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statements of guilt. ...’ Bryant v. State , 270 Ga. 266, 270-271(3), 507 S.E.2d 451 (1998). … The implied consent card is a recitation of the law and does not depend on the credibility of the officer testifying about the traffic stop.” Swain v. State, 251 Ga.App. 110, 552 S.E.2d 880 (July 20, 2001). Trial court is not bound by the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, during a defendant’s license suspension hearing, that a defendant did not refuse to consent to chemical testing when the State was precluded from fully litigating the refusal issue during the summary administrative hearing. Cited with approval, Malloy v. State , 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (June 17, 2013). Brice v. State, 242 Ga.App. 163, 529 S.E.2d 178 (February 1, 2000). Less-safe DUI conviction affirmed. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the implied consent card in a DUI case in which the defendant refused to submit to a breath test.” Horne v. State, 237 Ga.App. 844, 517 S.E.2d 74 (April 29, 1999). “Horne’s … contention that the trial court erred by allowing the Intoxilyzer printout to go out with the jury as a continuing witness is … misplaced, as ‘[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Hodson v. Mawson, 227 Ga.App. 490, 491(2), 489 S.E.2d 855 (1997).” Accord, Sagenich v. State , 255 Ga.App. 663, 566 S.E.2d 327 (May 22, 2002). 8. IMPEACHMENT Rosandich v. State, 289 Ga.App. 170, 657 S.E.2d 255 (January 11, 2008). After granting defendant’s motion to suppress, trial court properly admitted state-administered breath test results to impeach defendant’s testimony about how much he’d had to drink. “Rosandich testified on his own behalf at trial, asserting that on the night of his arrest, he had four or five beers over a four and one-half hour period and did not feel ‘at all affected’ by the alcohol. Before beginning its cross- examination, the State sought permission to impeach Rosandich with his breath test results to show that he had not been truthful about the amount of alcohol he consumed. The trial court granted the request, admitting the results for impeachment purposes. The court also permitted the arresting officer to testify based on his training and experience that Rosandich’s blood alcohol level was ‘[e]xtremely high’ and was not ‘consistent with someone capable of safely operating a motor vehicle.’” “‘Valid results of a breath, blood, or urine test, which are otherwise determined to be inadmissible on procedural grounds, may be properly admitted for impeachment.’ (Citation omitted.) Jones v. State, 241 Ga.App. 515, 516 (527 S.E.2d 223) (1999). The trial court initially found the test results procedurally inadmissible after concluding that the arresting officer failed to obtain valid consent for the test. The results, however, remained permissible fodder for impeachment. And once Rosandich testified that the limited alcohol he consumed did not affect or impair his driving, he opened the door to impeachment with the breath test. Id .; Shipman v. State, 221 Ga.App. 160, 161(1) (471 S.E.2d 225) (1996).” 9. INDEPENDENT TEST, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TENDER IN EVIDENCE Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly allowed arresting officer to testify that defendant obtained an independent blood test pursuant to implied consent, though defendant failed to tender evidence of the results. “During the trial, Schlanger hotly contested the results of the state’s blood test, arguing that the results were skewed and unreliable due to the unknown storage conditions of his blood sample while in route to the GBI lab. Consequently, the fact that he requested and received an independent test which he failed to produce at trial was relevant to a material issue in the case. OCGA § 24-2-1. Cf. Bedley v. State, 189 Ga.App. 90, 91(2) (374 S.E.2d 841) (1988). The state would have been further authorized to comment on Schlanger’s failure to produce the results of the independent test, had it chosen to do so. Williams v. State, 285 Ga.App. 190, 195-196(3)(c) (645 S.E.2d 676) (2007). See Blige v. State, 263 Ga. 244 (430 S.E.2d 761) (2) (1993) (before a party can comment on the opposing side’s failure to produce certain evidence, the existence of that evidence must first be placed into evidence). It follows that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.” Accord, Scott v. State , 332 Ga.App. 559, 774 S.E.2d 137 (June 18, 2015) (physical precedent only on this point). 10. INDEPENDENT TEST, FAILURE TO OBTAIN Holowiak v. State, 308 Ga.App. 887, 709 S.E.2d 887 (March 29, 2011). Per se DUI conviction affirmed; Trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant “had declined an independent test,” despite defendant’s argument that the evidence violated “his right against self-incrimination. … Here, Holowiak's defense was largely based on the unreliability of the test results from Intoxilyzer 5000; thus, such evidence would be relevant to show Holowiak's failure to adduce rebuttal evidence. See Dupont v. State, 204 Ga.App. 262, 264(4), 418 S.E.2d 803 (1992).”