☢ test - Í

(1999) (holding that defendant’s prosecution on DUI charges was not time-barred even though amended accusations were filed more than two years after offenses were committed, because original citations pertaining to the same offenses and conduct were filed prior to the statute of limitation’s expiration); Thomas v. State, 233 Ga.App. 224, 225(1), 504 S.E.2d 59 (1998) (same).” Change here: altering “drive or have physical control of a moving vehicle” to “drive a moving vehicle.” 2. Minor technical change in wording of accusation didn’t require that defendant be re-arraigned. “Barghi cites no authority for the argument that a minor amendment to an accusation, as occurred here, requires the State to arraign a defendant a second time. See Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 874–75(2)(a), 528 S.E.2d 312 (2000) (holding that filing of amended accusation that did not set forth new or different charge did not require State to arraign defendant a second time before proceeding to trial). Cf. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 396, 399(3), 614 S.E.2d 79 (2005) (noting that because amendment of the accusation did not constitute the commencement of a new prosecution, the previous arraignment of defendant was sufficient). 3. In bench trial, trial court was entitled to rely on evidence presented at prior motion hearing in denying plea in bar based on statute of limitation. “Barghi presented no evidence disputing the trial court’s earlier ruling that the State’s prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitation but, rather, simply reiterated her earlier legal arguments. … And given that the statute of limitation is not an element of the crime per se, it was perfectly appropriate for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to rely on evidence that was already a part of the case record.” Distinguishing Jenkins v. State , 278 Ga. 598, 604 S.E.2d 789 (2004) (after pretrial denial of plea in bar, same issue was still properly presented to jury). Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed amendment of accusation to withdraw nolle pros of one count after defendant withdrew guilty plea to other count, where the amendment took place before the expiration of the two year statute of limitation. Morris v. State, 310 Ga.App. 126, 712 S.E.2d 130 (June 17, 2011). Involuntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no error in allowing amendment of indictment. “On the first day of trial, after the jury was selected, the prosecutor noted to the trial court that the single count of the indictment was captioned “voluntary manslaughter” but that the language of the count omitted any allegation that Morris acted with the intent to kill. The prosecutor further stated that the State did not believe that Morris had acted with the intent to kill. Consequently, the prosecutor requested that the case proceed only on the lesser included charge of involuntary manslaughter and contended that Morris had notice of such a charge based upon the factual allegations in the indictment.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, he was “put on notice that he could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter;” indictment here alleged the facts necessary to establish involuntary manslaughter in the commission of simple battery. “One manner in which a person can commit simple battery is by “[i]ntentionally caus[ing] physical harm to another.” OCGA § 16–5–23(a)(2). Morris maintains that simple battery under OCGA § 16–5– 23(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause physical harm to another,” but Court of Appeals finds language here sufficient. “‘[T]he failure to allege intent is not fatal where the ... indictment employs language that necessarily raises an inference that the requisite criminal intent existed.’ State v. Harris, 292 Ga.App. 211, 212 (663 S.E.2d 830) (2008). … And we have held that an allegation in an indictment ‘that the offensive use of fists ... resulted in bodily injury’ is sufficient to allege the essential elements of simple battery. See Buchanan v. State, 173 Ga.App. 554, 555(4) (327 S.E.2d 535) (1985). Cf. Beals v. State, 288 Ga.App. 815, 816(1) (655 S.E.2d 687) (2007) (indictment was not defective for failure to expressly allege specific intent to commit a theft in armed robbery count because intent was ‘necessarily inferred from the allegation of the use of an offensive weapon to accomplish the taking’). In the present case, the indictment alleged that Morris ‘cause[d] the death of [the victim] ... by striking [the victim] with his fist ... contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.’ We have no trouble concluding that this language alleged ‘an offensive use of the fists [that] resulted in bodily injury,’ Buchanan, 173 Ga.App. at 554(4), and thus sufficiently alleged all of the essential elements of simple battery.” Amendments generally. “‘An indictment cannot be materially amended after the grand jury has returned the indictment into court; any subsequent amendment by the trial court or prosecution that materially affects the indictment is void and cannot serve as the basis for a conviction.’ Driggers v. State, 295 Ga.App. 711, 717–718(4)(b) (673 S.E.2d 95) (2009). See Ingram v. State, 211 Ga.App. 252, 253(1) (438 S.E.2d 708) (1993); Gentry v. State, 63 Ga.App. 275, 276 (11 S.E.2d 39) (1940). An amendment to the indictment can be actual or constructive; ‘[a] constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense contained in the indictment are altered to broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment’ as a result of erroneous jury instructions or a prosecutor's statements to the jury. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Castro, 89 F3d 1443, 1452–1453(III) (11 th Cir., 1996). See Salahuddin v. State, 241 Ga.App. 168, 170(2) (525 S.E.2d 422) (1999) (physical precedent only), abrogated on other grounds by Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 358(2) (589 S.E.2d 90) (2003).”