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Confrontation Clause rights before trial.” Daniel v. State, 298 Ga.App. 245, 679 S.E.2d 811 (June 8, 2009). At defendant’s trial for DUI, vehicular homicide, and related offenses, evidence of hospital blood test was properly admitted as business record where “[t]he printout contains only the factual data of the test results.” “[T]he evidence showed that the test was completed in the regular course of business, a record was kept in the regular course of business, the test results show only factual data, and blood test records are usually made at or within a reasonable amount of time after the blood was tested. Although neither witness testified that Daniel's test was recorded within a reasonable time after the results were generated, it was the usual practice of the hospital to make the record contemporaneously to generating a printed blood test result, and the printed result is time stamped ‘5/31/2003 12:38,’ only ten minutes after the blood test was ordered. Finally, there is no requirement that the testifying witness have personal knowledge of the specific document's creation. Oldham v. State, 205 Ga.App. 268, 270(1) (422 S.E.2d 38) (1992).” Ross v. State, 298 Ga.App. 525, 680 S.E.2d 435 (May 29, 2009). At defendant’s trial for theft by deception related to certain checks, trial court properly admitted certified copies of the checks despite absence of testimony from the issuing bank. The checks were authenticated by testimony of representatives of the bank depositing the items. “‘It is well established that a factual document may be admitted under the business records exception when an officer or employee of a business that received, relied upon, and retained the document in the regular course of its business testifies to that effect, despite the lack of testimony from a witness associated with the business that originally created the document.’ Walter R. Thomas Assocs. v. Media Dynamite, Inc., 284 Ga.App. 413, 416(1)(a) (643 S.E.2d 883) (2007) (the trial court properly admitted invoices for advertising time as business records of an advertising broker that in the regular course of its business received the invoices, used them to collect its commissions from its clients, and retained in its files, based on the testimony of the broker's president, despite the lack of testimony from a representative of the networks that aired the ads and created the documents); Jackson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 217, 218-219(1)(1) (433 S.E.2d 655) (1993) (the trial court properly admitted a mortgage application and related documents as business records of an intermediary mortgage purchaser that in the regular course of its business received the loan package, sold the loan to a secondary mortgagee, and retained the documents in its files, based on the testimony of an employee of the intermediary, despite the lack of testimony from a representative of the loan originator that created the documents), citing, Lewis v. United California Bank, 240 Ga. 823, 824-825 (242 S.E.2d 581) (1978) (‘Where routine, factual documents are made by one business, transmitted or delivered to a second business, and there entered or kept by the second business in the regular course of the business of the receiving business, they can become business records of the receiving business. Where the proper statutory foundation is laid they may be admitted in evidence as business records of the receiving business even though they were not initially prepared, made or produced by it. The test is not who made the original document constituting the event, act, transaction, or occurrence, but whether or not the document after it was made became a part of the business records of the person or firm having custody of the same.’); Moore v. State, 154 Ga.App. 535, 540 (268 S.E.2d 706) (1980) (a document becomes a business record of a business that receives it only if it is a ‘routine factual document[ ] made by the first business and transmitted to the second business as part of a related or symbiotic business relationship – almost as if the two firms were headquarters and branch in the same large corporation – in which the business of the receiving firm relies upon the[ ] record[ ]’) (emphasis omitted).” Hamilton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 47, 676 S.E.2d 773 (March 26, 2009). Motel’s records of electronic door key use were properly identified as business records, although witness was not the custodian of the record. “[Witness] did not have to personally maintain the records in order to lay a proper foundation for their admission. “‘The witness's lack of personal knowledge regarding how the records were created does not render them inadmissible, but merely affects the weight given to the evidence.’ (Footnote omitted.) Santana v. State, 283 Ga.App. 696, 698(1) (642 S.E.2d 390) (2007).” Admission of the records didn’t violate defendant’s right to confrontation, as “business records properly admitted under the ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception do not violate ‘a defendant's right of confrontation under the Federal and State constitutions.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 (485 S.E.2d 486) (1997).” Accord, Loyal v. State , 300 Ga.App. 65, 684 S.E.2d 124 (September 10, 2009); Wallace v. State , 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015). Yingst v. State, 287 Ga.App. 43, 650 S.E.2d 746 (July 31, 2007). Lieutenant who set up roadblock submitted standard form report showing proposed time, place and purpose. Lieutenant was in Iraq at time of hearing on defendant’s motion challenging constitutionality of roadblock, but his major testified and authenticated the report as a business record of the department. Held, report on establishment of roadblock, including purpose thereof, was properly admitted as a business record. “Major Mathis indicated that this was a form document routinely submitted when a roadblock took