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should not be admitted until after a preliminary investigation in which it is established that one or more of the dogs in question were of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, and had been trained or tested in the exercise of these qualities in the tracking of human beings, and were in the charge of one accustomed to use them. It must also appear that the dogs so trained and tested were laid on a trail, whether visible or not, concerning which testimony has been admitted, and upon a track which the circumstances indicate to have been made by the accused. When these preliminary tests have been made, the fact of tracking by a bloodhound may be permitted to go to the jury as one of the circumstances which may tend to connect the defendant with the crime with which he is charged.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bogan v. State, 165 Ga.App. 851, 853(3) (303 S.E.2d 48) (1983).” “[A]n officer's testimony regarding his own observations is admissible. See Simms v. State, 223 Ga.App. 330, 333(2) (477 S.E.2d 628) (1996). Furthermore, ‘[w]here a proper foundation for evidence is afterwards laid during the trial, there is no harm in allowing a party to use that evidence earlier in the trial.’ Horton v. Hendrix, [291 Ga.App. 416, 662 S.E.2d 227 (May 5, 2008)]. Here, the tracking dog's handler testified shortly after the patrol officer and provided a lengthy description of the dog's training and experience in tracking, as well as a description of his own training and experience as the dog's handler. After this foundation was laid without objection, the handler testified as to the dog's tracking of Johnson and Johnson's subsequent arrest. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the patrol officer to testify regarding the tracking dog's actions.” M. BRADY See subheading EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, below N. BUSINESS RECORDS See also subheading POLICE REPORTS , below See new OCGA § 24-8-803(6), 24-9-902(11), (12) Samuels v. State, 335 Ga.App. 819, 783 S.E.2d 344 (February 25, 2016). DUI and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted hospital emergency room record which recited that defendant presented as “intoxicated.” 1. Emergency room record wasn’t testimonial. “[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia has specifically held that ‘[m]edical records created for treatment purposes are not testimonial.’ Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881, 888(3), 717 S.E.2d 190 (2011); [other cits.]. And in this matter, Samuels’s hospital records are not testimonial in nature because ‘the circumstances surrounding their creation and the statements and actions of the parties objectively indicate that the records were prepared with a primary purpose of facilitating [her] medical care.’ Bowling, 289 Ga. at 887(3), 717 S.E.2d 190; see also Hartzler [ v. State, 332 Ga.App. 674, 679–80(2), 774 S.E.2d 738 (2015)] (holding that defendant’s medical records, and testimony regarding the blood-test results contained in his medical records, were not testimonial in nature, and thus, their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause).” 2. Statement in medical record properly admitted though hearsay. “[Federal] courts have held that ‘hospital records, including medical opinions, are ... admitted under [Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) ], which expressly permits “opinions” and “diagnoses.”’ Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 780(I)(D)(2) (1 st Cir., 1990); see also United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 987(II)(A) (9 th Cir., 2005) (holding that medical records from a hospital visit were kept in the ordinary course of business and are ‘classic exceptions’ to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)). Cf. Corbett v. State, 266 Ga. 561, 565, 468 S.E.2d 757 (1996) (noting that under Georgia’s former business exception rule, (3) which unlike OCGA § 24–8–803(6) did not expressly permit opinions, hospital records were admissible to the extent they were made in the regular course of business but would constitute hearsay to the extent they contained opinions of third parties not before the court). Given this construction of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), [cit.] the fact that OCGA § 24–8–803(6) is nearly identically worded, [cit.] and, as previously noted, the fact that these records were made to facilitate Samuels’s treatment and not in anticipation of prosecution, the trial court did not err in admitting the hospital records under OCGA § 24–8–803(6).” Wallace v. State, 335 Ga.App. 232, 779 S.E.2d 130 (November 16, 2015). Felony shoplifting conviction affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, store receipt was properly authenticated by security off icer’s testimony. “Contrary to Wallace’s contention, the security officer was competent to testify regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of the merchandise receipt because he had personal knowledge of the store’s process for determining the value of shoplifted items and he personally compared the merchandise in the cart to the items listed on the receipt. Cf. Bell v. State, 262 Ga.App. 788, 789, 586 S.E.2d 455 (2003) (store’s security agent’s testimony regarding value of stolen merchandise was admissible because he had personal knowledge of merchandise’s retail price). Moreover, the officer’s testimony sufficiently authenticated the receipt, which showed that Wallace shoplifted more than $500 in merchandise, and the officer confirmed that the receipt was created right after Wallace left the store. Finally, the officer’s testimony showed that he followed the store’s normal course of business in having a cashier scan the shoplifted items and then comparing the items to the itemized receipt to ensure that the receipt accurately reflected the value of the stolen merchandise. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the merchandise receipt as a business record.”