeter operator and that he performed the test in accordance with what he had been taught by the DFS, combined with the intoximeter printout showing his name and permit number, was held to be sufficient evidence of his qualifications.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Scara v. State, 259 Ga.App. 510, 511-512(1), 577 S.E.2d 796 (2003).” See also Smith (July 29, 2002), below. 2 . State Crime Lab tests were performed by trainee chemist, supervised by another chemist. At trial, the supervisor testified as to the method of testing and the results, and identified the official report; the trainee did not testify. Held, trial court properly admitted supervisor’s testimony. Birdsall v. State , 254 Ga.App. 555, 556, 562 S.E.2d 841 (2002). Millsap v. State, 261 Ga.App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568 (May 30, 2003). Provisions of OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(2), relating to proof of qualifications of blood drawer, apply only to DUIs. Testimony of drug agent that he saw blood drawn was sufficient to identify sample without testimony of person who drew it. Smith v. State, 256 Ga.App. 785, 570 S.E.2d 26 (July 29, 2002). State Crime Lab blood test results were admissible upon “the testimony of a chemist who operated the machine and performed the test.” “[C]ertificates are not the exclusive means of laying the foundation to admit blood-alcohol test results.” See also Verlangieri (June 9, 2005), above. Bess v. State, 254 Ga.App. 80, 561 S.E.2d 209 (February 28, 2002). Held, the Supreme Court, by concluding in Peek (March 6, 2000), below, that a certification under OCGA § 40-6-392(e) must be admitted under the business records exception, did not mean to exclude other hearsay exceptions which serve the same function. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted a DHR document under the public records exception, as OCGA § 24-7-20 provides a public records exception to the hearsay rule in the same way that OCGA § 24-3-14 provides a business records exception. Peek v. State, 272 Ga. 169, 527 S.E.2d 552 (March 6, 2000). Reversing 235 Ga.App. 693, 509 S.E.2d 358 (1998) and DUI conviction; trial court erred by admitting blood test results because state presented neither hospital employee’s testimony nor copy of employee’s state certification of qualification to draw blood for alcohol testing. Hospital’s education cumulative report was insufficient. “[T]he only acceptable methods of proving the qualification of the person who drew a defendant's blood are the certificate provided for in OCGA § 40-6-392(e), introduced by means of the business records exception to the hearsay rule, [cit.] and the testimony of the person who drew the blood.” Overrules Dean v. State, 232 Ga.App. 390(1)(a), 501 S.E.2d 895 (1998), and all prior cases holding or suggesting that other methods exist for proving the blood drawer’s qualifications. Note this case superseded by amendment to OCGA § 40-6-392(e).