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deemed given in the first place until an arrest has been effected. To the extent this was a serious injury accident, conflicts with Supreme Court’s Hough decision, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Handschuh v. State, 270 Ga.App. 676, 607 S.E.2d 899 (December 1, 2004). Whole court opinion. Implied consent must be read subsequent to arrest under both OCGA § 40-5-55 and OCGA § 40-6-392. Overrules numerous cases holding that an arrest is not required under OCGA § 40-5-55. Five judges dissent. Disapproved on this point, but judgment affirmed, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Hough v. State, 269 Ga.App. 744, 605 S.E.2d 43 (September 3, 2004). “An arrest or serious injury are alternative conditions precedent to seeking a chemical test pursuant to Implied Consent laws where reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(DUI) are also present. Here, … the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Hough was DUI in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) and Hough was involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury. Under these circumstances, an arrest is not also required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 for the administration of chemical testing per Implied Consent law” (emphasis in Court of Appeals decision). Affirmed, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Kahl v. State, 268 Ga.App. 879, 602 S.E.2d 888 (August 3, 2004). Reading of implied consent notice seconds before arrest was timely. “On several prior occasions, we have determined that an implied consent notice given at the time of arrest is timely, even if it precedes the formal arrest. See Oliver, [see below]; State v. Lentsch, 252 Ga.App. 655, 658(3) (556 S.E.2d 248) (2001); Crawford v. State, 246 Ga.App. 344, 345(1) (540 S.E.2d 300) (2000); Bass v. State, 238 Ga.App. 503, 505-506(3)(b) (519 S.E.2d 294) (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 903(2) (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000). In so doing, we noted that ‘under ordinary circumstances, the implied consent warning must be given at the time of the arrest, or at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of the individual case might warrant.’ [Cit.]” Kahl and Lentsch overruled, Handschuh v. State , 270 Ga.App. 676, 607 S.E.2d 899 (December 1, 2004) , affirmed as to this point, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Kahl, Oliver, Lentsch, Crawford and Bass are thus no longer good law. Oliver v. State, 268 Ga.App. 290, 601 S.E.2d 774 (July 1, 2004). “As Oliver received implied consent warnings shortly before his DUI arrest and was reminded of them a second time after arrest and before his blood test, we do not find that, under the circumstances of this case, Oliver received such warnings in an untimely manner. Because Oliver was not free to leave at the time that the initial implied consent warning was read to him, despite the fact that he may not have been formally under arrest, the reading of the notice was accomplished at the time of the arrest in accordance with OCGA § 40- 5-55, OCGA § 40-5-67.1(a), and OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4).” Reading implied consent prior to arrest in a non-serious injury accident DUI is ineffective per Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Shoemake v. State, 266 Ga.App. 342, 596 S.E.2d 805 (March 18, 2004). “The officer’s testimony about his habit and lack of a specific recollection [about timing of reading implied consent warning in DUI arrest] ‘went to its weight and credibility, but [does] not affect its sufficiency on appeal.’ [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 265 Ga.App. 129, 592 S.E.2d 903 (January 9, 2004). Delay of four minutes, 47 seconds, from arrest to reading of implied consent did not require suppression of test results where officer was checking for weapons and identification on defendant’s motorcycle and “determining whether there was a threat posed by two bystanders walking freely about in the proximity of the motorcycle.” “Moreover, in a situation where an officer properly delays the reading of implied consent for a brief period in order to attend to the exigencies of police work, it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate how he would have benefited by being read the implied consent notice earlier.” No such showing here; denial of motion to suppress affirmed. Buchanan v. State, 264 Ga.App. 148, 589 S.E.2d 876 (November 14, 2003). Based on Cooper (see below), trial court should have suppressed implied consent results obtained pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-55, even though probable cause to arrest for DUI was present (“[t]he officer noticed that Buchanan was incoherent, had red, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet.” Defendant “had been seen weaving, changing speeds erratically, and running a red light just before his truck veered off the road into the culvert.”). Officer told defendant that “‘due to the fact that he had been in an accident where I thought there might be serious injuries involved, I needed to draw blood,” thus, in light of Cooper , unintentionally misstating the law. Reversed and remanded. Explained in Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 762, 598 S.E.2d 373 (April 5, 2004) (officers misled defendant by telling him that result of refusal would be search warrant to forcibly take blood and urine; Buchanan does not “purport to authorize police to ignore a driver’s express refusal to