☢ test - Í

does not show that the witness [an attorney in another firm to whom the drafter faxed the document] had any personal knowledge of the drafting of the complaint or any familiarity with the drafting attorney’s business practices or regular course of dealing.” Diaz v. State, 245 Ga.App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (July 27, 2000). DUI and related convictions affirmed; sergeant could testify to authenticity of Intoxilyzer inspection record although he wasn’t personally familiar with the information contained therein. “Although Diaz objected that it was necessary for a witness identifying business records to have personal knowledge of the correctness of the records or to have made the entries himself, that is not the law. The fact that the witness has no personal knowledge of the entries does not affect their admissibility, although it might affect the weight afforded them. Shoney's, Inc. v. Hudson, 218 Ga.App. 171(1), 460 S.E.2d 809 (1995).” Duncan v. State, 271 Ga. 16, 515 S.E.2d 388 (April 27, 1999). “Parian, a GBI firearms expert, testified about the physical evidence relating to the gunshot which killed the victim. On cross-examination, Duncan’s counsel sought to question Parian about the contents of a GBI crime lab report containing results of a blood test administered to Bo Diddly which showed that he was intoxicated at the time he was shot. Duncan’s claim that the blood-alcohol test results should have been admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule lacks merit because there is nothing in the record to indicate that Parian was qualified to relate the facts upon which the entry of the blood-alcohol test results were made. Generally, ‘those portions of business records which contain conclusions, opinions, estimates and impressions of third parties who are not before the court are not admissible.’ Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370(3), 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993).” O. CALLER I.D. Inglett v. State, 239 Ga.App. 524, 521 S.E.2d 241 (July 28, 1999). Evidence of telephone caller-i.d. display was properly admitted: “There is no merit in defendants' argument that Grizzard's testimony concerning the identification of … the telephone caller constituted inadmissible hearsay. These computer-generated data automatically appearing on the screen of the telephone do ‘not constitute out-of-court statements by any person or “the conclusion of a third party not before the court.”’ Caldwell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 46, 47, 495 S.E.2d 308 (1997).” P. CAUSE OF DEATH Brown v. State, 297 Ga. 685, 777 S.E.2d 466 (September 14, 2015). Felony murder conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant’s failure to provide child with necessary sustenance proximately caused infant’s death. “‘Where one inflicts an unlawful injury, such injury is to be accounted as the efficient, proximate cause of death, whenever it shall be made to appear, either that (1) the injury itself constituted the sole proximate cause of the death; or that (2) the injury directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death; or that (3) the injury materially accelerated the death, although proximately occasioned by a pre-existing cause.’ Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824, 829 (10 S.E.2d 861) (1940). See also [ State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010)] (‘Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal ... conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.’). In this case, the State’s medical expert testified that Davis’s malnutrition materially contributed to his death from battered child syndrome, because that starvation severely affected the child’s ability to heal from the chronic and acute physical abuse he suffered at the hands of Appellant and Wilson.” Franklin v. State, 295 Ga. 204, 758 S.E.2d 813 (May 19, 2014). Felony murder conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant’s beating three months earlier caused defendant’s death. “Here, the dislodgement of the tracheal tube was not an unforeseen intervening cause of the victim's death because the beating placed the victim in a chronic vegetative state necessitating the placement of the tracheal tube. As such, the dislodging of the tracheal tube was only secondary to the beating which was the proximate cause of death. See Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19(1), 596 S.E.2d 159 (2004) (kicking the victim with a steel-toed boot was proximate cause of the victim's death days later; the victim's fall head-first onto concrete after being kicked was not reasonably unforeseeable); Green v. State, 266 Ga. 758(2)(b), 470 S.E.2d 884 (1996) (defendant's stabbing his wife was the proximate cause of her death from a stress ulcer); Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470(1), 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981) (defendant's actions in robbing the victim at gunpoint and hitting the victim were the proximate cause of the victim's death by cardiac arrest). The jury was authorized to reject any alternate theory of causation and conclude that appellant's actions in beating the victim caused the victim's death. Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563(1), 722 S.E.2d 765 (2012). See also Bryant v. State, 270 Ga. 266(1)(a), 507 S.E.2d 451 (1998) (evidence sufficient to convict on charge of felony murder where gunshot to the head caused victim to be immobilized for a significant amount of time during treatment and recovery; said immobilization put the victim at greater risk of suffering the pulmonary