☢ test - Í

The defendant on appeal objects, stating that because he did not receive a copy of the breath test results at least ten days before trial, the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence. The officer who administered the breath test testified that he gave the defendant a copy of the test printout at the time of his arrest and advised him to keep it just in case he decided to hire a lawyer. Held, as defendant has already been provided with a copy of the test results, he was not harmed by any failure by the State to provide the same pursuant to discovery. 25. RIGHT TO COUNSEL Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006). Person charged with DUI is not entitled to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to take a breath test; “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not come into play until the criminal process has progressed to a ‘critical stage’ after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Michigan v. Jackson , 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); United States v. Gouveia , 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); see O’Kelley v. State , 278 Ga. 564, 604 S.E.2d 509 (2004) (an initial appearance hearing is a formal legal proceeding at which right to counsel attaches even though it is not often a critical stage). And Georgia’s constitutional right to counsel does not attach unless the proceeding constitutes a ‘critical stage.’ Ballard v. Smith , 225 Ga. 416, 418, 169 S.E.2d 329 (1969). A critical stage in a criminal proceeding is that point at which rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or the outcome of the case can be substantially affected. Fortson v. State , 272 Ga. 457, 458, 532 S.E.2d 102 (2000); Ballard v. Smith , supra.” 26. SEARCH WARRANTS State v. Padgett, 329 Ga.App. 747, 766 S.E.2d 143 (November 18, 2014). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly suppressed results of blood test taken and analyzed at hospital at officer’s request pursuant to implied consent. Hospital test in these circumstances constituted a state test, and “the State conceded that the hospital's analysis of Padgett's blood sample did not comply with the requirements of OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(1)(A).” “Here, it is undisputed that the blood analysis at issue was performed at the request of a law enforcement officer for the purpose of a DUI investigation pursuant to consent gained after an implied consent warning. Thus, the test was State-administered for purposes of OCGA § 40–6–392(a), and the State had the burden of showing that it met the statutory requirements, which it concedes it could not do.” Results were not made admissible when the State later obtained a search warrant for the hospital records; “the presence of a warrant did not cure the improper testing procedure that occurred in this case.” McAllister v. State, 325 Ga.App. 583, 754 S.E.2d 376 (January 22, 2014). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution; trial court properly denied motion to suppress blood test results, obtained pursuant to search warrant following defendant’s refusal of implied consent testing. Contrary to defendant’s argument, OCGA § 40–5–67.1(d.1) expressly authorizes police to seek a search warrant for blood after a driver refuses implied consent testing. “While McAllister asserts that this reading of the statute renders meaningless the language of OCGA § 40–5–67.1(d): ‘no test shall be given’ if a driver refuses to submit to chemical testing after an officer reads the implied consent notice, his argument is without merit. The Legislature's addition of Subsection (d.1) clarified that this language applies only to warrantless chemical tests given by the State in the event that a driver has refused such testing after the implied consent warning. Practically speaking, the language to which McAllister points also is not meaningless simply because the State may now apply for a warrant to perform the test because it is only a possibility, and in the face of a refusal the officer must be able to present sufficient evidence of probable cause to a magistrate in order to obtain a warrant for the test. Thus, if the officer does not have sufficient cause to obtain the warrant, then no warrant could be issued and such a test will not be authorized.” Missouri v. McNeely, 11-1425, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 2013 WL 1628934 (April 17, 2013). Affirming Missouri Supreme Court; in DWI prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress results of blood testing done at state direction without warrant, consent, or without exigent circumstances. Reject’s state’s argument that “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. We conclude that it does not, and we hold, consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Based on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), where “the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence.” Id. at 770. Rejects state’s argument that drivers’ privacy interest is minimal. Schmerber “explained that the importance of requiring authorization by a ‘“neutral and detached magistrate”’ before allowing a law enforcement officer to ‘invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.’ Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)).” Exigencies in Schmerber justified warrantless blood-draw: “time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” Id., at 770–771. No