☢ test - Í

and other evidence in question to any such ideology; rather, that link was forged only via the State's opening statement and closing argument, which itself was improper. See Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264, 266(2), 658 S.E.2d 596 (2008) (prosecutor ‘improperly injected new evidence’ during closing argument); Alexander v. State, 270 Ga. 346(2), 509 S.E.2d 56 (1998) (prosecutor's description of defendant's alleged gang ties in opening statement held reversible error where no evidence of such presented at trial). In sum, ‘one is left with the feeling that the [evidence in question] was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.’ Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (finding improper the admission of evidence of defendant's membership in organization called ‘the Aryan Brotherhood’).” 5. DEFENDANT’S DRUG USE/DEALING Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (March 27, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; reference by officer to defendant “smoking weed” was properly cured by jury instruction, didn’t require mistrial. Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted relevant evidence, though it stated or suggested that defendant was a drug dealer. One witness “mentioned generally that she knew the people standing on the street corner were drug dealers. This comment occurred as part of her explanation for why she felt it was important to keep the argument on the street from escalating. The second witness, Perrymond, was allowed to testify that the victim had ‘brought himself onto the dealer side of the [neighborhood]’ where he (Perrymond), appellant, and other individuals were standing. This evidence, admissible to prove the circumstances surrounding the assault on Tanks and to counter appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense, was admissible even though it may have incidentally placed appellant's character into issue. See Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 691(8) (512 S.E.2d 896) (1999) (relevant evidence that defendant was a drug dealer did not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally placed defendant's character into evidence).” Harmless in any event in light of other evidence that defendant sold drugs, including his own admission. Hawkins v. State, 316 Ga.App. 415, 729 S.E.2d 549 (June 26, 2012). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed; no mistrial required based on “evidence that he had used cocaine and marijuana before the robbery. White [co- onspirator testifying for State] testified that the evening of the crime, he had used marijuana and cocaine, and he remembered the defendants smoking marijuana in the truck. Hawkins argues that this testimony was not relevant, given the trial court's earlier ruling that Hawkins's statement was admissible, a ruling which necessarily included a finding that Hawkins was not intoxicated at the time he gave his statement. Given this ruling, Hawkins argues, the only reason for introducing evidence of his marijuana use was to place his character in evidence. ‘Evidence is not inadmissible simply because it might incidentally reflect on the defendant's character.... What is forbidden is the introduction by the state in the first instance of evidence whose sole relevance to the crime charged is that it tends to show that the defendant has bad character . [White's] testimony he and [Hawkins] used drugs ... on the day of the [crime] was relevant evidence of [Hawkins's] state of mind and admissible as part of the res gestae. Whether the effects due to their use may have worn off by the time of the [crime] was a question for the jury to decide.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Pless v. State, 260 Ga. 96, 98(2), 390 S.E.2d 40 (1990).” Coleman v. State, 308 Ga.App. 731, 708 S.E.2d 638 (March 24, 2011). First degree child cruelty convictions reversed; trial court erred by admitting evidence that defendants purchased and used marijuana, offered by State “to rebut the Colemans' ‘assertions of poverty to explain and justify their conduct’” in failing to feed and care for their infant child. “But the relevant issue is whether they claimed poverty as a defense to the charges against them. The Colemans were charged with willfully depriving D.C. ‘of necessary sustenance to the extent that said child's health was jeopardized.’ At no time during the trial did the Colemans claim that they were unable to provide food for D.C. because they were poor. And the State presented no evidence of such a claim. Therefore evidence that the Colemans purchased and used marijuana was not relevant to rebut a claim that they did not make. The marijuana evidence therefore was not admissible on this ground.” Cobb v. State, 302 Ga.App. 821, 692 S.E.2d 65 (March 12, 2010). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault, no mistrial demanded where victim/defendant’s former boyfriend testified that he was avoiding defendant because “I seen tracks on her arms.” “[T]he improper reference to drug use appeared to be inadvertent because the State explained that it expected Andrews to say that ‘they had a bad relationship, that he didn't want to be around her,’ instead of making a reference to drug use. This record supported a finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally solicit a comment about drug use. [Cit.] Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to give curative instructions to the jury rather than grant a mistrial. [Cits.]”