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require a blood test from a DUI suspect following his refusal, it follows that an officer is not permitted to circumvent the implied consent statute by merely requesting consent without giving any implied consent notice or warning. … We will not permit or encourage the circumvention of the mandatory implied consent statute by police. Therefore, we hold that in all cases in which police officers request a chemical test of a person’s blood, urine or other bodily substances in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle for the purpose of determining whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, they must give the notice required by the implied consent statute.” Makes no reference to OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d.1) (making voluntary tests admissible), effective July 1, 2006; opinion does not disclose date of offense. Harrelson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 664, 653 S.E.2d 98 (September 27, 2007). At defendant’s trial for vehicular homicide, trial court erred in admitting into evidence results of state tests of defendant’s blood and urine where samples were given by consent but the statutory implied consent warning was never read. “‘Ordinarily, a person is presumed to know the law and his rights secured thereby. But where the statute itself provides that a person ‘shall’ be advised of his rights under the law, the legislature obviously meant to abrogate this presumption and replace it with the requirement that notice be given. Thus, it was necessary, under this statute, for the [requesting] officer to notify [Harrelson] of his right to have an additional test made and that this right be made known to [him] ... In the absence of the advice, the [blood] test results are inadmissible.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [ State v. Peters, 211 Ga.App. 755, 756 (440 S.E.2d 515) (1994).]” Note, incident here occurred in 2005; OCGA § 40-5-67.1 amended effective July 1, 2006 by Ga. L 2006, Act 545, by adding new subsection (d.1): “Nothing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.” State v. Stelzenmuller, 285 Ga.App. 348, 646 S.E.2d 316 (May 10, 2007). Trial court could grant motion to suppress based on finding that implied consent notice was not timely read, casting doubt on officer’s credibility. State v. Austell, 285 Ga.App. 18, 645 S.E.2d 550 (March 23, 2007). A 5-2 majority of Court of Appeals finds that trial court did not err in finding that implied consent warning was not timely read. Trooper had to wrestle defendant to the ground to handcuff him. “The Trooper then put Austell in his patrol car, called the State Police Post to get a wrecker to remove Austell’s car, secured Austell’s car, started an inventory of Austell’s car, tried to get his composure back, saw that Austell had vomited in the back seat of the patrol car, waited for a deputy to arrive, and finally took Austell to the jail where he read Austell his implied consent rights. The Trooper testified that he delayed reading Austell his rights because, with everything that had taken place, he felt that it would be safer for him to get Austell to the jail where it would be lighted, where others would be, rather than just reading Austell his rights on the Interstate with only the two of them present. According to the Trooper, Austell was in custody for 10 or 15 minutes before the deputy arrived, it was approximately another 10 or 15 minutes before he left the scene, it took about five minutes to get from the scene to the jail, and it took approximately another ten minutes after he arrived at the jail before he read Austell his implied consent rights.” Two dissenters argue that the delay was reasonable after the struggle with a large powerful drunk, alone at night on the roadside, but majority holds that the trial court’s decision is not clearly erroneous. “Although the various reasons for the Trooper delaying the reading of the implied consent warnings suggested in the dissent might be reasonable, they were not the reason offered by the Trooper. The one and only reason the Trooper gave for delaying reading Austell his rights was with everything that had taken place, he felt that it would be safer for him to get Austell to the jail where it would be lighted and where others would be, rather than just reading Austell his rights on the Interstate with only the two of them present. The trial court rejected this reasoning, implicitly determining that the Trooper’s testimony was not credible. As we cannot say that this decision is clearly erroneous, given the various times in which the warnings could have been given and were not, we are bound to accept it.” Compare Cain (July 6, 2005), below (affirming trial court’s opposite finding under similar circumstances). Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga.App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (March 5, 2007). Reading of implied consent some 25 minutes after arrest was timely under the circumstances: “After securing Dunbar and calling a tow truck, the officer interviewed the passenger, patted him down, asked him about the presence of weapons or open containers of alcohol, and began inventorying Dunbar’s vehicle. During the inventory, the officer found containers with a strong odor of alcohol.” Naik v. State, 277 Ga.App. 418, 626 S.E.2d 608 (January 27, 2006). “Given the concerns of the arresting officer for the safety of himself and the passenger, the security of the roadway, the protection of Naik’s purse and other valuables, and Naik’s fragile emotional state, his 18-minute delay in reading Naik her implied consent rights was timely under the circumstances . See State v. Marks, 239 Ga.App. 448, 453-454(2), 521 S.E.2d 257 (1999) (holding that the 16-minute