☢ test - Í

erred in admitting money orders with stamped entries made by someone outside the receiving bank who didn’t testify. Defendant deposited money orders, which were later returned to the bank marked “Apparent Counterfeit.” Trial court admitted them based on testimony of bank officer. “It is well settled that ‘those portions of business records which contain conclusions, opinions, estimates and impressions of third parties who are not before the court are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.’ Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370(3) (434 S.E.2d 479) (1993) (punctuation omitted). And, the bank CFO's testimony indicated that the determination that the money orders deposited and cashed by Holmes were counterfeit was a conclusion or opinion made by a third party institution, whose representatives did not testify at trial. Accordingly, the money orders stamped ‘Apparent Counterfeit’ should not have been admissible as a business record to prove that the money orders were, in fact, counterfeit, see Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 854(3) (472 S.E.2d 74) (1996) (holding that copy of drug analysis report would not be admissible as a business record because it contained the conclusion of a third party not before the court); Malcolm, 263 Ga. at 370–71(3) (same), and the trial court erred in allowing them into evidence.” Accord, Forrester (March 19, 2012), below. Hite v. State, 315 Ga.App. 221, 726 S.E.2d 704 (March 27, 2012). DUI conviction affirmed; standard State Patrol record setting forth purpose for roadblock was properly admitted as business record. “Trooper Christian testified that the Roadblock Form is a type of document kept in the regular course of business at the Georgia State Patrol. In explanation for this statement, he said that Puckett prepared one of these forms every time they had a roadblock and furnished them to the officers when the roadblock resulted in any arrests to aid the officers in establishing the authority for the roadblock in court, particularly at Administrative License Suspension hearings. The forms were completed shortly around the time of the roadblock, either before or after the event. Christian said that he picked up the Roadblock Form in this case from his desk when he pulled his case file on Hite's arrest. He stated that he had seen Puckett's signature on many occasions, and he believed that the signature on the form belonged to Puckett. We find that this testimony laid a sufficient foundation for the introduction of the Roadblock Form into evidence. Moreover, the form contained only ‘routine facts whose accuracy is not affected by bias, judgment, and memory’ and thus was subject to admission as a business record. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Yingst v. State, 287 Ga.App. at 44. Compare Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 33(1) (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001) (finding narrative portion of police report not admissible as a business record because narrative may contain opinion and reflect ‘human attitudes and emotions which are subjective in nature and susceptible to many interpretations’).” Forrester v. State, 315 Ga.App. 1, 726 S.E.2d 476 (March 19, 2012). Physical precedent only. Forgery convictions reversed; evidence didn’t support finding that the money orders in question were counterfeit. “[T]he only evidence introduced at trial to demonstrate that the money orders were counterfeit were copies of the processed orders themselves, each bearing a stamp reading, ‘Payment Stopped Counterfeit.’ which the State proffered under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24–3–14(b).” State presented witness from bank who testified to bank procedure; she testified that the “Counterfeit” stamp would have been entered by the financial institution on which the money order was drawn. “[I]t is well settled that ‘[t]hose portions of business records which contain conclusions, opinions, estimates and impressions of third parties who are not before the court are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370(3) (434 S.E.2d 479) (1993). Here, [bank witness’s] testimony indicates that the determination that the money orders delivered by Forrester were counterfeit was a conclusion made by a third party institution, whose representatives did not testify at trial. [fn: Moreover, we note that no specific evidence was even presented as to who applied the ‘counterfeit’ stamp to the copy of the money orders and thus no adequate foundation laid as to the stamp's admissibility as a business record. ] Thus, we agree with Forrester that the ‘counterfeit’ stamps should not have been admissible as a business record to show that the documents were, in fact, counterfeit. See Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 854(3) (472 S.E.2d 74) (1996); Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462(11) (291 S.E.2d 497) (1982). Compare Ross v. State, 298 Ga.App. 525 (680 S.E.2d 435) (2009) (affirming admission of copies of processed checks as a business record where defendant raised only foundational arguments and did not contend that the ‘NSF’ stamp on a check represented a conclusion or violated the confrontation clause).” Accord, Holmes (April 25, 2012), above. Warren v. State, 309 Ga.App. 596, 711 S.E.2d 108 (May 16, 2011). Convictions for forgery and theft by taking affirmed; trial court properly admitted credit card statements as business records. “The trial court admitted all of the statements as credit card company business records under OCGA § 24–3–14 based on foundational testimony given by representatives of the companies. Warren objected that the foundational testimony was inadequate because the portions of the statements showing her credit card purchases from third-party merchants were not business records generated by the credit card companies, but were business records generated by the merchants that required additional foundational testimony from the merchants. The record shows that, at or near the time credit card purchases were made from the