☢ test - Í

Hanes v. State, 294 Ga. 521, 755 S.E.2d 151 (February 24, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting into evidence “a .45 caliber Taurus pistol and ammunition found within Hanes's reach at the time of his arrest for Thomas's murder. In general, a ‘trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest if “the evidence is wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the arrest is remote in time from the charged crime, and the evidence is not otherwise shown to be relevant.”’ (Citation omitted .) Manuel v. State, 315 Ga.App. 632, 633(1) (727 S.E.2d 246) (2012). Otherwise, admission of such evidence is within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 633–34. We accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, and review the trial court's decision to admit the evidence recovered from Hanes's arrest only for abuse of discretion. Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10(3) (727 S.E.2d 112) (2012). The .45 caliber pistol seized at the time of Hanes's arrest was largely identical to the murder weapon in size, style, and brand. This evidence is both probative of the general circumstances of Hanes's arrest and highly relevant to the murder and aggravated assault, which were committed with a similar weapon. Here, the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous, and there was no apparent abuse of discretion in denying the defense's motion to suppress. Id.” Forensics showed, however, that the gun found with defendant wasn’t the murder weapon. Arrest occurred two and one-half months after the shooting. Accord, Young v. State , 297 Ga. 737, 778 S.E.2d 162 (October 5, 2015) (no error in admitting evidence of a gun in defendant’s possession when arrested three days after the murder, similar to the murder weapon but not the same gun; citing Hanes ). Pitchford v. State, 294 Ga. 230, 751 S.E.2d 785 (November 25, 2013). Murder, burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted video recordings seized pursuant to search warrant, which showed “Pitchford smoking marijuana, making crude jokes, and reciting inflammatory rap lyrics.” Though prejudicial …, the recording was relevant in that other content on the seized tapes proved that the tapes themselves, along with the camcorder on which they were made, had belonged to [victim] Greene. The recordings themselves thus established a definitive link between Pitchford and property stolen from Greene, and this evidence was, therefore, properly admitted.” Disapproved on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). Long v. State, 324 Ga.App. 882, 752 S.E.2d 54 (November 20, 2013). False imprisonment, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting evidence of weapons (a machete, a crossbow) present at defendant’s home where the incident occurred, but which weren’t used in the incident. “As the victim reported in her written statement that Long threatened her with a machete, told Officer Jones it was on the dresser, and the machete was found in the bedroom where the incident occurred, the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence. To the extent that the trial court may have erred by allowing evidence of the crossbows, we find its admission harmless, particularly in light of the evidence showing that Long was preparing to go hunting the next day. Chambers v. State, 250 Ga. 856, 861(5), 302 S.E.2d 86 (1983) (admission of gun not used in crime harmless even though it was not relevant evidence).” Johnson v. State, 323 Ga.App. 65, 744 S.E.2d 921 (July 3, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted video defendant’s comments to himself in back of patrol car: ““I'm really f–––ed. I mean, I'm really, really, really, really f–––ed.” Comment, not prompted by police questioning, was part of res gestae. “That the statement was ambiguous—the object of his statement may have been the collateral consequences affecting his medical licensure rather than the fact that he was actually less safe to operate a vehicle because of his level of intoxication—was an issue for the jury. Moreover, it is unlikely that any rational juror's passion would have been unduly inflamed from the mere fact that Johnson used a curse word during the course of an arrest.” Bufford v. State, 320 Ga.App. 123, 739 S.E.2d 421 (March 6, 2013). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to “evidence regarding [defendant’s] appearance at the time of his arrest,” as such evidence was made relevant by the defense suggestion that the offenses may have been committed by defendant’s brother. Hamlin v. State, 320 Ga.App. 29, 739 S.E.2d 46 (February 27, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no error “in admitting into evidence a photograph showing him standing next to a police car after his arrest. Hamlin's hands are not visible in the photo, and he argues that this makes him appear to be handcuffed. Hamlin contends that any probative value the photo has was outweighed by the photograph's prejudicial effect.” Court of Appeals disagrees: “[a]t the time the photograph was admitted, the jury already knew that Hamlin had been arrested. Further, most jurors likely would assume that the police usually handcuff a person arrested for armed robbery. See Solis–Morales v. State, 315 Ga.App. 724, 727, n. 8, 728 S.E.2d 253 (2012). The jury also had heard, without objection, Rogers' testimony that when he identified Hamlin as the person who robbed him, that Hamlin was sitting in a police car. Given this testimony and the trial court's proper charge to the jury on the presumption of innocence, we cannot say that Hamlin ‘has