☢ test - Í

advances/assault made by defendant on occupant of residence while defendant was committing burglary, although defendant was not charged with any offense related to the sexual advances/assault; burglary was based on theft of items from residence. “‘The State is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of a crime even though the defendant is not charged with every crime committed during the entire criminal transaction.’ (Citation omitted.) Flowers v. State, 191 Ga.App. 396, 399(2) (381 S.E.2d 768) (1989). Because Meyers’ statements to and acts toward N.B. occurred during the commission of the burglary, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See Burger v. State, 242 Ga. 28, 32-33(8) (247 S.E.2d 834) (1978) (evidence that defendant’s co-indictee sodomized the victim after they kidnapped him but before they murdered him was admissible as res gestae, even though the defendant was not charged with kidnapping or sodomy, because the offenses were all part of one on-going criminal transaction); Hardegree v. State, 230 Ga.App. 111, 111-112(1) (495 S.E.2d 347) (1998) (victim testified that, after the defendant broke into her home but before he raped her, defendant told her that he was ‘running from the law, had been drinking, was on drugs really bad, and needed money for gas’; the Court noted that, even if the defendant had objected to this evidence at trial, it would have been admissible as res gestae); Yarborough v. State, 186 Ga.App. 845, 846-847 (368 S.E.2d 802) (1988) (kidnapping victim’s testimony that, during the kidnapping, the defendant showed her a ‘hit list’ of people that he intended to kill was admissible as res gestae).” Accord, Garrett v. State , 285 Ga.App. 282, 645 S.E.2d 718 (May 8, 2007) (trial court properly allowed kidnapping victim to testify that she was also raped by defendant as part of the same incident, although the rape was not charged). Adkins v. State, 280 Ga. 761, 632 S.E.2d 650 (July 13, 2006). No error in admitting hat defendant wore at time of arrest, bearing the slogan “Fuck Everybody.” “Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to view clothing worn by [defendant] at the time of arrest. In addition, it was shown that the clothing was similar to clothing worn by the shooters at the crime scene.” Head v. State, 279 Ga.App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (June 1, 2006). Fact that defendant “appeared drunk at the time of his arrest” one day after committing the armed robbery and related offenses here prosecuted was irrelevant and should have been excluded from evidence citing “ Browning v. State, 236 Ga.App. 893, 894(2), 513 S.E.2d 779 (1999) (evidence defendant arrested for DUI while driving stolen car inadmissible in theft by taking trial).” Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 539, 630 S.E.2d 410 (May 18, 2006). “[Co-defendant] Lane contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Dowdy that Lane attempted to rape her as part of the res gestae of the murder. The State, however, is entitled to present the entirety of the res gestae of the crime involved. ‘Even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. This is true even if the defendant’s character is incidentally placed in issue.’ Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593(6) (351 S.E.2d 625) (1987). In addition, because [victim] Tyson consoled Dowdy after the attempted rape, the rape attempt and its aftermath were relevant to the existence of motive for the murder and were, therefore, admissible. Payne v. State, 273 Ga. 317(3) (540 S.E.2d 191) (2001).” Accord, Nash v. State , 285 Ga. 753, 683 S.E.2d 591 (September 28, 2009) (At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant also pointed his gun at a bystander and stole the bystander’s necklace, although defendant wasn’t charged with those offenses.); Dixon (November 2, 2015), above (under pre-2013 Evidence Code, drugs found at murder scene properly admitted). Wesson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (May 16, 2006). “At trial, the State, over Wesson’s objection, proffered Laurie Williams as a witness. Williams, who along with several others was arrested at Wesson’s residence the same day as Wesson, testified that it was general knowledge that Wesson and his son engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Wesson argues that this testimony constituted evidence of other crimes and that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 to determine if the evidence was being offered for appropriate purposes. We disagree. Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(E) provides in part: ‘ Nothing in this rule is intended to prohibit the state from introducing evidence of similar transactions or occurrences which are ... immediately related in time and place to the charge being tried, as part of a single, continuous transaction. ’ Indeed, ‘the State is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae and such evidence is not rendered inadmissible despite the fact that the character of the accused is incidentally implicated.’ Jones v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 334(3) (511 S.E.2d 883) (1999). Here, Williams’s testimony regarding her knowledge of Wesson’s involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine was not evidence of a separate crime but rather constituted evidence of a continuous transaction. See Herndon v. State, 253 Ga.App. 543, 546(2) (559 S.E.2d 749) (2002); Jones, supra, 236 Ga.App. at 334(3). Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 therefore does not apply. See Herndon, 253 Ga.App. at 547(2); Jones, supra, 236 Ga.App. at 334(3). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to proffer Williams’s testimony regarding Wesson’s involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.”