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instruction to jury). Morita v. State, 270 Ga.App. 372, 606 S.E.2d 595, (November 8, 2004). “[S]tating that someone is seeing a psychiatrist does not necessarily inject one’s character into evidence. See Hinely v. State, 275 Ga. 777, 782, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002).” Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 98, 581 S.E.2d 715 (May 2, 2003). “‘[T]he decision to give curative instructions to the jury rather than grant the mistrial request following the introduction of bad character evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and is not error.’” 8. FLIGHT See EVIDENCE – FLIGHT/ESCAPE, below 9. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS Furlow v. State, 297 Ga.App. 375, 677 S.E.2d 412 (April 7, 2009). Appears to hold that witness’s comment on defendant’s future dangerousness to other children was improper. Witness was fellow inmate with defendant, who testified that defendant told him about molesting victim. Witness’s letter to district attorney was admitted in evidence, with closing remark, “I sure hope this guy is not placed back on the street where he can get at my three kids or anybody else's without getting the help he needs first. If this can help you in some way then God bless you and please make sure this guy gets the help he needs before placing him back into society.” 10. GANG AFFILIATION Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845, 778 S.E.2d 774 (October 19, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; under pre- 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted witness’s prior statement to police for impeachment purposes when he recanted on the stand. Defendant objected to witness’s description of defendant as a gang leader, as improper character evidence, but the court allowed it in, “reasoning that the fact that Collins gave “very specific information” in response to the interviewer’s open-ended question tended to show that Collins was not being coached through the interview. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this portion of the statement was relevant for impeachment purposes, and this is true even though the evidence of Redding’s alleged gang affiliation may have incidentally put his character in issue. See Wolfe v. State, 273 Ga. 670, 674(4)(a), 544 S.E.2d 148 (2001) ( evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation admissible, despite its negative reflection on defendant’s character, where it was ‘relevant and material to an issue in the case’).” Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted “gang bible” as “relevant to the count of the indictment alleging that the defendants were members of a criminal street gang. See Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 445(3) (746 S.E.2d 127) (2013). … The fact that the notebook does not specifically name the co-defendants' alleged gang goes to its evidentiary weight and does not render it inadmissible. See Sifuentes, 293 Ga. at 445(3).” Lingo v. State, 329 Ga.App. 528, 765 S.E.2d 696 (November 12, 2014). Physical precedent only. Robbery conviction affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting evidence of defendant’s gang membership. “In this case, there was no evidence whatsoever that the robberies were gang-related. Although gang affiliation may be admissible to show motive, [fn: See, e.g., Wolfe v. State, 273 Ga. 670, 674(4)(a), 544 S.E.2d 148 (2001) (gang membership was key to the defendant's motive to commit the crimes, which he did at the request of gang members and pursuant to gang's code of conduct, which required him to participate or to suffer repercussions); Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 499, 507(4), 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006) (evidence of defendant's gang membership was admissible and ‘relevant to show how the defendants knew one another, and to provide a context and motive for the defendants' joint participation in the robbery’). ] that was not the purpose of the admission of the evidence in this case, and there was no evidence that Lingo's gang membership was in any way related to his motive for committing the crimes. And … because the evidence of Lingo's gang affiliation was unrelated to the crimes, it was not res gestae. Moreover, Lingo's prior gang affiliation had minimal probative value with regard to identity. The fact that Lingo was wearing gang colors—red and black—at the time the crimes were committed is not enough in itself to establish a probative connection between the crimes alleged and his gang affiliation, particularly given that others who were involved in the robberies were not wearing gang colors. Compare Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 98, 104(5)(c), 581 S.E.2d 715 (2003). Similarly, the fact that Lingo's co-defendant was also a member of the same gang was of limited probative value, considering that they were apprehended together and in the absence of any evidence that the crimes were gang-related. Thus, the evidence of Lingo's gang membership two years before the crimes in the case was of minimal, if any, probative value. In the absence of a charge of violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, OCGA § 16–15–1 et seq., evidence of a defendant's gang affiliation is highly prejudicial. See Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 662(2), 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013) (‘it was highly prejudicial for the