☢ test - Í

72(b),” although the accusation cited OCGA § 40-6-71 (failure to yield “to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction” before turning left at an intersection). “Ervin points out that this Code section is not applicable because the school bus was not ‘approaching from the opposite direction.’ But, as noted by the trial court, the language in the accusation charging Ervin with a failure to yield turning left could also describe a violation of OCGA § 40-6- 72(b). See In re: B.C.G., 235 Ga.App. 1, 3(1) (508 S.E.2d 239) (1998) (‘the description of the offense charged prevails over any Code section cited’). Because ‘[Ervin]'s objection to the improper code citation in the charging instrument was a special demurrer, ... his failure to challenge it before entering his plea constitutes a waiver of his right be tried on a perfect charging instrument.’ Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 307, 309(2) (656 S.E.2d 920) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Washington v. State, 283 Ga.App. 570(1) (642 S.E.2d 199) (2007) (claim that indictment failed to give notice of crime charged because it cited wrong Code section was waived by failure to file demurrer or motion to quash); Glass v. State, 267 Ga.App. 129, 131(2) (598 S.E.2d 857) (2004) (to the extent defendant's argument that he was charged under wrong Code section constitutes an attack on the charging instrument, that claim is waived by failure to file demurrer or motion to quash).” Accord, Doe v. State , 306 Ga.App. 348, 702 S.E.2d 669 (October 5, 2010) (language of indictment, describing offense of attempting to influence winning of lottery prize, controlled over erroneous reference to code section dealing with falsely uttering a state lottery ticket) ( affirmed on other grounds, 290 Ga. 667, 725 S.E.2d 234 (March 5, 2012)); State v. Wilson , 318 Ga.App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (September 25, 2012) (indictment purporting to charge aggravated assault on police officer omitted allegations about police officer, but still sufficient to allege aggravated assault and thus survive general demurrer). State v. King, 296 Ga.App. 353, 674 S.E.2d 396 (March 2, 2009). Trial court erred in granting demurrer; accusation was sufficient to charge defendant with per se DUI: “Although the accusation did not specifically allege that King's alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed before his driving ended, the accusation was not defective because it alleged that King violated OCGA § 40-6-391 and it was titled ‘Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (Per Se).’ See Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga.App. 755, 757-758(1)(c) (577 S.E.2d 825) (2003). Thus, there could be no confusion over the crime King was charged with. See id. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in sustaining King's general demurrer regarding the DUI per se charge. See OCGA § 17-7-71(c) (providing that an accusation is sufficient either when it tracks the statutory language or when it is worded ‘so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood’ by the factfinder); [ State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga.App. 751, 753(3) (662 S.E.2d 828) (2008)]; State v. Howell, 194 Ga.App. 594, 595 (391 S.E.2d 415) (1990).” Accord, Ogilvie v. State , 313 Ga.App. 305, 721 S.E.2d 549 (November 9, 2011), reversed on other grounds, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (November 5, 2012) (references to code sections on vehicular homicide and failure to yield to pedestrians adequate “to provide Ogilvie with notice of the elements of the charges against her.”). State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga.App. 751, 662 S.E.2d 828 (June 3, 2008). Trial court erred in granting demurrer; accusation was not insufficient though it failed to set out all of the elements of the offense but alleged that the defendant’s acts were “in violation of” the applicable code section (here, failure to yield and failure to obey traffic-control devices). “Because an accused cannot admit an allegation that her acts were ‘in violation of’ a specified Code section and yet not be guilty of the offense set out in that Code section, such an accusation is not fatally defective. [Cit.] Consequently, an accusation that charges an accused with having committed certain acts in violation of a specified penal statute will withstand a demurrer, despite the omission of an essential element of the charged offense. [Cit.]” This is true even though the code section provides more than one method of committing the offense – here, “what instruction of a traffic-control device … the State alleged she had failed to obey.” Accord, State v. King , 296 Ga.App. 353, 674 S.E.2d 396 (March 2, 2009) (DUI “in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391”). But see Dixson (November 23, 2011), above. Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 307, 656 S.E.2d 920 (January 25, 2008). Defendant waived error in code section citation on traffic ticket by failing to raise it before arraignment. “Pruitt complains that the charging instrument was defective because it cited OCGA § 40-6-181 (speeding) rather than OCGA § 40-6-391 (DUI). ‘[Pruitt’s] objection to the improper code citation in the [charging instrument] was a special demurrer, and his failure to challenge [it] before entering his plea constitutes a waiver of his right to be tried on a perfect [charging instrument].’ Nye v. State, 279 Ga.App. 347, 349(1) (631 S.E.2d 386) (2006) (citation omitted).” Accord, Ervin (June 2, 2009), above. Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149, 646 S.E.2d 676 (June 11, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s demurrer to count of indictment which listed erroneous code section for offense (concealment of a death). The trial court “should strike the incorrect Code section from the indictment.” Nye v. State, 279 Ga.App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (April 19, 2006). Accusation charging defendant with speeding but citing