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examination that he had surrendered to police after he learned they had a warrant for his arrest, and because a juror would not be surprised to learn that someone being tried for murder was in prison, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ottis's motion for a mistrial .” Accord, Knowles v. State , 245 Ga.App. 523, 538 S.E.2d 175 (August 10, 2000) (“Reference to the length of time a defendant has been in pretrial detention is not grounds for a mistrial.”). Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (February 2, 1999). No error in admitting booking photograph to show that defendant appeared to be intoxicated when arrested for DUI , even though alco-sensor test was negative. Officers suspected defendant of being under influence of other drugs found in car, but defendant refused to take a urine test. Accord, Smith v. State , 265 Ga.App. 236, 593 S.E.2d 695 (January 20, 2004) (Not error to admit defendant’s book-in photograph where State contended it showed that defendant was intoxicated at time of his vehicular homicide arrest ). 16. MISCELLANEOUS Miller v. State, 295 Ga. 769, 764 S.E.2d 135 (October 6, 2014). Convictions for murder and concealment of death affirmed. No mistrial required where accomplice testified that “appellant declared ‘this wasn't his first....’ Before he could finish the sentence, appellant's counsel objected,” and curative instructions were given. “We agree with the trial court's conclusion that even if the jury assumed the witness was about to testify that appellant said ‘this was not his first rodeo,’ the jury had no way to know what was intended by such a statement as they had no knowledge of the appellant's prior criminal record. … In this case, the incomplete sentence uttered by the witness was not in response to an improper question about prior acts. Further, the witness did not actually testify to any prior criminal acts by the appellant or to any admission of such acts by the appellant.” Hicks v. State, 315 Ga.App. 779, 728 S.E.2d 294 (May 3, 2012). RICO conviction affirmed; reading of indictment to jury, including allegations not proven at trial, didn’t require mistrial “based on allegedly improper character evidence.” “Hicks failed to identify any authority … for the premise that a criminal defendant is entitled to a mistrial solely on the basis that, at the beginning of jury selection, the venire heard allegations as to which a directed verdict was later granted. Because the allegations of the indictment did not constitute evidence, as the jury was repeatedly and thoroughly instructed, Hicks' character was not improperly placed in issue. See Robinson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 736, 746–747(4)(b) (719 S.E.2d 601) (2011) ( Where the trial court instructed the jury that it was not to consider the indictment as evidence in the case, the court's reading of a portion of the indictment containing ‘unproven and unsubstantiated allegations’ did not constitute an improper introduction of character evidence. ). There was no abuse of discretion.” Coleman v. State, 308 Ga.App. 731, 708 S.E.2d 638 (March 24, 2011). Physical precedent only. First degree child cruelty convictions reversed; trial court erred by failing to grant mistrial where DFCS worker mentioned that victim – defendants’ infant child – “had been in foster care.” “[T]he statement that D.C. ‘was in foster care for a while’ could have given the jury the impression either that the Colemans were guilty of the crime charged, or that a court determined that living in the Coleman home was contrary to D.C.'s welfare for some other reason attributable to the Colemans.” “This holding is limited to the particular facts of this case and should not be construed to stand for the proposition that any mention of the involvement of DFACS or foster care in a criminal case creates grounds for per se reversal.” Adams dissents on this point: “foster care … is often used for placement of children deemed to be deprived. The jury possibly could be told that the definition of deprivation ‘focuses upon the needs of the child regardless of parental fault.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re: A.B., 285 Ga.App. 288 (645 S.E.2d 716) (2007). Or a jury possibly could be told that the child was in foster care as a result of the allegations raised against the parents and that additional decisions regarding the child's care will be determined after the trial. Other instructions might be appropriate.” Denton v. State, 286 Ga. 494, 689 S.E.2d 322 (February 8, 2010). Felony murder conviction affirmed. “Contrary to Denton's contention, testimony by [crack house resident] Jones that she initially refused to let Denton into the crack house because Denton ‘acts up all the time’ did not place Denton's character in issue. See Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 17, 21(3) (602 S.E.2d 921) (2004) (officer's vague testimony that he ‘got out with’ defendant did nothing to impugn his character).” Carrie v. State, 298 Ga.App. 55, 679 S.E.2d 30 (May 4, 2009). Three examples of what does not constitute bad character evidence: 1. “A comment that a defendant has been in trouble or is a bad person does not place her character in issue, since it is unclear what is meant by such a remark. Waugh v. State, 263 Ga. 692, 693-694(3) (437 S.E.2d 297) (1993). See Sneed v. State, 267 Ga.App. 640, 641-642(2)(c) (600 S.E.2d 720) (2004). … See also Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 522, 525(4) (615 S.E.2d 532) (2005) (counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to prosecutor's opening remarks referring to