☢ test - Í

Smith v. State , 244 Ga.App. 165, 534 S.E.2d 903 (May 24, 2000). Convictions for rape and related offenses affirmed; no mistrial required where witness improperly commented that fingerprints found at crime scene matched defendant’s “criminal history.” Trial court gave curative instruction. Citing Dimauro v. State, 185 Ga.App. 524(2), 364 S.E.2d 900 (1988) (curative instruction sufficient where officer testified that he used photo of defendant from “a previous arrest”); Dunn v. State , 251 Ga. 731, 734(4), 309 S.E.2d 370 (1983) (curative instruction sufficient where “a State's witness testified that the defendant had an arrest record.”). Mitchell v. State, 242 Ga.App. 694, 531 S.E.2d 143 (March 10, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed. “ Where, as here, no information was presented to the jury regarding the defendant's prior arrest and the jury never had the opportunity to glean such information from the fingerprint card itself, the presence and ‘admission of [the] fingerprint card[] alone ... [do] not introduce character into evidence....’ Keller v. State, 231 Ga.App. 546, 548(4), 499 S.E.2d 713 (1998). The court did not err in denying Mitchell's motion for mistrial.” Rittenhouse v. State, 272 Ga. 78, 526 S.E.2d 342 (February 14, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting “a booking photograph that depicted appellant at the time he was admitted to jail. … The photograph was relevant to identify appellant Rittenhouse and to show how he appeared at the time of the crime. Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255(12), 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995). Appellant Rittenhouse had so dramatically changed his appearance since the time of the crime that many witnesses had difficulty distinguishing between him and his twin brother, who was a codefendant. The two brothers were easily distinguishable at the time of the crime. Since booking photographs have been held not to inject character into evidence because they do not suggest that the defendant has committed previous crimes, appellant Rittenhouse has failed to demonstrate how the admission of the photograph prejudiced him. Edmond v. State, 228 Ga.App. 695(2), 492 S.E.2d 583 (1997).” Accord, Thompson v. State , 281 Ga.App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (September 20, 2006) ( photographs taken the night of the shooting helped witnesses identify defendant, whose name they did not know, or who they confused with his twin brother; also defendant had long dreadlocks at time of offense, but shorter hair at time of trial ); Gillespie v. State , 333 Ga.App. 565, 774 S.E.2d 255 (July 16, 2015) (physical precedent only) (booking photo showed braids defendant wore at time of incident but not at trial). Tuten v. State, 242 Ga.App. 223, 529 S.E.2d 221 (February 3, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper character evidence where investigator testified that a photograph of defendant “from previous files” was used in a photo line-up. “[T]he Supreme Court has stated that ‘[u]nder previous decisions of this court, actually exhibiting a mugshot to the jury has not been held erroneous. Therefore, an arguable reference to a mugshot, while not to be encouraged, did not impermissibly place appellant's character [in] issue.’ (Citations omitted.) Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 775(3), 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979).” Accord, Handley v. State , 289 Ga. 786, 716 S.E.2d 176 (October 3, 2011) (actual reference to “mugshot” of defendant used in investigation didn’t place his character into issue). Murray v. State, 271 Ga. 504, 521 S.E.2d 564 (September 20, 1999). Court properly admitted defendant’s note allegedly threatening witness, since evidence that he wrote it while in jail awaiting trial did not place his character at issue. Accord, Handspike v. State , 279 Ga.App. 496, 631 S.E.2d 730 (May 19, 2006); Dade v. State , 292 Ga.App. 897, 666 S.E.2d 1 (May 29, 2008). Kellibrew v. State, 239 Ga.App. 783, 521 S.E.2d 921 (September 2, 1999). Trial court properly allowed witness to testify that he could positively identify defendant because they had spent time in jail together. “As Bullock was the only witness who could identify Kellibrew, the State's case rested on the credibility of Bullock's positive identification of Kellibrew as the culprit. Thus, the evidence that the two had spent time together in jail was relevant to Bullock's ability to recognize Kellibrew. [fn] See Battle v. State, 195 Ga.App. 542, 544(2), 394 S.E.2d 788 (1990). Moreover, we note that Bullock testified that, before shooting him, Kellibrew said he ‘can't go back to jail.’ This statement was clearly admissible as part of the res gestae even if such evidence incidentally placed Kellibrew's character in evidence. See Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274, 282(8), 514 S.E.2d 458 (1999).” Ottis v. State, 271 Ga. 200, 517 S.E.2d 525 (June 7, 1999). Defendant’s character not placed in issue where prosecutor mentioned defendant’s present incarceration. “During the prosecutor's cross-examination of [defendant], the prosecutor asked Ottis if he and [co-defendant] Floyd were currently in jail together. Ottis responded that they were. After that response, defense counsel objected, and moved for a mistrial on the ground that the State had improperly placed Ottis's character into issue. … Because the prosecutor's question and Rudolph [Ottis]'s response concerned whether Rudolph was currently in jail, because a juror would likely infer from evidence of Rudolph's present incarceration that the incarceration was for the present crime and not a past crime, because Rudolph testified on direct