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Andries v. State, 236 Ga.App. 842, 512 S.E.2d 685 (February 19, 1999). Trial court properly admitted uncertified but self-authenticated copies of intox inspection certificates. “Unlike many other self-authentication provisions under the Georgia Code, [See, e.g., OCGA §§ 7-1-95 (admissibility of documents of Department of Banking & Finance); 40-5-2 (admissibility of records of application for licenses); 24-3-17 (admissibility of copies of records of Department of Public Safety)] OCGA § 40-6-392(f) does not require that copies must be certified to be admissible. As such, we must assume that, had the legislature intended such a rule to apply to copies of certificates of inspection under OCGA § 40-6-392(f), it would have expressly provided so.” Accord, Wright v. State , 238 Ga.App. 442, 519 S.E.2d 461 (June 4, 1999). Hammontree v. State, 236 Ga.App. 342, 512 S.E.2d 57 (February 9, 1999). 1. Intox results were not inadmissible despite defendant’s contention that “the inspections authorized and periodically performed by the GBI Division of Forensic Sciences are insufficient to establish that all components of the Intoxilyzer 5000 are working properly, because the Division of Forensic Sciences does not separately ‘inspect two of the three components (or filters) designed to detect the presence of [the] interfering substances [toluene and acetaldehyde] in human breath.’ … ‘[T]he fact that a testing procedure has some margin of error or may give an erroneous result under certain circumstances [not shown to apply in the case sub judice] relates to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the test results. See Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 126(3), 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991); [cit.].” Gutierrez v. State, 228 Ga.App. 458(1), 459, 491 S.E.2d 898 (1997). The trial court did not err in overruling this ground of defendant’s motion in limine.” 2. “Defendant … contends the existing regulations promulgated by the GBI fail to comply with OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A), arguing that any such regulation ‘must be approved through the procedures set forth in the [Georgia Administrative Procedure Act],’ OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq. This contention is without merit. The authorities relied upon by defendant have been legislatively superseded by the enactment of OCGA § 35-3-155, which Code section ‘expressly provides that the Division of Forensic Sciences need not seek approval of testing methods and procedures through the Administrative Procedure Act.... [After] a review of the record, we conclude that the [S]tate met its burden under [OCGA] § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A) through the testimony of the [trained officer] who [certified this particular Intoxilyzer 5000].’ Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225(4), 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998). The trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion in limine on this ground.” Davis v. State, 236 Ga.App. 32, 510 S.E.2d 889 (January 14, 1999). Intoxilyzer inspection certificates were properly admitted as business records under OCGA § 24-3-14, citing Brown v. State , 268 Ga. 81, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997). Distinguishing cases where foundation for documents as business records was not properly laid: “ Mullinax v. State, 231 Ga.App. 534, 535(2), 499 S.E.2d 903 (1998) (officer did not know if documents were made contemporaneously with the testing); Hamilton v. State, 228 Ga.App. 285, 286(4), 491 S.E.2d 485 (1997) (no foundation laid other than showing certificates were maintained in log book); Daniel v. State, 227 Ga.App. 92, 93, 488 S.E.2d 129 (1997) (no effort to lay foundation).” Accord, Brandon v. State , 236 Ga.App. 203, 511 S.E.2d 573 (February 3, 1999). 14. INTOXILYZER FUNCTIONING/MARGIN OF ERROR Denstaedt v. State, 329 Ga.App. 233, 764 S.E.2d 565 (October 7, 2014). DUI-per se conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel “failed to admit into evidence at trial print cards generated during a quarterly inspection of the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to test his alcohol concentration.” Defense sought to show that, during inspection, the machine read a sample at 0.075, which “was outside the range of the Intoxilyzer's calibration standard, which requires a reading between 0.076 and 0.084 for a 0.08 solution.” But counsel failed to subpoena a representative from the police department to authenticate the card, instead attempting to admit it through the defense’s expert witness, who could not lay a business record foundation for it. Held, no prejudice shown because the expert “testified that there are many potential reasons for the slight discrepancy in the difference check on November 26, 2010, [but] he could not identify the actual cause and never stated that he believed the machine's margin of error on the date of testing could have been so great that [defendant’s] alcohol concentration, which the Intoxilyzer measured as 0.132 grams, was actually below 0.08. Viewing the record as a whole, we find no reasonable probability that, had the print cards been introduced into evidence, the jury would have concluded that the State presented insufficient proof that Denstaedt's alcohol concentration was 0.08 grams or more.” McFadden dissents, faulting trial counsel for failing to argue for the admission of the expert’s opinion based on hearsay. West v. State, 300 Ga.App. 583, 685 S.E.2d 486 (October 23, 2009). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court properly allowed officer to express his opinion, based on his operation of the intox machine and the inspection certificates, that the machine was “in good working condition.” “This evidence belies West's contention that the officer's testimony concerning the machine being in good working order was speculative.” Laseter v. State, 294 Ga.App. 12, 668 S.E.2d 495 (October 9, 2008). Intox test results were admissible despite