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that she remembered nothing from the time that she took her bedtime medication [“an antidepressant, a muscle relaxant, an antianxiety medication, and a fourth drug often used to treat Parkinson's disease,” taken after drinking three glasses of wine] and the time she ‘came to’ handcuffed in the back of a police car. However, the [trial judge, sitting as] trier of fact, after watching a videotape of the defendant's arrest, did not find her testimony about being in a sleep state credible. He further pointed out that the defendant was on notice from her own daughter that she had a problem with alcohol, but that she chose to drink an excessive amount of alcohol the evening of her arrest.” Defendant’s pharmacology expert “testified that sleepwalking is a recognized side effect of the medications Larsen had been taking, particularly when taken in combination with each other and with alcohol.” Peck v. State, 245 Ga.App. 599, 538 S.E.2d 505 (August 18, 2000). Evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for DUI – less safe: defendant stole truck from trucking company, driving it through a hole in a fence and damaging the truck. Truck was found on the side of the road near the company “in some bushes”; defendant fled from the scene but was quickly apprehended. “Officers testified that Peck had a strong odor of alcohol about him.” Held, evidence was insufficient to show that defendant was a less safe driver due to alcohol consumption. “Although there was evidence of damage to the truck, there was also testimony that the truck had been driven through the fence around the lot at Simpson Trucking Company. Therefore, because there was no testimony or other evidence about Peck’s manner of driving or ability to drive, the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict on the DUI count. See Davis v. State, 206 Ga.App. 647, 649, 426 S.E.2d 267 (1992); Clay v. State, 193 Ga.App. 377, 378, 387 S.E.2d 644 (1989).” Note no evidence of field sobriety evaluations, physical or mental manifestations of intoxication, or opinions from officer as to whether defendant was less safe to drive. See also Allen (August 30, 2002), above. Diaz v. State, 245 Ga.App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (July 27, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s less-safe DUI conviction: “If a driver's blood alcohol level is 0.08 grams or more, the trier of fact may infer that the driver is under the influence of alcohol. Stepic v. State, 226 Ga.App. 734, 735–736(1), 487 S.E.2d 643 (1997). Here, in addition, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that Officer Murray was trained and experienced in DUI detection. She observed Diaz driving erratically, and she detected the odor of alcohol on him. Diaz lied to the officer about his drinking and about how long he had lived in Georgia. Diaz's eyes were red and glazed, he performed poorly on several field sobriety tests, and the alco-sensor test indicated the presence of alcohol. He admitted consuming three or four 12–ounce beers before driving, and his blood alcohol level was between 0.089 and 0.090. This court has held that the smell of alcohol, intoxicated appearance, furtive conduct, and a positive alco-sensor test are sufficient to support a conviction for DUI to the extent of being a less safe driver. Byrd [ v. State, 240 Ga.App. 354, 523 S.E.2d 578 (1999)]. The evidence presented here was more than sufficient to support Diaz's conviction on that charge.” Note, statutory inference relating to blood alcohol level over 0.08 grams was eliminated from OCGA § 40-6- 392(b) effective July 1, 2001. Kersey v. State , 243 Ga.App. 689, 534 S.E.2d 428 (April 21, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s DUI conviction: “evidence that Kersey ran a stop sign, failed to stop her car until she reached her house, ran into [Officer] Bates’ patrol car, smelled of alcohol, and was belligerent toward the arresting officers amply supports the jury's verdict. See Moore v. State, 234 Ga.App. 332, 334(3)(c), 506 S.E.2d 685 (1998).” Gilmore v. State, 242 Ga.App. 470, 530 S.E.2d 221 (February 22, 2000). Evidence supported less-safe DUI conviction. “Driving under the influence of alcohol may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Duggan v. State, 225 Ga.App. 291, 293, 483 S.E.2d 373 (1997). In this case, [Trooper] Fagan's detection of a strong odor of alcohol on Gilmore and Gilmore's involvement in an accident constituted evidence of impaired driving ability caused by alcohol. It was within the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence they offered, including Gilmore's testimony that after having been involved in an accident he knew would be investigated, he decided to drink half a pint of an alcoholic beverage.” Goodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 167, 529 S.E.2d 175 (February 1, 2000). Evidence supported less-safe DUI conviction. Aside from defendant’s admission that he was driving, “[t]he officer also testified that he knew the accident had occurred within three hours of his arrival on the scene because his department's normal response time to calls from the City of Avondale Estates is between five and seven minutes. He also testified that no one, including the defendant, ever told him that the accident happened a long time before his arrival. [Cit.] The evidence was sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that Goodson was intoxicated at the time he was in control of his car.” Kelly v. State, 242 Ga.App. 30, 528 S.E.2d 812 (January 21, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s DUI conviction.