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special demurrer was deficient, and was harmful here because a prior indictment against defendant for the same charge had been quashed. “If trial counsel had timely challenged [this count] of the second indictment, any future prosecution for that crime would be barred. OCGA § 17-7-53.1; State v. Dorsey, 251 Ga.App. 788, 555 S.E.2d 141 (2001).” Epps v. State, 262 Ga.App. 113, 584 S.E.2d 701 (July 2, 2003). Accusation erroneously gave two dates for the offense, one a past date and one an obviously-erroneous future date. Held, since date was not an essential averment, this “did not make the accusation absolutely void.” Any date within the statute of limitations could be proven. The accusation was void as to the future date, but not the past date. “‘[U]nless the defects appearing in the indictment or accusation are so great that the indictment or accusation is absolutely void, [the] right to a perfect indictment or accusation may be waived, and is waived by going to trial under a defective indictment or accusation without complaint.’” 6. DATE OF OFFENSE – DATE NOT MATERIAL Hunt v. State, A15A2064, ___ Ga.App. ___, 783 S.E.2d 456, 2016 WL 1203927 (March 29, 2016). Rape, child molestation and related convictions affirmed, but sentences vacated and remanded. Victim testified that defendant raped her on at least two different occasions, but didn’t know dates. Indictment charged Hunt with two counts each of rape plus multiple counts of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. The charges were stated in paired identical counts; each pair charging that two identical acts occurred “‘on and between the 6th day of August, 2005, and the 1st day of March, 2007, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury,’ with the only difference between the two counts in each pair being that the second count specified that the second occurrence of the same crime occurred on an ‘occasion different’ or ‘on a different date’ than the first occurrence.” Held, the paired charges merged for sentencing. “‘Where two charges are indistinguishable because all of the averments, including date (which was not made an essential element), victim, and description of defendant’s conduct constituting the offense were identical, only one sentence may be imposed.’ Daniels v. State, 320 Ga.App. 340, 342(2), 739 S.E.2d 773 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). [Other cits.] … The State did not allege in these counts, nor could they, that the separate events within the same date range were somehow material averments of the complaint.[ fn] Accordingly, Hunt may be sentenced on only one of the counts in each of the matching pairs of counts listed above.[fn]” Miller dissents. Jones v. State, 333 Ga.App. 796, 777 S.E.2d 480 (September 15, 2015). Incest and related convictions affirmed, but convictions for having intercourse with the same victim on different dates should have merged where the dates weren’t alleged to be material allegations of the indictment. Allegation in the indictment that the acts occurred in different time periods and “that each act was ‘separate and distinct from the act alleged’ in the other count” was insufficient, especially given trial court’s charge “that it was sufficient that the State show that the offense occurred within the seven years before the indictment was filed regardless of the date listed on the indictment.” Reed v. State, 294 Ga. 877, 757 S.E.2d 84 (March 28, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error where “the indictment cites the date of the murder as ‘on or about the 21st day of May, 2007,’ when in fact the evidence shows that the murder occurred in early March of 2007.” “[E]xcept where the exact date of the offense is alleged to be an essential element thereof or where the accused raises an alibi defense, any variance between the date listed in the indictment and the date on which the crime is proven to have occurred is of no consequence.” Daniels v. State, 320 Ga.App. 340, 739 S.E.2d 773 (March 13, 2013). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses should have merged for sentencing. “The issues arise out of the fact that, with one exception, Daniels was charged in each of six pairs of counts with identical sexual misconduct toward the same victim, with one count alleging misconduct before July 1, 2006, and the other alleging misconduct on or after that date. … The six pairs of counts were charged in this fashion because effective July 1, 2006, the legislature modified and amended the punishment provisions related to these crimes.” Dates of the offenses, however, were not made essential averments of the indictment, and the jury was specifically instructed that each charge could be proven to have occurred as of any date within the seven year statute of limitation. Thus, “based on the indictment and on the jury instruction, ‘the jury could have found Mr. Daniels guilty based on conduct occurring before July 1, 2006, for the offenses that alleged the date range beginning July 1, 2006.’ Thus, [defendant] could have been given the post-July 1, 2006 sentences for actions occurring before July 1, 2006.” Distinguishing cases where “the trial court … charged the jury that the dates in the indictments were not material averments of the crimes. See, e.g., Salley v. State, 199 Ga.App. 358, 362(4), 405 S.E.2d 260 (1991) (‘[T]he averments of each count refer to a different period of time hence same is made an essential averment of the transaction, and each count of the indictment is distinguishable’) (citation and punctuation omitted); Hamilton v. State, 167 Ga.App. 370, 371, 306 S.E.2d 673 (1983) (although offenses charged involved the same conduct, they were for different periods of time).” Accord, Jones (September 15, 2015), and Hunt (March 29, 2016), above.