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In re: R.M., 305 Ga.App. 483, 699 S.E.2d 811 (August 2, 2010). In juvenile’s delinquency petition, trial court properly ruled that juvenile’s detention for DUI by trooper constituted an arrest notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-45(b): “[t]he taking of a child into custody is not an arrest, except for the purpose of determining its validity under the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” “As our Supreme Court explained in Hough [ v. State, 279 Ga. 711 (620 S.E.2d 380) (2005)] ‘an arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of another to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 716(2)(a). Specifically, the Court continued, ‘The defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force. Thus, implied consent is triggered at the point that the suspect is not free to leave and a reasonable person in his position would not believe that the detention is temporary, regardless of whether a ‘formal arrest’ has occurred. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. We conclude that R.M.'s detention by [Trooper] Shirah, following Shirah's statement that R.M. was under arrest, was an ‘arrest’ sufficient to trigger the implied consent law, notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-45(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying R. M.'s motion to suppress on this ground. Id.” Thrasher v. State, 300 Ga.App. 154, 684 S.E.2d 318 (September 22, 2009). Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress blood test results, based on untimely reading of implied consent. “Thrasher was arrested for leaving the scene of the accident at or about 4:48 p.m. when Sergeant Tucker began questioning him. Thrasher was read his implied consent rights at 5:45 p.m., 57 minutes later. There is no indication that Thrasher was formally arrested for driving under the influence at either point in time. Inasmuch as the arresting officer must read a person's implied consent rights contemporaneously with an arrest for driving under the influence involving an accident (OCGA §§ 40-5-55 and 40- 6-392(a)(4)), we must first determine whether Thrasher was under arrest for driving under the influence in the circumstances of this case, and if so when.” “Here, it is clear that Sergeant Tucker believed he had probable cause to arrest Thrasher for driving under the influence of methamphetamine immediately after questioning him at the scene of the accident. Upon further interviewing Thrasher at the county jail, the basis for Sergeant Tucker's initial probable cause determination did not change. And having been arrested for leaving the scene of the accident at or about 4:48 p.m., Thrasher was not free to leave thereafter. Given the foregoing, the absence of evidence showing Thrasher's formal arrest for driving under the influence, whether at the scene of the accident or later at the jail, and the fact that Sergeant Tucker nonetheless read him his implied consent rights, we conclude that Thrasher was, in fact, under arrest for driving under the influence when he was arrested at the scene of the accident and that he was not read his implied consent rights until nearly an hour had elapsed thereafter.” Lynch v. State, 293 Ga.App. 858, 668 S.E.2d 264 (September 16, 2008). Evidence that Coweta County officers detained defendant for 15 minutes based on BOLO from Peachtree City officers did not require finding that defendant was under arrest, thus necessitating reading of implied consent warning; Coweta County officers had no probable cause for DUI arrest. “[T]he BOLO did not include information that Lynch was suspected of DUI, the Coweta officers never saw Lynch drive and did not notice Lynch acting in an impaired manner, and they merely detained him for approximately 10 to 15 minutes until Officer Smiley could arrive to follow up on the investigation that began in Peachtree City.” Counsel thus was not ineffective for failure to subpoena Coweta officers to motion to suppress hearing. State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 661 S.E.2d 529 (May 19, 2008). Reversing 285 Ga.App. 640 (647 S.E.2d 338) (2007). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress implied consent results; reading of implied consent notice was proper. Officer told defendant he was being arrested “for hit-and-run and possession of illegal drug paraphernalia;” officer didn’t say he was arresting defendant for DUI, although he had probable cause to believe defendant was DUI, but did read the implied consent warning. Defendant agreed to take a breath test. Held, “[t]he coincidence of probable cause to arrest Underwood for a violation of the DUI statute and Underwood’s actual arrest meant that Underwood was, as a matter of law, ‘arrested for an[] offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of’ the DUI statute.” Accord, Scoggins v. State , 306 Ga.App. 760, 703 S.E.2d 356 (November 10, 2010). State v. Morgan, 289 Ga.App. 706, 658 S.E.2d 237 (February 22, 2008). In defendant’s vehicular homicide prosecution, trial court properly suppressed results of state administered blood test, done by consent without reading of implied consent. Officer testified that he didn’t read implied consent because he didn’t have probable cause for arrest, so he simply asked for consent. “We do not condone such conduct. Were we to do so, we would effectively eviscerate the implied consent statute. If, under State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 316-317, 612 S.E.2d 281 (2005) (test results suppressed where DUI suspect was given implied consent warning and refused test, then police threatened to obtain a search warrant and forcibly obtain blood sample if suspect did not consent), an officer is prohibited from obtaining a search warrant to