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intrinsic to the charged offense, and thus does not fall within Rule 404(b)’s ambit, if it (1) arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) is necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Nowak, 370 Fed.Appx. 39, 41(I) (11 th Cir., 2010). See also United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344(II)(C) (11 th Cir., 2007) (accord). Moreover, ‘evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. In this case, the uncharged offenses were part of a crime spree committed by a burglary crew of which Baughns was a part, even if there was no evidence that he directly participated in those offenses. All of the offenses were committed in a similar way, within a two-week period and in the same area of Athens– Clarke County, and included overlapping participants. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the uncharged burglaries. Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 891, 892(3), (4), 506 S.E.2d 124 (1998); Rust v. State, 264 Ga.App. 893, 897(1), 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003); Sullivan v. State, 242 Ga.App. 839, 840–841(3), 531 S.E.2d 367 (2000); Vick v. State, 211 Ga.App. 735, 737(2), 440 S.E.2d 508 (1994); Baird v. State, 207 Ga.App. 44, 44–45(1), 427 S.E.2d 37 (1993).” 14. JUVENILE RECORD Harris v. State, 296 Ga.App. 465, 675 S.E.2d 236 (March 5, 2009). “[W]hen a defendant presents witnesses as to his good character, the State is entitled to cross-examine as to his juvenile record to impeach such testimony. Redman v. State, 281 Ga.App. 605, 606(2) (636 S.E.2d 680) (2006); Williams v. State, 171 Ga.App. 927, 928(2) (321 S.E.2d 423) (1984). Nevertheless, he notes that in order to utilize such evidence, the State ‘is required to demonstrate that the questions were asked in good faith, and based on reliable information that can be supported by admissible evidence.’ (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied.) Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 90-91(8)(c) (402 S.E.2d 41) (1991).” 15. LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS/INCARCERATION Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed prosecutor to cross-examine defendant’s girlfriend Larkin as to “whether Larkin had ‘put money on’ appellant's prison account while he was awaiting trial and whether on the night of the crimes she had two black eyes.” Testimony properly went to Larkin’s relationship with defendant and whether “she may have been testifying out of fear or intimidation.” Fact that “evidence that an accused has been confined in jail in connection with the case at issue does not place his character in evidence. Williams v. State, 242 Ga. 757, 758(2) (251 S.E.2d 254) (1978); Walker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 83, 84–85(1) (576 S.E.2d 62) (2003).” Culajay v. State, 309 Ga.App. 631, 710 S.E.2d 846 (May 19, 2011). Methamphetamine trafficking and sale convictions affirmed; no improper character evidence where “during the redirect examination of the undercover officer who purchased the methamphetamine from Culajay, the State's prosecutor asked if Culajay looked ‘substantially the same’ as he did on the date of the last drug sale. The undercover officer replied, ‘No. He's lost a little bit of weight since he's been in jail.’ … As we have previously explained, ‘evidence that an accused has been confined in jail in connection with the case at issue does not place his character into evidence.’ Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 484, 486(2) (668 S.E.2d 700) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Smith [ v. State, 302 Ga.App. 128, 133(1)(c) (690 S.E.2d 449) (2010)] (same); Fields v. State, 176 Ga.App. 122, 123 (335 S.E.2d 466) (1985) (holding that ‘evidence that an accused is presently confined in jail does not place his character in evidence’). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Culajay's objection to the undercover officer's testimony.” Accord, Bright v. State , 292 Ga. 273, 736 S.E.2d 380 (January 7, 2013); Miller v. State , 295 Ga. 769, 764 S.E.2d 135 (October 6, 2014) (State’s witnesses “referred in their testimony to appellant's incarceration in the context of explaining why they initially failed to make truthful statements to investigators, stating that they felt safer speaking to the authorities once they knew appellant was in jail.”) Baker v. State, 307 Ga.App. 884, 706 S.E.2d 214 (February 16, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed. Not improper character evidence where defendant volunteered on the stand that he had been in the federal penitentiary, then prosecutor followed up with questions about that subject. “‘Where the defendant testifies and admits prior criminal conduct, he has not placed his character “in issue” within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 24-9- 20(b). Rather, he has raised an issue which may be fully explored by the State on cross-examination. It was appellant ... who introduced the topic. He cannot now complain that the prosecutor followed up on cross-examination.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cobb v. State, 251 Ga.App. 697, 698 (555 S.E.2d 79) (2001); see Mitchell v. State, 193 Ga.App. 214, 215-216(2) (387 S.E.2d 425) (1989).” Notes that no relevancy objection was raised.