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wrong code section was sufficient. “In determining whether the instrument is valid, ‘[i]t is the description of the crime, rather than the description and number of the section under which it appears in the Code which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rank v. State, 179 Ga.App. 28(1) (345 S.E.2d 75) (1986).” Accord, Pruitt (January 25, 2008), and Ervin (June 2, 2009), both above. Thompson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 878, 534 S.E.2d 151 (April 21, 2000). Conviction for driving without proof of insurance reversed. 1. UTC alleging that defendant drove with “no insurance” charges a violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b), which makes it illegal to “knowingly operate[ ] ... a motor vehicle without effective insurance on such vehicle,” not, as State contends, “OCGA § 40-6-10(a)(1), which makes it illegal to drive with no proof of insurance.” “‘[T]he defendant has the right to rely on the specific manner of committing the crime that is alleged in the indictment,’” quoting Kevinezz v. State, 265 Ga. 78, 81(2)(b), 454 S.E.2d 441 (1995). “We note that, under Georgia law, “the description of the offense charged prevails over any Code section cited.’ (Punctuation omitted.) In re: B.C.G., 235 Ga.App. 1, 3(1), 508 S.E.2d 239 (1998). Harridge v. State , 243 Ga.App. 658, 534 S.E.2d 113 (April 18, 2000). In defendant’s prosecution for vehicular homicide and related offenses, trial court properly denied defendant’s “demurrer to the indictment count charging him with failing to maintain a lane. The indictment cited the applicable Code section, OCGA § 40–6–48, which provides that whenever a road is divided into two or more lanes of traffic ‘a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.’ OCGA § 40–6–48(1). After citing that Code section, the indictment states that Harridge ‘did fail to operate his motor vehicle entirely within a single lane of traffic....’ Harridge argues that this language is deficient because it does not allege that he failed to ascertain whether he could move from his lane safely. The argument is unpersuasive. … The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been more definite, but whether it contains the elements of the offense charged, sufficiently informs the defendant of the charges so that he can present his defense without being surprised by the evidence and protects him against another prosecution for the same offense. Wade v. State, 223 Ga.App. 222, 223–224, 477 S.E.2d 328 (1996). Moreover, the absence of certain language in an indictment can be cured by citation to the applicable statute. Id.; Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116, 117(1), 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990).” 4. CONSPIRACY – DESCRIPTION OF OVERT ACTS Bradford v. State, 283 Ga.App. 75, 640 S.E.2d 630 (November 29, 2006). Indictment alleging conspiracy to traffic in drugs was sufficient. “Bradford contends that Counts 1 and 3 are ‘deficient in factual details’ to advise her of the alleged acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The indictment clearly charges, however, that in furtherance of the conspiracy, Bradford ‘did arrange for the distribution of’ both amphetamine and methamphetamine. And we find no authority requiring the indictment to set forth the particulars of the overt act. See, e.g., Causey v. State, 154 Ga.App. 76, 79(2) (267 S.E.2d 475) (1980) (failure to specify exact date of overt act does not render indictment ‘demurrable for vagueness’). All that is required is a reference to the overt act alleged by the State. See id. The indictment therefore sufficiently apprised Bradford of the crimes charged.” Accord, State v. Pittman , 302 Ga.App. 531, 690 S.E.2d 661 (January 29, 2010) (Grant of special demurrer to RICO indictment reversed; indictment not required to set out particulars of overt acts, citing Bradford ). 5. DATE OF OFFENSE – DATE IMPOSSIBLE Palatini v. State, 333 Ga.App. 523, 774 S.E.2d 818 (July 14, 2015). Physical precedent only; interlocutory appeal of denial of special demurrer to indictment charging sexual exploitation of children. Indictment charges defendant with possessing pornographic images of children on his computer on April 24, 2009, although GBI seized the computer on December 7, 2007. This, however, is no basis for grant of a special demurrer because it “concerns the underlying evidence in the case rather than the form of the indictment.” Distinguishing cases charging a date later than the indictment itself ( Spencer v. State, 123 Ga. 133, 51 S.E. 294 (1905)), or no specific date ( Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga.App. 854, 614 S.E.2d 118 (2005)). Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 633 S.E.2d 537 (July 14, 2006). Indictment charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on a date after the indictment was returned. “This was an obvious clerical error which, after verdict and judgment, would not have vitiated the indictment. Wood v. State, 118 Ga.App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968); Lewis v. State, 55 Ga.App. 743(2), 191 S.E. 278 (1937). However, defendant could have challenged the indictment on the ground that it set forth an impossible date by filing a timely written demurrer. See Lewis v. State, supra (‘[a]fter verdict and judgment the indictment alleging an impossible day, or a day after the bill was found true, is held good. It would be otherwise if it were excepted to in time on special demurrer in writing’). Defendant did not do that. [fn]” Failure to file a